Saturday, 6 February 2010

Principles that underpin what to do when in doubt (3)

As discussed in the previous blog, we are going to look at the main arguments for the theory that it is “ugly” for Allah to punish someone for a duty that he is unaware of. Each of these arguments is countered by Shahid al-Sadr and although there are 4 arguments, and we will focus on the first three in this blog:

1. What makes you do an action (محرّك = muharrik)? It is not the reality (الواقع = al-waqi’), but it is what you know (معلوم = ma’lum) e.g. if you know that there is a lion roaming on the street, what do you do? You base your actions on your knowledge, not on the reality (which may be that there is no lion on the street). It is clear that punishment when you do not even have knowledge (the cause of your action (muharrik)), is “ugly”.

Shahid al-Sadr replies to this and says that the محرّك (muharrik) is not based on what you know. Rather, it is actually based on your intention to obey Allah. e.g. it is not your knowledge of the fact prayers are wajib that makes you pray, but the intention that you must obey Allah in all situations that makes you pray.

This hits the core of the issue: what is the range of the right of obedience of Allah (حق الطاعة). Does the scope of obedience of Allah include issues that are doubtful?


2. What is customary amongst rational people (عرف العقلاء) – e.g. if you have a slave who does not know that he has to do something, it is known amongst the rational people, that you clearly cannot punish them.

Another example given by al-Mirza, is that if a stranger enters a new country and in some of its streets, it is not allowed to enter, does it make sense that he is punished?

Shahid al-Sadr responds by saying that this might be true for a slave and slave owner, but this is different for Allah. He says that it is dangerous to make such an analogy without having a cause for the analogy. He goes further and explains:

- it is possible that this obedience was put there because the other person put it there e.g. the people of a village might elect a leader, or because Allah put it there e.g. the father compared to his children

- alternatively the obedience could be there because that is where it must be e.g. the obedience to Allah from all mankind, which is there not because of mankind but instead because of the position of Allah as the Creator…etc.

Therefore, the examples put forward by al-Mirza are applicable to the first type but not the second.


3. Shaykh al-Isfahani says that rationality’s scope is split into two:
a. Practical: something to do with actions e.g. the law that truth is good to do; lying is bad to do; it is good to keep someone’s trust; it is not good to be unfaithful

b. Theoretical: the impossibility of two contradictory things both being true; the possibility of two different things both being true

There are very many theoretical rules whereas according to Shaykh al-Isfahani, the practical laws are split into implications of these two: “justice is good” and “injustice (ظلم) is bad”.

Shaykh Isfahani uses this and identifies “ugliness” as only one thing – “injustice (ظلم)”. So the question then becomes: when does going against the duties of Allah become injustice towards Him? Is it just things that are known duties that are considered to be injustice, or things that are possible to be duties? He says that it is clear that if the duty is not known (only possible), then going against it, is not something that is excessive or against Allah to the extent that it is injustice towards him, so there cannot be any punishment against such a person.

Sayyid al-Sadr replies to this and firstly asks what is meant by “injustice is bad”. The implication first is that Allah has the right to obedience (otherwise how could injustice towards him potentially be an injustice?). Therefore, prior to considering whether “injustice is bad”, we have to consider Allah’s right to obedience on us and whether it is applicable on issues where there is doubt. Shahid al-Sadr is basically pointing out that it is not a strong argument to base the principle, on “injustice is bad”, when the principle itself is an assumption of “injustice is bad”.

In the next blog, we will look at the final argument, and Shahid al-Sadr's response.

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