Apologies again for the long time since the last post – my excuse is inlaws and a trip abroad! Anyway, it seems that in general, people are less interested in the usul itself, only in its usage in determining rulings. With this in mind, I will return to fiqh istidlali (derivation of rulings) as I started, and where the most enthusiasm was. In previous blogs, I concentrated on Ayatullah Saanei’s works, due to their focus on contemporary issues. However, I think that it is important also to look at the great Ayatullah Khui, especially when discussing the derivation of fiqh rulings. His work is the culmination of years of research and one of a few of its kind, with over 40 volumes explaining his rulings. It is now so renowned that other scholars use it in their discussions. Syed Fadlallah, for example, uses it in his bahth kharij lessons, which I had the opportunity to attend. He reads parts of Syed Khui’s rulings, and then puts forward his point of view.
Regardless, I have decided to continue on my theme of contemporary issues and am going to look at a part of his work on Taqlid. Just a quick aside: the volume on taqlid is 370 pages long (that is the length of the commentary and reasoning of only a couple of pages worth of rulings!). On page 186, he discusses one of the conditions for becoming a mujtahid: being a man.
His derivation of this condition begins with reference to a narration by Abu Khadija Salim ibn Mukarrim al-Jamaal who said:
Abu ‘Abd Allah Ja’far ibn Muhammad al-Sadiq (A.S.) said: “Be careful that some of you do not bring others to trial in front of the people of injustice; instead, head the man* among you who knows…”
Wasa-`il al-Shi’a 27:13/Chapters of the pages on Judges, Chapter 1, Page 5.
(* = rajul [Arabic])
He discusses the chain of narration by starting with the final member of the chain Abu Khadija Salim ibn Mukarrim al-Jamaal. When discussing chains of narration, the first port of call is always the scholars of rijal in the past: in particular, Najashi and Shaykh Tusi.
In Najashi’s rijal book (188/501), he considers Abu Khadija to be trustworthy. Shaykh Tusi in his Fahrast (his rijal book 79/327), considers him to be a weak narrator of hadith but according to Allama, he considers him trustworthy in another place. In addition, Abu Khadija is in one of the narrators of Ibn Qawlawayh’s Kamil al-Ziyarat, which is considered as a sufficient condition to be trustworthy (I can go into further detail as to why most Shi’i scholars consider this to be the case if anyone is interested). Now, when faced with potentially contradicting opinions on Abu Khadija, Ayatullah Khui considers the following options as to the timing of the two opinions of Shaykh Tusi:
Either the time of Shaykh Tusi’s consideration of Abu Khadija as weak and trustworthy was at the same time. In such a case, we could not consider either to be an authority, and we would be left with Najashi’s opinion of Abu Khadija being trustworthy.
Alternatively, if the consideration of Abu Khadija as trustworthy came after Shaykh Tusi’s previous opinion of him being weak, then his final opinion of trusworthiness is later is a relinquishing of his previous opinion.
Finally, if Shaykh Tusi’s opinion of Abu Khadija as weak came after his view of Abu Khadija as trustworthy, then it is again a relinquishment of his previous view, and against the view of Najashi.
As you cannot tell the order, there are doubts about his opinion of weakness, as you cannot be sure of the final position (the only one where Shaykh Tusi’s final view matters and is of weakness). Therefore, you cannot rely on the two opinions of Shaykh Tusi and you return to the opinion of trustworthiness of Najashi and others.
He does not consider there to be any issue with the rest of the chain of narration.
In the next blog, I will focus on the remainder of his derivation.
Wednesday, 26 May 2010
Sunday, 18 April 2010
Authority of Narrations (3)
The second verse that is used to validate the usage of this kind of narration, is that in Surah Tawbah, verse 112:
"And it does not beseem the believers that they should go forth all together; why should not then a company from every party from among them go forth that they may apply themselves to obtain understanding in religion, and that they may warn their people when they come back to them that they may be cautious?" (Shakir)
Scholars using this verse believe it implies that the people (who the experts of religion return to) must heed the warnings of these experts of religion and this “heeding” is absolute i.e. not dependent on the people reaching certainty about these experts, and thus punishable if not followed.
There is a long discussion but the most potent argument against this line of reasoning is that this may give credence to the idea that an expert should be listened to, but is irrelevant to the discussion we are having about relying on a trustworthy person transmitting a narration.
This verse is thus not seen in the same light as that in Surah Naba, and is not considered to be useful in this discussion.
We have now discussed the main verses from the Qur`an that are used, and we will now move onto narrations. It is important to note, that it is clearly not possible to use narrations that are of this category i.e.khabar wahid to determine the authority of these narrations, otherwise it would be a circular argument.
We thus have to consider only narrations that must be correct because they have been narrated by many independent people at each generation since the time of the Prophet (SAW) i.e. tawatur. This is authoritative because of the extreme unlikelihood of every one of the narrators (who are examined to be trustworthy) to have lied independently and reached the same conclusion (Shahid al-Sadr uses a rational calculation of probabilities argument to discuss the implausibility of this being wrong). This will be the focus of the next blog!
"And it does not beseem the believers that they should go forth all together; why should not then a company from every party from among them go forth that they may apply themselves to obtain understanding in religion, and that they may warn their people when they come back to them that they may be cautious?" (Shakir)
Scholars using this verse believe it implies that the people (who the experts of religion return to) must heed the warnings of these experts of religion and this “heeding” is absolute i.e. not dependent on the people reaching certainty about these experts, and thus punishable if not followed.
There is a long discussion but the most potent argument against this line of reasoning is that this may give credence to the idea that an expert should be listened to, but is irrelevant to the discussion we are having about relying on a trustworthy person transmitting a narration.
This verse is thus not seen in the same light as that in Surah Naba, and is not considered to be useful in this discussion.
We have now discussed the main verses from the Qur`an that are used, and we will now move onto narrations. It is important to note, that it is clearly not possible to use narrations that are of this category i.e.khabar wahid to determine the authority of these narrations, otherwise it would be a circular argument.
We thus have to consider only narrations that must be correct because they have been narrated by many independent people at each generation since the time of the Prophet (SAW) i.e. tawatur. This is authoritative because of the extreme unlikelihood of every one of the narrators (who are examined to be trustworthy) to have lied independently and reached the same conclusion (Shahid al-Sadr uses a rational calculation of probabilities argument to discuss the implausibility of this being wrong). This will be the focus of the next blog!
Monday, 5 April 2010
Authority of Narrations (2)
Apologies for the delay since the last post - I don't have internet at my new place! Anyway, we have so far discussed in brief, the largest and most important basis for relying on khabar wahid narrations (the verse of Naba in Surah Hujurat). It is very much based on using the maf-hum. However, there are two main reasons to object to interpreting this verse in that way:
1. This is a linguistic discussion, which considers the verse to be similar to the phrase: “if you have a boy as a child, then circumcise him”, which does not have a mafhum because you cannot infer from this phrase that if you don’t have a boy, then you don’t circumcise him, as the circumcision is reliant on the condition being fulfilled i.e. from the verse, we cannot make the inference above. The best way to understand this further is to consider the various possible meanings of the verse:
a. A report – if a fasiq comes with it – you have to look into it
b. The report of a fasiq – if a fasiq comes with it – you have to look into it
c. The person who comes with a report/narration – if he (or she) is a fasiq – you have to look into it
The objection (likening the verse to the circumcision phrase) makes sense if we consider the second meaning of the verse, but this seems least likely, as the verse does not really imply that the report has to be the report of a fasiq. Therefore, this objection is not a valid objection.
2. At the end of the verse, the reason (ta’lil – تعليل) is provided for the ruling i.e. “lest you harm a people, whilst in ignorance”. Therefore, every narration that does not result in certain knowledge, requires clarification and research. This includes narrations coming from just individuals.
This can be explained by considering the phrase: “don’t eat this pomegranate because it is sour”. This order not to eat the pomegranate is qualified by it being sour, and it can be inferred from this that you should not eat all sour things, even if it is not a pomegranate. Similarly, from the verse, you can infer that anything that might harm others because you are not resulting in certain knowledge, is not authoritative, and requires clarification/investigation.
There are two main answers to this point that the reason for the verse (ta’lil) seems to contradict what is understood above (mafhum):
A. This assumes that the ta’lil (reason of the verse) should be understood over the mafhum (the implication of the verse). However, it could be argued that the mafhum is a special case of the general ta’lil. The response would be that there is no mafhum at all because of the ta’lil. And therefore, this answer is not correct.
B. The ta’lil (reason of the verse) does not actually contradict the mafhum because of the meaning of جهالة. Above, it has been translated as ignorance, meaning the lack of knowledge but this is the meaning of جهل, and جهالة actually has the meaning of doing something silly. Therefore, although taking a narration from a just person may be something that is without complete knowledge, it is not something silly, and the argument does not apply!
Therefore, Shahid al-Sadr considers this verse to be a complete and valid basis for using narrations transmitted by a trustworthy person even if it does not make you completely confident in it being correct.
In the next blog, we will look at other pieces of evidence (one other verse of the Qur`an, and then perhaps some narrations/other disucssions).
1. This is a linguistic discussion, which considers the verse to be similar to the phrase: “if you have a boy as a child, then circumcise him”, which does not have a mafhum because you cannot infer from this phrase that if you don’t have a boy, then you don’t circumcise him, as the circumcision is reliant on the condition being fulfilled i.e. from the verse, we cannot make the inference above. The best way to understand this further is to consider the various possible meanings of the verse:
a. A report – if a fasiq comes with it – you have to look into it
b. The report of a fasiq – if a fasiq comes with it – you have to look into it
c. The person who comes with a report/narration – if he (or she) is a fasiq – you have to look into it
The objection (likening the verse to the circumcision phrase) makes sense if we consider the second meaning of the verse, but this seems least likely, as the verse does not really imply that the report has to be the report of a fasiq. Therefore, this objection is not a valid objection.
2. At the end of the verse, the reason (ta’lil – تعليل) is provided for the ruling i.e. “lest you harm a people, whilst in ignorance”. Therefore, every narration that does not result in certain knowledge, requires clarification and research. This includes narrations coming from just individuals.
This can be explained by considering the phrase: “don’t eat this pomegranate because it is sour”. This order not to eat the pomegranate is qualified by it being sour, and it can be inferred from this that you should not eat all sour things, even if it is not a pomegranate. Similarly, from the verse, you can infer that anything that might harm others because you are not resulting in certain knowledge, is not authoritative, and requires clarification/investigation.
There are two main answers to this point that the reason for the verse (ta’lil) seems to contradict what is understood above (mafhum):
A. This assumes that the ta’lil (reason of the verse) should be understood over the mafhum (the implication of the verse). However, it could be argued that the mafhum is a special case of the general ta’lil. The response would be that there is no mafhum at all because of the ta’lil. And therefore, this answer is not correct.
B. The ta’lil (reason of the verse) does not actually contradict the mafhum because of the meaning of جهالة. Above, it has been translated as ignorance, meaning the lack of knowledge but this is the meaning of جهل, and جهالة actually has the meaning of doing something silly. Therefore, although taking a narration from a just person may be something that is without complete knowledge, it is not something silly, and the argument does not apply!
Therefore, Shahid al-Sadr considers this verse to be a complete and valid basis for using narrations transmitted by a trustworthy person even if it does not make you completely confident in it being correct.
In the next blog, we will look at other pieces of evidence (one other verse of the Qur`an, and then perhaps some narrations/other disucssions).
Wednesday, 17 March 2010
Authority of Narrations (1)
This is a bit less technical - and hopefully more interesting - discussing a major part of our law. Most of our law is based on narrations that are narrated by only a few individuals, and should we rely on such narrations?
Ideally we would only rely on narrations that we can have complete confidence in e.g. those that are reported by many to many (tawatur - تواتر). However, the vast majority of narrations do not reach that level and are potentially misleadingly called “single narrations” (khabar wahid – خبر واحد) – note that a narration narrated by several people is still called khabar wahid.
The validity of using these narrations, which do not reach certainty (and are thus called dhunun – ظنون), is a vital pillar of the most legal laws. In the next few blogs, I will briefly discuss how Shahid al-Sadr comes to the conclusion that it is valid to use these narrations as the basis of law. There are, however, some famous scholars of the past, who do not believe in their validity such as Sayyid al-Murtada.
The discussion will be in two parts:
1. Whether we can use khabar wahid at all
2. It we can use these narrations, what are the limitations of them e.g. only by trustworthy people?
The first part is a major discussion, and as I have noticed that technical topics have not been as well received, I will stay at a higher level, which will hopefully retain your interest!
There are several bases for relying on khabar wahid narrations:
1. Qur`an
2. Narrations
3. Rationality
The biggest and most important basis for relying on khabar wahid narrations is the verse of Naba in Surah Hujurat:
“O you who believe, if a fasiq (evil-doer) comes to you with a report, look carefully into it, lest you harm a people, whilst in ignorance, then be sorry for what you have done.”
This verse clearly shows the obligation in clarifying what the person says when they come on the condition that the person is fasiq. Now what is understood (mafhum - مفهوم) by this, is that there is no obligation of clarifying when the person who comes is not a fasiq. There are some more technical discussions (which I will not go into unless someone is interested) to conclude from this, that the narration of a just person is authoritative.
In the next blog, we will look at the objections to this line of argument and then move onto the other verse used....etc.
Ideally we would only rely on narrations that we can have complete confidence in e.g. those that are reported by many to many (tawatur - تواتر). However, the vast majority of narrations do not reach that level and are potentially misleadingly called “single narrations” (khabar wahid – خبر واحد) – note that a narration narrated by several people is still called khabar wahid.
The validity of using these narrations, which do not reach certainty (and are thus called dhunun – ظنون), is a vital pillar of the most legal laws. In the next few blogs, I will briefly discuss how Shahid al-Sadr comes to the conclusion that it is valid to use these narrations as the basis of law. There are, however, some famous scholars of the past, who do not believe in their validity such as Sayyid al-Murtada.
The discussion will be in two parts:
1. Whether we can use khabar wahid at all
2. It we can use these narrations, what are the limitations of them e.g. only by trustworthy people?
The first part is a major discussion, and as I have noticed that technical topics have not been as well received, I will stay at a higher level, which will hopefully retain your interest!
There are several bases for relying on khabar wahid narrations:
1. Qur`an
2. Narrations
3. Rationality
The biggest and most important basis for relying on khabar wahid narrations is the verse of Naba in Surah Hujurat:
“O you who believe, if a fasiq (evil-doer) comes to you with a report, look carefully into it, lest you harm a people, whilst in ignorance, then be sorry for what you have done.”
This verse clearly shows the obligation in clarifying what the person says when they come on the condition that the person is fasiq. Now what is understood (mafhum - مفهوم) by this, is that there is no obligation of clarifying when the person who comes is not a fasiq. There are some more technical discussions (which I will not go into unless someone is interested) to conclude from this, that the narration of a just person is authoritative.
In the next blog, we will look at the objections to this line of argument and then move onto the other verse used....etc.
Monday, 8 March 2010
Textual Evidence supporting Freedom when there is doubt (3)
We are currently trying to understand the meaning of the verse is Surah Talaq (65), verse 7:
“Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it.”
(لا يكلف الله نفسا إلا ما آتاها)
This is a tafsir discussion, and we are focussing on the meaning of "what" in this verse. Is it:
Option 1: money/property (due to the context of the verse)
Option 2: any action
Option 3: any duty.
Shaykh Ansari believes that Itlaq implies that all four of the above must be true and following a discussion, Shahid al-Sadr agrees.
We then have to further our understanding of the scope of this verse:
1. Is this verse specific to doubts about whether something is haram or not (e.g. smoking), or if it is generalized to actions that might be wajib e.g. recitation of supplications when seeing the new moon. The answer is that although some verses are specific to doubts about the impermissibility of actions, this verse does not specify either haram/wujub so it clearly encompasses both.
2. Is the verse specific to doubts about the legality about a ruling, or about the applicability of a ruling. There are two possibilities of what the verse might mean in this regard:
A. إيتاء تشريعي: The verse means Allah giving only in terms of laws (as Allah is the Creator of the Law) and His duty is to with regards to making clear the law, not the details about its applicability
B. إيتاء تكويني: The verse means that Allah has created everything, and therefore, His duty is to make everything clear.
Using the same argument as in the previous blog (absolute = Itlaq), it encompasses both meanings, and thus includes doubts in the applicability of a ruling as well.
3. The final question that occurs in one’s mind when considering this verse is whether baraa`a is applicable when you have a doubt only after trying to investigate, or before any investigation. One might think that using the same arguments above (itlaq = absolute), the verse should apply to both before and after investigation. However, in the case where the law is available in the books of narrations for example, such that if the individual searched, he would find out that Allah had given a ruling. The verse is not talking about baraa`ah for laws reaching the individual, but about Allah giving a law.
Therefore, we can be content that this verse is sufficient to show that when there is a ruling on whcih there is doubt, you are free to do what you want, and this textual evidence supercedes the previous blogs' discussions on ihtiyat, which would only be applicable IF there was no textual evidence.
“Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it.”
(لا يكلف الله نفسا إلا ما آتاها)
This is a tafsir discussion, and we are focussing on the meaning of "what" in this verse. Is it:
Option 1: money/property (due to the context of the verse)
Option 2: any action
Option 3: any duty.
Shaykh Ansari believes that Itlaq implies that all four of the above must be true and following a discussion, Shahid al-Sadr agrees.
We then have to further our understanding of the scope of this verse:
1. Is this verse specific to doubts about whether something is haram or not (e.g. smoking), or if it is generalized to actions that might be wajib e.g. recitation of supplications when seeing the new moon. The answer is that although some verses are specific to doubts about the impermissibility of actions, this verse does not specify either haram/wujub so it clearly encompasses both.
2. Is the verse specific to doubts about the legality about a ruling, or about the applicability of a ruling. There are two possibilities of what the verse might mean in this regard:
A. إيتاء تشريعي: The verse means Allah giving only in terms of laws (as Allah is the Creator of the Law) and His duty is to with regards to making clear the law, not the details about its applicability
B. إيتاء تكويني: The verse means that Allah has created everything, and therefore, His duty is to make everything clear.
Using the same argument as in the previous blog (absolute = Itlaq), it encompasses both meanings, and thus includes doubts in the applicability of a ruling as well.
3. The final question that occurs in one’s mind when considering this verse is whether baraa`a is applicable when you have a doubt only after trying to investigate, or before any investigation. One might think that using the same arguments above (itlaq = absolute), the verse should apply to both before and after investigation. However, in the case where the law is available in the books of narrations for example, such that if the individual searched, he would find out that Allah had given a ruling. The verse is not talking about baraa`ah for laws reaching the individual, but about Allah giving a law.
Therefore, we can be content that this verse is sufficient to show that when there is a ruling on whcih there is doubt, you are free to do what you want, and this textual evidence supercedes the previous blogs' discussions on ihtiyat, which would only be applicable IF there was no textual evidence.
Sunday, 28 February 2010
Textual Evidence supporting Freedom when there is doubt (1)
We are currently trying to understand the meaning of the verse is Surah Talaq (65), verse 7:
“Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it.”
(لا يكلف الله نفسا إلا ما آتاها)
This is a tafsir discussion, and we are focussing on the meaning of "what" in this verse. Is it:
Option 1: money/property (due to the context of the verse)
Option 2: any action
Option 3: any duty.
The ramifications of this are very wide ranging, as if it is any duty (as Shaykh Ansari claims), then the principle of baraa`a (as discussed in previous blogs i.e. that you are free to do what you want when you get a rule on which there is doubt) is confirmed.
However, although Shaykh Ansari uses the idea of Itlaq (as explained in the previous blog) to say that as there is no indication that any of these options is true, all must be true. There are some arguments against this idea:
The first argument against this point of view is a grammatical and very technical one, which I advise those not interested to ignore: in summary, the first two options are different to the third option grammatically (the first two are direct objects, whereas the third is an absolute object). Therefore, all three cannot all be used. However, this is seen as a weak point because the word can be considered a direct object here rather than an absolute object. [A possible argument that one could use تكليف or وجوب – but they are synonymous and therefore, still absolute objects]
The next question is whether the many narrations (these will be discussed later), which mentions the obligation of ihtiyat, are considered to be more applicable than this verse of the Qur`an. This is because the verse says that if it is not known what the duty is, then there is no punishment. However, these narrations, say that Allah informs you of the obligation of ihtiyat. Therefore, the verse is not applicable, as the duty is known to be ihtiyat.
This argument is similar to the situation where we have the principle that everything is tahir until you know it is najis. Then if someone comes and tells you that something is najis, does the principle still hold? Obviously not – and that is the argument here. Please ask if this is not clear and I can try and clarify further.
The answer to whether the verse of the Qur`an takes priority can be understood dependent on the meaning of the verse:
1. نفي السببية: “Allah does not punish someone due to the impermissibility of an action, as long as it is not known”. With this meaning, what is mentioned above is correct, and ihtiyat is applicable. This is because the ihtiyat is the known obligation.
2. نفي الموردية: “Allah does not punish someone when considering an impermissible action as long as it is not known but the individual is completely free in the aforementioned action”. In this case, where the verse intends actual freedom for the individual in the action, as long as it is unknown, whereas the narrations intend ihtiyat (precaution). In this case, there is clear contradiction between the two, and therefore the verse takes precedence.
The question though, is which of the two above is correct. Shahid al-Sadr considers the second one to be true because this makes sense in the context of the verse (the correct meaning is clear that Allah does not task an individual in financial matters other than what is possible for the individual to pay).
Therefore, Shahid al-Sadr backs up Shaykh Ansari that Itlaq is applicable. In the next blog, we will try and look at one more argument against Shaykh Ansari's view and how Shahid al-Sadr counters it.
Regardless, it does seem that the topic is getting a bit dry and not as interesting to most readers so following the next blog, I will move onto another potentially more interesting topic - and that is what is the basis for fiqh relying on khabar wahid i.e. traditions that come through one/few strong chains of narrations (but not enough to make you be certain of its authenticity), whilst there is a general view that you should not act based on anything other than certainty!
“Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it.”
(لا يكلف الله نفسا إلا ما آتاها)
This is a tafsir discussion, and we are focussing on the meaning of "what" in this verse. Is it:
Option 1: money/property (due to the context of the verse)
Option 2: any action
Option 3: any duty.
The ramifications of this are very wide ranging, as if it is any duty (as Shaykh Ansari claims), then the principle of baraa`a (as discussed in previous blogs i.e. that you are free to do what you want when you get a rule on which there is doubt) is confirmed.
However, although Shaykh Ansari uses the idea of Itlaq (as explained in the previous blog) to say that as there is no indication that any of these options is true, all must be true. There are some arguments against this idea:
The first argument against this point of view is a grammatical and very technical one, which I advise those not interested to ignore: in summary, the first two options are different to the third option grammatically (the first two are direct objects, whereas the third is an absolute object). Therefore, all three cannot all be used. However, this is seen as a weak point because the word can be considered a direct object here rather than an absolute object. [A possible argument that one could use تكليف or وجوب – but they are synonymous and therefore, still absolute objects]
The next question is whether the many narrations (these will be discussed later), which mentions the obligation of ihtiyat, are considered to be more applicable than this verse of the Qur`an. This is because the verse says that if it is not known what the duty is, then there is no punishment. However, these narrations, say that Allah informs you of the obligation of ihtiyat. Therefore, the verse is not applicable, as the duty is known to be ihtiyat.
This argument is similar to the situation where we have the principle that everything is tahir until you know it is najis. Then if someone comes and tells you that something is najis, does the principle still hold? Obviously not – and that is the argument here. Please ask if this is not clear and I can try and clarify further.
The answer to whether the verse of the Qur`an takes priority can be understood dependent on the meaning of the verse:
1. نفي السببية: “Allah does not punish someone due to the impermissibility of an action, as long as it is not known”. With this meaning, what is mentioned above is correct, and ihtiyat is applicable. This is because the ihtiyat is the known obligation.
2. نفي الموردية: “Allah does not punish someone when considering an impermissible action as long as it is not known but the individual is completely free in the aforementioned action”. In this case, where the verse intends actual freedom for the individual in the action, as long as it is unknown, whereas the narrations intend ihtiyat (precaution). In this case, there is clear contradiction between the two, and therefore the verse takes precedence.
The question though, is which of the two above is correct. Shahid al-Sadr considers the second one to be true because this makes sense in the context of the verse (the correct meaning is clear that Allah does not task an individual in financial matters other than what is possible for the individual to pay).
Therefore, Shahid al-Sadr backs up Shaykh Ansari that Itlaq is applicable. In the next blog, we will try and look at one more argument against Shaykh Ansari's view and how Shahid al-Sadr counters it.
Regardless, it does seem that the topic is getting a bit dry and not as interesting to most readers so following the next blog, I will move onto another potentially more interesting topic - and that is what is the basis for fiqh relying on khabar wahid i.e. traditions that come through one/few strong chains of narrations (but not enough to make you be certain of its authenticity), whilst there is a general view that you should not act based on anything other than certainty!
Friday, 19 February 2010
Textual Evidence supporting Freedom when there is doubt
So far we have discussed what the rational principle should be, if there is a ruling on which you have a genuine doubt i.e. whether it rationally makes sense to:
1. Observe precaution (Syed Sadr's view)
2. Be free to do anything (Ayatullah Khui's view)
This was a purely theoretical exercise, assuming there was no textual evidence pointing to another option....however, in reality there is textual evidence that the proponents of both points of view above, agree on - and that textual evidence points to the fact that you do not need to observe precaution but you are actually free to do anything.
We will first look at the Qur`anic evidence for this, then move onto narrations. This is a very long discussion, but it shows the importance given to this part of usul al-fiqh.
Firstly, the verse is Surah Talaq (65), verse 7:
“Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it.”
(لا يكلف الله نفسا إلا ما آتاها)
This verse is in the context of discussing the issue of a husband’s duty to pay for the wife’s expenses when he divorces her e.g. when she is pregnant, he has to continue paying for her expenses until she gives birth and if she breastfeeds the baby, then the payment should continue until the end of the breastfreeding. The question that is raised, is what is the level of this payment? Does it depend on the wealth of the husband? The point is that the amount depends on what the person is able to pay. The complete verse is as follows:
"Let the affluent man spend out of his affluence, and let he whose provision has been tightened spend out of what Allah has given him. Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it. Allah will bring about ease after hardship." (65:8)
According to Shaykh Ansari’s work – Al-Rasa`il, the word ما in the verse above (translated as “[according to] what”), introduces a relative phrase, and the question we have to answer is the meaning of “what”. There are three possibilities for the meaning of "what":
1. Money/wealth/property i.e. the verse means that Allah does not task any soul with paying money, other than to the extent to which he is able to pay. This understanding of the verse is possible due to the verse’s presence in the context of paying for a wife’s subsistence.
2. Action i.e. Allah does not "task" any soul with an action other than if he/she is able to do that action. This understanding is possible due to the term “task” mentioned in the translation, as that term (task) is only used with actions.
These two explanations of the verse do not result in the implication of the legal baraa`a. However, the third possibility does:
3. Duty i.e. Allah does not task any soul with a duty except when the duty has come to the individual. And it is clear that “coming to the individual” requires knowledge of the duty by the individual. The meaning thus becomes: Allah does not task any individual with a duty except when he has made it known to the individual, and without making it known, there is no duty.
However, the problem occurs: how do we confirm the final possibility when it is possible that one of the first two are correct. Shaykh Ansari uses the principle of Itlaq (i.e. absolute meaning). He says that as there are no indicators that the meaning is specific to one of the first two meanings, it must incorporate all of them.
However, of course there are counter arguments to this point of view, which we can discuss in the next blog!
1. Observe precaution (Syed Sadr's view)
2. Be free to do anything (Ayatullah Khui's view)
This was a purely theoretical exercise, assuming there was no textual evidence pointing to another option....however, in reality there is textual evidence that the proponents of both points of view above, agree on - and that textual evidence points to the fact that you do not need to observe precaution but you are actually free to do anything.
We will first look at the Qur`anic evidence for this, then move onto narrations. This is a very long discussion, but it shows the importance given to this part of usul al-fiqh.
Firstly, the verse is Surah Talaq (65), verse 7:
“Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it.”
(لا يكلف الله نفسا إلا ما آتاها)
This verse is in the context of discussing the issue of a husband’s duty to pay for the wife’s expenses when he divorces her e.g. when she is pregnant, he has to continue paying for her expenses until she gives birth and if she breastfeeds the baby, then the payment should continue until the end of the breastfreeding. The question that is raised, is what is the level of this payment? Does it depend on the wealth of the husband? The point is that the amount depends on what the person is able to pay. The complete verse is as follows:
"Let the affluent man spend out of his affluence, and let he whose provision has been tightened spend out of what Allah has given him. Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it. Allah will bring about ease after hardship." (65:8)
According to Shaykh Ansari’s work – Al-Rasa`il, the word ما in the verse above (translated as “[according to] what”), introduces a relative phrase, and the question we have to answer is the meaning of “what”. There are three possibilities for the meaning of "what":
1. Money/wealth/property i.e. the verse means that Allah does not task any soul with paying money, other than to the extent to which he is able to pay. This understanding of the verse is possible due to the verse’s presence in the context of paying for a wife’s subsistence.
2. Action i.e. Allah does not "task" any soul with an action other than if he/she is able to do that action. This understanding is possible due to the term “task” mentioned in the translation, as that term (task) is only used with actions.
These two explanations of the verse do not result in the implication of the legal baraa`a. However, the third possibility does:
3. Duty i.e. Allah does not task any soul with a duty except when the duty has come to the individual. And it is clear that “coming to the individual” requires knowledge of the duty by the individual. The meaning thus becomes: Allah does not task any individual with a duty except when he has made it known to the individual, and without making it known, there is no duty.
However, the problem occurs: how do we confirm the final possibility when it is possible that one of the first two are correct. Shaykh Ansari uses the principle of Itlaq (i.e. absolute meaning). He says that as there are no indicators that the meaning is specific to one of the first two meanings, it must incorporate all of them.
However, of course there are counter arguments to this point of view, which we can discuss in the next blog!
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