Wednesday 22 December 2010

Seafood (FINAL) - and your thoughts on the next set

In the last 10 blogs we have seen how Fadlallah derives rulings – what is most interesting is that even though his conclusion is radically different from everyone else, the general method he uses, is very similar to others.

The main difference has been in how he has dealt with contradictions in narrations. In general, we see that when there is a contradiction between sahih narrations (regardless of number), the options (in order of preference) are:

1. Try and harmonise them and find a ruling that all the narrations make sense for
2. Take that which is in line with the Qur’an where this can be done
3. Take that which is against the Sunni opinion
4. Ignore both sets of narrations and refer back to the Asl

Fadlallah believes that numbers 1, 2 and 4 all lead to his opinion (i.e. that it is allowed to eat all seafood) and he does not believe that 3 is applicable. Most other scholars believe that 1 is not possible, 2 is not relevant, 3 is correct, and 4 would lead to Fadlallah’s opinion if 3 was not correct. Therefore, most scholars believe that fish without scales are not allowed [and this is a huge simplification] because the Sunnis believe they are allowed (details are in previous blogs).

What needs to be understood, is that although there are scholars out there, who have suggested radically alternative methods of derivation of Islamic law using the ideas of contextualisation (Fazlur Rahman, Shahrur, Soroush), or the fact that Qur’anic principles can supersede even sahih narrations (Saanei perhaps), Fadlallah does not seem to fall into these categories. He seems to be using an adapted version of the general methodology rather than a new methodology entirely!

Regardless, hopefully this detailed set of blogs has given an insight into how scholars of fiqh, reach their conclusions, and how if you have a different conclusion, it does not really necessarily mean you are outside the mainstream.

In the next blogs, we will look at one of the following options:
1. Another similar ruling on fiqh to understand how rulings are derived (but this seems to be boring you guys!)
2. A brief overview of the “alternative” ideas out there e.g. the work being done by the “progressives”
3. A look at tafsir – perhaps looking at the suggestion: “Is the Qur’an's view on women/marriage sexist?”

One of the readers had suggested music (following what they heard from a lecturer during the first ten days of Muharram), but this will not be possible at the moment as the research required is too much! InshaAllah next year we can reach this area...

Your views would be appreciated!

Wednesday 8 December 2010

Seafood (10)

In the last blog we looked at Fadlallah’s view that there was no consensus on the issue of eating fish without scales, and he noted that there is an apparent contradiction in the narrations with some suggesting they are allowed (a minority but unambiguous) and some suggesting they are not allowed (a majority but potentially open to being restricted).

When dealing with contradictions in Shi’i usul al-fiqh, there are several methods (as the assumption is that the Imam cannot have made a mistake and said two contradictory things):
1. Trying to reconcile them where possible and plausible (jam’ urfi) e.g. if there is something general and something particular, they both could be right and one could be an exception to the other
2. Give a greater weight to the set of narrations that is against the opinion of the Sunnis (based on the fact that the Imams might have been in Taqiyya and said one of the statements under duress) – this rule of “ma khalaf al-aama” is based on a sahih narration in al-Kafi from the 6th Imam (AS).

Normally the first option will always be preferred where possible and plausible. Where the above two do not reach a conclusion, the narrations are discarded.

The method used by most scholars in this case is the second one as Sunnis believe that you can eat fish without scales. However, Fadlallah says that there must be constraints to the usage of this second rule. He posits two important constraints:

1. Only the minimum would be said by the Imam (AS) i.e. he would not add supplementary evidence if he was under duress. In this case, we see the Imam (AS) backing up this point of view with Quranic verses and Fadlallah wonders why he would do this if he was only under taqiyya – as it backs up the other argument

Of course, one might argue that the Imam might have used that verse of the Quran to justify the Sunni position, in order to satisfy the Sunni audience and protect his followers but the problem is that this is a legal matter, and therefore the assumption must be that the Imam expressed what he wanted to express unless you are confident that this is not the case i.e. the evidence is on the other foot!

2. Secondly, he suggests that this rule can only be applied as a last resort when you cannot reconcile the narrations (we will come to this later – to understand Fadlallah’s view)

3. Finally, he says that according to the narration that is the basis of this rule, the first thing to do is to compare the narrations with the Qur’an before looking at the Sunnis’ actions. And in this case, Fadlallah argues that the narrations that support the eating of fish without scales are in line with the Quran as stated in previous blogs


Fadlallah therefore argues that using the second method of solving the apparent contradiction does not make sense here, and for him, it does make sense to reconcile the narrations in the following way:

1. Those that indicate impermissibility – consider that they actually are talking about makruh (rather than haram) – this is a possible interpretation in usul al-fiqh where “Don’t do XX” can be an advisory statement.
2. Those that indicate permissibility – consider these to be again referring to makruh

Therefore, the correct rule for him is that these fish without scales are makruh to eat.

In the final blog on this topic, I will conclude and discuss this methodology and how it provides an insight into the minds of scholars. I will also give my thoughts on the next set of blogs – and hope that you agree with them!

Sunday 7 November 2010

Seafood (9)

Below are a summary of the main narrations used to form the prohibition of eating fish without scales (from the previous blog):

1. ‘…he said: eat fish with scales, and do not eat fish without scales.’
2. ‘Can the whale be eaten?’ He responded: ‘That which has scales can be eaten.’
3. ‘Ali was in Kufa on the mule of the Messenger of God. Then he passed by the whale market and said: ‘Do not eat and do not sell that which does not have scales.’
4. ‘Do not approach that which does not have scales.’
5. ‘The true Islam includes several parts: the testimony that there is no God but Allah…[and]… the impermissibility of al-jirri and al-tafi, (8) and al-marmahi [eel] and al-zamir (9) and all fish without scales.’ (10)

In usul al-fiqh, it is an agreed principle, that a negative imperative (e.g. “don’t do XX”) normally means it is haram to do it. However, it is also agreed that if there are any other contextual indicants, you might infer that it COULD mean it is makruh and the “don’t” is advisory. Therefore, most the narrations are of this category and although they imply that fish without scales are haram, they leave out the possibility that if there is any other context, they might imply makruh instead.

This argument is true for all the narrations except, some might argue, for narration number 3 and 5 above, where the context seems to make it very clear that it is haram.

Fadlallah analyses these two narrations and finds that the fifth narration has a weak chain, and hence should not be used to draw a conclusion. The only one of any substance he needs to look at is the fifth narration. His main view is that it is not clear that Imam Ali (AS) went to the market specifically to tell the people that this is haram – it is equally likely that he was just passing by and noticed this, and was discouraging it. More than that, it says that he was on the mule of the Prophet (SAW). Now as he is in Kufa, that means it was in his Caliphate i.e. 25 years after the Prophet’s death – an unlikely age for a mule!

He concludes, therefore, that ALL of the narrations might mean that fish without scales are makruh if there is some context that might support this theory.


Fadlallah then analyses the narrations, that indicate that fish without scales are permissible to consume. Two such narrations are as follows:

‘He said: I asked Abu ‘Abd Allah about eating eels (jarith) he responded [using Qur’an 6:145] “Say: In all that has been revealed to me, I do not find anything forbidden to eat for the one who wishes to eat it” then he added: “God has not made impermissible any animal in the Qur’an other than pig; and everything from the sea without scales…is not impermissible, it is actually discouraged.”’ (1)

Muhammad ibn Muslim from Ja’far ibn Muhammad [al-Sadiq]: ‘I asked Abu ‘Abd Allah about…fish without scales, are they impermissible to be eaten? He responded: Muhammad, read this verse from al-An’am [Qur’an 6:145]: “Say: In all that has been revealed to me, I do not find anything forbidden to eat”…he explained: “Indeed what is impermissible is that which God and his Messenger have considered impermissible in his Book…”.’ (2)

Fadlallah notes that these narrations are explicit (sarih) in permitting the consumption of all fish, and this undoubtedly precludes the possibility of them being impermissible. In the next blog we will discuss how to reconcile the apparent contradiction between this set of narrations and the one above (only 2 blogs left on this topic!).

(1) Wasa’il al-Shi’a, volume. 16, page 334, no. 19; considered sahih (from Zurara from 6th Imam)
(2) Ibid., Page 335 also considered sahih.

Wednesday 20 October 2010

Seafood (8)

Apologies for the delay – I’ve been working hard to try and see if I can publish the research in a journal…we will see what happens!

Anyway, back to the topic at hand – we have looked at non-fish animals from the sea and noted Fadlallah’s conclusion that they are okay to eat. This is because there is no consensus and even the author of Wasa’il (al-Hur al-Amili) says that the narration used to substantiate the claim that non-fish animals are haram, should not be understood without reading the narration which allows it, and therefore must be considered makruh. Alternatively, the Qur’anic general principles should be referred to, if you cannot reach a conclusion on the narrations.

We are now moving onto fish without scales – the final type of sea animal! This is quite controversial (Tusi even said that it is an essential part of being Shia). But there are three levels of discussion:

1. Is there consensus on the issue?
2. What do the narrations say?
3. What should we do

On the first issue, Fadlallah notes opinions of major scholars of the past:
Al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli in his Shara’i‘ says: ‘As for fish which do not have scales at all, like al-jirri (1), there are two narrations, the more well-known of the two indicates impermissibility. (2)

Shahid al-Thani in Al-Masalik hesitates as well: ‘The Shi‘a scholars differ in considering their permissibility because of the difference in the narrations concerning them’, similarly to Ardabili in Majma‘ and Sabzawari in Al-Kifayah. (3)
Fadlallah considers it clear that there is no scholarly consensus regarding the permissibility of consuming fish without scales.


On the second issue, Fadlallah considers two groups of narrations:

1. Those that imply that fish without scales are haram
2. Those that imply that fish without scales are halal


There are very very many in the first category – many of which are sahih. I will mention 5 of the most important and we will discuss them and Fadlallah’s discussion on them in the next blog:

Muhammad ibn Muslim from Muhammad ibn Ali [al-Baqir]: ‘…he said: eat fish with scales, and do not eat fish without scales.’ (4)
Hammad ibn ‘Uthman from Ja‘far ibn Muhammad [al-Sadiq]: ‘Can the whale be eaten?’ He responded: ‘That which has scales can be eaten.’ (5)
Abdullah ibn Sunan from Ja‘far ibn Muhammad [al-Sadiq]: ‘Ali was in Kufa on the mule of the Messenger of God. Then he passed by the whale market and said: ‘Do not eat and do not sell that which does not have scales.’ (6)
Hannan ibn Sudayr from Ja‘far ibn Muhammad [al-Sadiq]: ‘Do not approach that which does not have scales.’ (7)
Al-Fadl ibn Shadhan from al-Rida in his letter to al-Ma’mun: ‘The true Islam includes several parts: the testimony that there is no God but Allah…[and]… the impermissibility of al-jirri and al-tafi, (8) and al-marmahi [eel] and al-zamir (9) and all fish without scales.’ (10)

How can these mean anything other than fish without scales are haram? We will look at this in the next blog…

(1) Jirri is a type of fish (Majma’ al-Bahrayn)
(2) Muhaqqiq al-Hilli in Shara’i’ al-Islam, book 3, page 217 (from Fadlallah’s work)
(3) Al-Shahid al-Thani in Masalik al-Afham, book 13, page 14; Ardabili in Majma’ al-Fa’ida, book 11, page 189; Sabzwari in Kifayat al-Ahkam, book 2, page 596 (from Fadlallah’s work)
(4) Wasa`il, book 16, chapter 8, page 329, no. 1 ; considered sahih
(5) Ibid. no. 2 ; considered sahih
(6) Ibid. no. 4; considered sahih
(7) Ibid., no. 5; considered reliable but to a lower degree
(8) A fish which dies in the water and rises to the surface (refer to Majma’ al-Bahrayn)
(9) A type of fish (Majma’ al-Bahrayn)
(10) Wasa`il, book 16, chapter 9, page 333, no. 9 ; considered weak

Monday 20 September 2010

Seafood (7)

In the previous blog we discussed how consensus cannot be used to remove the base position that animals from the sea that are not fish, are permissible. We now move onto looking at other reasons why the base position might not be applicable.

Firstly, consider the Qur`anic verse:

“FORBIDDEN to you is carrion (1), and blood, and the flesh of swine, and that over which any name other than God's has been invoked, and the animal that has been strangled, or beaten to death, or killed by a fall, or gored to death, or savaged by a beast of prey, save that which you [yourselves] may have slaughtered while it was still alive”(2)

Some may conclude that when it is not established that they have been slaughtered in the Islamic way, the animal is considered dead, and therefore the general order of impermissibility is applicable.

Firstly, Fadlallah notices that what is intended by “carrion” is not animals which have not been slaughtered (in the Islamic way), rather it refers to animals that have died by themselves. This is best demonstrated by considering an animal, which is slaughtered without fulfilling all the conditions of an Islamic slaughter (3). Such an animal is not considered “carrion”, even if the meat is not allowed to be eaten.

Further to this, there is no evidence to suggest that animals that are not allowed to be eaten are “carrion”. In fact even animals that are impermissible to be eaten, which are not inherently ritually impure, are not considered “carrion” if they are slaughtered (although they are still not allowed to be eaten). Therefore, what is meant by “carrion” is that which has died itself, and that is what is considered impermissible.(4)

Secondly, the statement “save that which you [yourselves] may have slaughtered while it was still alive” is not linked to “carrion” because “the flesh of swine” is impermissible regardless of whether it has been slaughtered in the Islamic way or not.

Therefore, this Qur`anic argument is not sufficient to show that animals of the sea are impermissible.


Finally, Fadlallah considers the narrations relevant to this topic:

“I asked him about Al-Rubith (5). He said: Don’t eat it, Ammar, because we do not define it as fish.”(6)

This narration is used as the main reasoning why some scholars consider animals in the sea that are not fish, to be impermissible to be eaten. It is based on the prohibition of the Imam (AS) on eating al-Rubith, an animal not known as a fish. The narration is considered to be equivalent to the statement: “everything that is not fish, is not allowed to be eaten”. Therefore, the permissibility is restricted to fish alone.

The problem with this is that it contradicts other narrations that are clear in the permissibility of al-Rubith (7) - and this is agreed by the author of al-Jawahir (8). Therefore, this narration cannot be used to conclude that every sea animal that is not considered a fish, is impermissible.


In the end, therefore, the base position still holds and animals from the sea that are not fish, are considered permissible! In the next blogs, we will focus on the most difficult topic: that about fish without scales.

Again, if you have any ideas for future blogs….

(1) Translation of Maytata; may also be translated as carcass of a dead animal, dead meat (Yusuf Ali)
(2) Qur`an, 5:3 (translation by Asad)
(3) For example, the name of God has not been invoked prior to slaughter
(4) Fadlallah also notes that this inference is possible from similar verses in the Qur`an (e.g. 2: 173)
(5) This is considered a type of fish (Lane), also refer to Majma’ al-Bahrayn, Volume 2, Page 254
(6) Wasa`il, Volume 24, Page 140
(7) Refer to Wasa`il, Volume 24, Page 140; that is the reason the author of Wasa`il titled the chapter by: “The fact that al-Rubith is not impermissible but is detested”
(8) This is recognized as a leading reference in Fiqh

Tuesday 14 September 2010

Seafood (6)

As the base position and the general Qur`anic principles discuss sea animals in general, it has not so far been necessary to tailor the arguments to the different types of animals of the sea. However, when it comes to looking at the more specific evidence, Ayatullah Fadlallah divides the discussion into the three relevant categories: fish with scales, fish without scales, and other animals in the sea.

Fish with scales:
Ayatullah Fadlallah does not exert any effort in proving that fish with scales are Halal, as there is complete consensus amongst both Shi’is and Sunnis on this issue.

Other animals in the sea that are not fish:
Ayatullah Fadlallah proposes that three main sources of evidence potentially can be used to supersede the general Qur`anic principle that all animals in the sea are Halal: consensus, other Qur`anic principles and specific narrations. In this blog, we will focus on consensus.

Ayatullah Fadlallah argues that although some have claimed there is consensus on the Hurma (from Haram) of all animals in the sea that are not fish (1), many eminent scholars of the past and present have doubts including al-Ardabili(2), al-Sabzwari (3), al-Fayd al-Kashani (4) and al-Naraqi (5), proving that no consensus had been established.

Further to this, in general Shi’i Fiqh, consensus, is not authoritative in of itself unless it uncovers or is based on textual evidence that has not reached us. In such a case, it would be useful as there may be no other way to derive the ruling, and consensus at some time due to a clear ruling would be authoritative for us.

However, the consensus (if not based on evidence that has not reached us) will otherwise be based on their personal opinions and judgements which are both fallible and potentially influenced by the views of the major scholars of the time, rather than based on textual evidence. If the scholars in the consensus explain their ruling, and give their sources, then this gives further right to later scholars to challenge their process of derivation, and the consensus in such a case cannot be authoritative.

It is important to note here, that this is a significant feature of Ayatullah Fadlallah: that the claim of consensus, does not prevent him from investigating a subject and having the courage (or some would argue arrogance) to issue a ruling (6) that is contrary to that on which there was apparent consensus (7).

In the next blog we will conclude the discussion by looking at the Qur`anic principles and specific narrations relevant to animals of the sea that are not fish. The subsequent blog will then be on fish without scales!

Please do email if there are any preferences for the next set of blogs, as there are only a few more on this topic!

(1) Jawahir al-Kalam, Volume 36, Page 242
(2) Al-Majma’, Volume 11, Page 187
(3) Kifayat al-Fiqh, Page 348 (Hijri edition); Volume 2, Page 596 from the recent edition published by the Foundation of Islamic Publications in the city of Qum
(4) Mafatih al-Shara`i’, Volume 2, Page 184
(5) Al-Mustanad, Volume 15, Page 59
(6) Consider his opinion, legalizing cloning (refer to his website)
(7)Compare with earlier blog, where Ayatullah Khui argues convincingly that all the evidence suggesting that the People of the Book are ritually impure, are not conclusive, but still chooses to issue a precautionary ruling, in line with previous scholars rather than in line with his reasoning.

Monday 6 September 2010

Seafood (5)

In the previous blogs, we looked at two general principles: that everything in the Earth is Halal and food in general is Halal (I emphasise these are general principles that would be the base position if and only if there is on other evidence saying the opposite).

We are now going to look at evidence for another general principle – that anything hunted from the sea for food, is allowed to be eaten.

There are many verses of the Qur`an used to justify this general principle (note again that this does not mean that there might be exceptions to this general rule in narrations):

1. Surah Ma`ida, verse 96: “Lawful to you is the pursuit of water-game and its use for food, for the benefit of yourselves and those who travel but forbidden is the pursuit of landgame;- as long as ye are in the sacred precincts or in pilgrim garb” (Ihram)

There is no restriction provided in this verse, and what is understood normally from this verse (‘urf) is that any prey from the sea is allowed to be eaten.

There are two responses to this reasoning:

Firstly, it may be understood, from the context, that the verse has been revealed to make it clear what is Halal and not Halal for the person in Ihram, not generally, as it says in the end of the verse: “as long as ye are in the sacred precincts or in pilgrim garb” (ma dumtum huruma)

The following points can be mentioned in response:

• The mention of “lawful…for…those who travel” implies that that it has nothing to do with being in Ihram. This is because if what was intended from the verse was that both commands about prey from the sea and land were only relevant for the one in Ihram, there would be no reason to mention “for those who travel”. And the idea that what is meant by “for those who travel” is only those who travel whilst in Ihram, is against the apparent meaning of the verse

• The universality of the verse, especially with the addition of the words “and its use for food”, makes people think that everything that is hunted from the sea is Halal or at the minimum, this will lead to some people believing that the lawfulness of the food is absolute, which would otherwise require the Prophet (SAW) intervene and make it clear that the lawfulness is specified only to fish with scales…etc.. Therefore, the base position is that it is Halal unless there is a narration to say something different.


Secondly, there is another argument against the reasoning that all seafood is Halal. The main point is that the verse actually means: “what is Halal for you, is benefitting from everything that is hunted from the sea, and what is Halal for you is eating, what is eaten from it” (1). The reasoning is that “its use for food” is added to “pursuit of water-game”, indicating that not all water-game is Halal, only that which is eaten.

However, the problem with this argument, is that it is based on interpreting water-game as what is hunted, and this is not the apparent meaning of the verse. This is because water-game is the act of hunting itself and therefore the verse is explaining t he legality of hunting as a known act, and the food that comes from it.


2. Verses such as:

Surah Nahl, Verse 14: “It is He Who has made the sea subject, that ye may eat thereof flesh that is fresh and tender…”

Surah Fatir, Verse 12: “…yet from each (kind of water) do ye eat flesh fresh and tender, and ye extract ornaments to wear…”

From these, we can infer that one of the most important benefits from the seas which Allah has made for mankind, is that he can eat from it as long as it is “fresh and tender” and by the lack of any restriction, this applies to all animals of the sea i.e. fish, whales and other animals.

It is clear that the term “fresh and tender” is not a restriction on the rule that it is allowed to eat what is from the sea. This is clear because there is complete agreement amongst all scholars that you can eat fish that are not “fresh and tender”. The usage of the term, therefore, is just to explain what is mostly the case or because good fish is that which is “fresh and tender”.

In the next blog, we will move onto the heart of the issue – the narrations that discuss these topics.

(1) Tafsir Jawami’ al-Jami’ of Tabarsi, Volume 1, Page 534

Sunday 29 August 2010

Seafood (4)

Following the last blog, one of the avid readers of the blog asked for a slight clarification. The previous blog (and this blog) are not saying that all food on the earth is Halal. It is saying that:
- IF you do not receive any evidence from other verses or narrations, this would be the base position
- Or IF there are only contradictory narrations and you cannot choose one group over another, then both are discarded, and this is the base position
Therefore, the idea is that food from the earth is Halal, unless you find evidence to the contrary.

In the last blog, we discussed the general Qur`anic principle that everything in the Earth is Halal (with the proviso given above). We now can look at another principle, which says that given no evidence to the contrary, food is Halal (with the proviso given above).

Firstly, he quotes the Qur`anic verse:
Say: "I find not in the message received by me by inspiration any (meat) forbidden to be eaten by one who wishes to eat it, unless it be dead meat, or blood poured forth, or the flesh of swine,- for it is an abomination - or, what is impious, (meat) on which a name has been invoked, other than God’s". But (even so), if a person is forced by necessity, without wilful disobedience, nor transgressing due limits,- thy Lord is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. (1)

This was revealed in response to the Kuffar who used to say certain things were Haram. Allah was teaching the Prophet that there was nothing Haram in what was given by Allah other than eating something dead, or blood or pork. It seems to be quite clear in noting that the base position, is Halal.

There are two arguments brought against this:

1. Some may argue that this only applies to land animals. The response is quite obvious: that there is no restriction mentioned, so it must also apply to sea animals!
2. There are many foods that are Haram to eat in Shari’a which are not mentioned in this verse e.g. eating snake and dog…etc. (agreed upon by all) which means that this cannot be meant in the way assumed. However, the response is that this does not affect the general base position. It just means that there are exceptions in narrations, which is what we will look at in later blogs.


There are also many Sahih narrations where the Imams were asked whether a particular type of sea or land animal was Haram, to which they responded using the verse above. There are a lot of these narrations mentioned in the footnotes of his book, but I will mention one of them:

In a sahih narration of Muhammad ibn Muslim (2): “He said I asked Abu Abdullah about ‘jari’, ‘maarmaahi’ and ‘zumayyar’ (3) and fish which do not have scales – are they Haram? He said to me: ‘O Muhammad, read this verse in which it says…[refer to verse above]…so I read it until I completed it, after which he said: Indeed what is Haram is that which Allah and His messenger have prohibited in His book …”

In the next blog, we will look at the most famous and important general Qur`anic principle in this regard, and that is that all marine life is Halal [with the previous proviso]. After that, we will move onto the core of the issue, and that is the narrations on the topic!

(1) Qur`an, Surah An’am: 6:145
(2) Wasa`il al-Shia, Volume 24, Page 136, Chapter 4 on Haram foods)
(3) These are three types of fish without scales

Sunday 22 August 2010

Seafood (3)

We have looked at the base ruling and concluded that if there was no evidence to the contrary, seafood would be considered Halal. We now move onto general statements, which would supersede the base ruling if they can be confirmed. There are many general texts in this regard, suggesting the following:

1. Everything that is in the earth is halal
2. Everything that mankind eats is Halal
3. Absolute Halal nature of hunting from the sea and its food

Note that these are general rules, and would be the fall back position, if there are no specific exceptions found in texts (later blogs).


1. Everything in the earth is Halal

There are three Quranic verses that can be used substantiate this claim:

1. “It is He Who hath created for you all things that are on earth” (1)

The earth includes land and sea (not only land) and He has created everything so that we can benefit from it so it must be able for us to benefit from it by eating and drinking unless we are told otherwise through a specific text.

And some might consider that the verse means that we should be content with God’s creation, rather than saying that everything able to be eaten is Halal to eat. This is because being content with the creation does not imply that.

However, one could say that being content with what Allah has created, implies that man should benefit from it, through fulfilling his nutritional needs. For example, if someone said to another person: “I have made these things for you”, the apparent meaning is that he is happy with you to use it.


2. Verse of the Qur`an: “Oh mankind, eat from what is in the earth as something Halal, good” (2). The implication could be that it is allowed for mankind to eat what is in the earth because it is Halal and good; and fruits of the sea are considered amongst these.

Now there are two reasons for the usage of good (طيب): either to limit the Halal to only what is good, so something that is dirty is not considered Halal, or with the meaning of all that is in the earth is Halal and good.

“Tayyib” has many meanings, including Halal, Tahir, that in which there is no pain/harm…

However, we can consider this to not be applicable because it is talking about eating what is Halal and good – nothing about what is Haram and bad. Therefore, it does not help determine what actually is Haram and is therefore irrelevant.


3. Qur`anic verse: “They ask you about what is Halal for them. Say: Good provisions is what is Halal for you” (4). The “good provisions” – what man is able to benefit well from – is Halal and okay to eat. This is aided by what is in the book (5) attributed to Imam Rida (AS): “Know, may Allah have mercy on you that Allah, may He be blessed and exalted, did not make allowed any food or drink except that in which there is benefit and silah, and he did not make Haram anything other than that in which there is daral and talaff and fasaad. So every beneficial item for the body is halal and every harmful item is haram.”

From these discussions, we can conclude that this principle holds i.e. all food on the earth is Halal unless we get specific evidence to the contrary. In the next blog, we will look at the next general principle.

(1) Qur`an: 2:29
(2) Qur`an: 2:168
(3) Kanz al-Urfan in Fiqh al-Qur`an: Chapter 2, Page 390
(4) Qur`an: 5:4
(5) al-Fiqh al-Radawi (34:1)

Saturday 14 August 2010

Seafood (2)

We will now start by looking at what the correct course of action should be about eating seafood, if there was no evidence at all i.e. what the base ruling (أصل - `asl) is.

In general, the base position is that everything created by Allah in terms of food and drink are Halal, unless there is specific evidence to the contrary. I have discussed the reasoning for this in a previous blog but we will go through Syed Fadlallah’s main reasoning (very similar):

1. Rationally, how can Allah punish you for eating seafood, if you do not have any evidence saying it is Haram. Further to the rational reasoning, there are lots of texts suggesting this e.g. “We do not punish [any community] until We have sent [it] an apostle (to give warning)” (1) and “My nation is not responsible for that which they do not know” (2).

2. There are several narrations explaining that everything is halal unless you know that it is haram e.g. the Muwathaq (3) narration of Mas’ada ibn Sadqa from Abu Abdullah (AS) who said: I heard him say: “Everything is halal for you until you know that it is Haram…” However, these narrations are about individual situations rather than a general ruling, and therefore, they are not applicable here.

The first point is enough to conclude the base rule is that seafood is Halal unless there is evidence to suggest the contrary.

However, there may be other “base rulings” that may be applicable. Syed Fadlallah goes through some possibilities:

A. The base situation is that animals are not slaughtered/slaughtered in the correct way

In general, if you saw a dead animal, the base assumption would be that the animal would have either:

- Not been slaughtered in the Islamic method e.g. not cutting the jugular vein, or reciting the name of Allah at the slaughter, or facing Qibla based on the Shii opinion
- Or the animal is not able to be slaughtered e.g. dog or pig where cutting the jugular vein does not leave a positive result when they are slaughtered

Therefore, if there is a doubt about whether the animal has been slaughtered, then the base position is that the animal has not been slaughtered in the correct way.

Therefore, if we doubt the permissibility of an animal even after the slaughter, then it is considered Haram. Similarly if we doubt if something is able to be slaughtered, then it must be considered not slaughtered.

In this case, if we doubt whether seafood (not fish)/fish without scales is halal, you can infer that there is a doubt in the fact it can be slaughtered, and therefore this basis of non-slaughterability applies.

However, this argument does not work, as there is no real doubt about its slaughterability. This is because every animal is able to be slaughtered other than dog and pig (a reference is available if required).

Even if we were to accept that the basis applies, we would have to look at the legal rules in later blogs, which make it not applicable.


B. Istis-hab – Assumption of previous state

In usul al-fiqh, there is a principle that when you are sure of a situation, and you are unsure whether it has changed, you assume the previous state. The argument behind this, is not discussed here. We will focus on how it might be used to result in a different base ruling.

The argument is as follows:
- We know that before slaughter, the animal is definitely Haram to eat.
- Therefore if we doubt whether the animal is able to be slaughtered, we then doubt whether it is Halal to eat.
- Therefore, we prefer the previous known Haram state before slaughtering.

However, we note the following:

1. The principle of Isits-hab is only relevant (in Syed Fadlallah’s opinion [similar to Ayatullah Khui]) on doubts on whether a rule is applicable, not on if there is a rule in the first place

2. The first leg of the argument is not correct, as it is not definitely the case that eating the animal from the sea is haram because if a person takes a small fish from the sea and swallows it before its death, there is no evidence that he has committed a sin

3. The principle of Istis-hab only applies when the subject (according to the custom) which you have certainty in, is the same as the subject which you doubt has changed. In this case, the subject changes from an animal to meat; or from a non-slaughtered animal to a slaughtered animal.

Regardless, the previous two points are enough to note that this argument is not sufficient.

Overall, in this blog, we have come to the conclusion that IF there was no evidence, the base ruling is that seafood is Halal to eat. In the next blog, we will start looking at general pieces of evidence that may be applicable, and may affect the base ruling.

(1) Qur`an, Surah Israa (17), Verse 15
(2) Wasa`il al-Shi’a, Volume 15, Page 369, Paragraph 1, Chapter 56 in the chapters on Jihad al-Nafs
(3) Muwathaq is the one level below sahih in terms of reliability of the people in the chain of narrations. Please email if you would like more information.

Monday 9 August 2010

Seafood (1)

It seems that the majority of readers (who responded) consider the moon issue to be overly talked about, so we are moving to seafood! This topic was chosen for two reasons:

Firstly, because it is a topic, about which there are differences of opinion. This is useful because it shows how scholars think and come to conclusions, and it is easy to see inside the mind of a scholar!

Secondly, because Ayatullah Fadlallah published a short explanation of his point of view on the topic a few months prior to his death. I thought it makes sense to cover a piece of legal derivation from one of the leading jurists of the day, especially as I have not covered anything from him so far.

Now onto the topic! The general opinion amongst Shii scholars is that eating animals from the sea is not allowed other than fish with scales. Some even consider this opinion as a distinguishing feature of being an Imami. However, Syed Fadlallah does not believe that this is correct and in the next few blogs, I will detail his method of proving his case.

His work here is not a part of a larger look at every single ruling like Ayatullah Khui’s work – instead, it is just a detailed look at one topic. This makes it possible to frame the discussion in a different way, and the structure of the argument is therefore interesting:

1. Firstly, he considers whether all sea food should be Halal or Haram if there was no evidence at all i.e. what the `Asl (base ruling) is

2. He then moves onto the general pieces of evidence (‘Umumat) that are available, which would be applicable if there was no specific evidence to the contrary (e.g. in the Qur`an, the verses that might imply that all food from the sea is Halal)

3. Finally, he looks at specific evidence relevant to the topic, which if considered sound, would take precedence as exceptions to the general rules laid out above.


In the next blog, we will look at point 1 i.e. what the base ruling should be if there was no evidence to the contrary.

Sunday 1 August 2010

Najasah of the Kafir (8)

In the previous blog, we discussed a possible way to deal with the contradictory narrations i.e. to prefer those that imply the Taharah of Ahl al Kitab, because of the fact they are clearer. The author of al-Madarik (1) and Ayatullah Sabzwari (2) (may Allah be pleased with them) have come to this same conclusion but the majority of scholars at the time of Ayatullah Khui were not happy with this way of solving the contradiction.

They have actually cast aside the narrations on the Tahara of the Ahl al Kitab based on the following reasons (3):

1. They consider the narrations contrary to the verse of the Qur`an (9:28 – “Indeed the Mushrikun are naijs…”) and the narrations of Najasah are in agreement with this. And it is clear that agreeing with the Qur`an is a reason to prefer one side of an argument when there is a contradiction. However, Ayatullah Khui does not consider this reasoning correct, as we have discussed that the verse talks about the Mushrikun rather than the Ahl al Kitab (refer to previous blog)

2. The narrations on Najasah are in opposition to the view of the Sunnis (refer to earlier blog) and one of the methods of solving contradictory narrations is to turn to narrations from the Imams (AS) that say that you must take what is against the school of those in opposition (to the Imams) (4)

They therefore attribute the narrations on Tahara to Taqiyyya, and this attribution is seen as totally unacceptable by the author of al-Madarik (5) and Sabzwari, wondering how it can be possible to put such weak rules on the Imams (6)

Even though there are many narrations which say that you should take the narration that opposes the school of the opposition (Sunnis), these are only in instances of genuine contradiction. However, there is no contradiction between the “No” in the narrations of Najasa and the clarity of it being Makruh to eat their food in the texts on their Tahara.

Ayatullah Khui is particularly scathing, saying:
“Can you see that these contradict each other? If there is no contradiction, then why would you put the texts of Tahara on the majority [i.e. on Taqiyya]? …I really wonder what the author of al-Hada`iq (may Allah be pleased with him) was doing in his book.” It is difficult to believe that in all their places in these narrations were due to Taqiyya in front of the Sunnis.

Ayatullah Khui then gives forward another reasoning why Taqiyya is not applicable. In the same narrations where it discusses the Tahara of the Ahl al-Kitab, it must have been in the minds of the religious people in the times of the Imams (AS) that they are Tahir, and that was the reason they asked about eating with them because they knew about the outer Najasah of the Ahl al Kitab when they ate pork…etc..

There are many narrations that show this:

- the sound (sahih) narration of Mu’awiya ibn ’Ammar who said: “I asked Abu Abdullah (AS) about clothes which the Zorastrians work with, and they are dirty/foreigners* and they drink wine. He said: yes”. The addition of the “and they are foreigners who drink wine” implies that he knew that they were Tahir otherwise. (* = depending on the version of Wasa`il al-Shi’a 3:518/chapters on Najasa, 73:1)
- the sound (sahih) narration of ‘Abdullah ibn Sunnan, who said: “he asked Abu Abdullah (AS) when I was present: ‘A Dhimmi borrowed my clothes and I know he drinks wine and eats pork. He then returns it to me. Should I wash it before I pray in it?’ Abu ‘Abdullah (AS) said: ‘Pray in it and do not wash it because of that as you lent it to him and he is Tahir and you have not become certain that he has made it Najis, so there is no problem to pray in it unless you become certain that he has made it Najis

I will ignore the other two noted.

From this it is clear that the Tahara of the Ahl al Kitab was in the mind of the narrators until the 12th Imam (AS) and they used to ask about how to act with them and what to do, given that they eat pork and drink wine.

Therefore, it is difficult to give a fatwa (religious ruling) according to the narrations considering them to be najis, but it is also difficult to give a ruling according to the narrations considering them to be tahir because most scholars from the early periods and the recent periods consider them to be najis. Therefore, there is no choice but to consider it Ihtiyat al-Luzumi to consider them Najis.

Therefore, you can see that although Ayatullah Khui is very clear in his opinion that Ahl al Kitab are tahir, in the end, he observes precaution solely because of the fact that most of the scholars of the earlier period had a different opinion! Hopefully, this shows the way that Ayatullah Khui made his decision, his thinking and seeing inside the mind of a scholar!

In the next blog, we have two options:
1. Ayatullah Fadlallah on seafood – it is useful to see into the mind of another great scholar, especially as the structure of his argument differs from the types we have seen so far, and also because again Taqiyya is used by some scholars.

2. Consider moon issues (topical)

Please email with your thoughts!

(1) al-Mudarik 2:294-298
(2) Dhakhira al-ma’aad: 150
(3) al-Hada`iq, 5:162-172
(4) Wasa`il al-Shi’a 27:106/chapters on the attributes of a judge 9:1, 19, 25 and others
(5) al-Mudarik 2:294-298
(6) al-Hada`iq, 5:173

Wednesday 28 July 2010

Najasah of the Kafir (7)

We have now very extensively looked at both sides of the argument. There is clearly a contradiction between the narrations that imply that Ahl al Kitab are tahir, and those that imply that Ahl al Kitab are najis.

When there are contradictions there are many options:
1. Jam’ ‘urfi i.e. try and harmonise the narrations where possible:
a. Consider one group of narrations to be an exception/special case of the other (general vs specific)
b. Consider one group of narrations to be an explanation of the other…etc.
2. Preferring one over the other (due to one being more explicit/less open for interpretation)
3. Consider neither set of narrations to be authoritative

Ayatullah Khui believes that the natural way to aggregate all these contradictory narrations is to consider those that imply the najasah of the Ahl al Kitab, are actually implying that it is Makruh to eat with them…etc.

The reason given is that the evidence implying the taharah of the Ahl al Kitab is absolutely clear (sarih) rather than just apparent (dhahir), which means that if you are going to harmonise the narrations, preference must be given to the clear narrations, implying that the less clear narrations must have a less obvious meaning.

Ayatullah Khui gives the example of the main narration used to imply Ahl al Kitab are najis: the narration of Sa’id ibn al-A’raj (1) (which has a good chain of narration [with a trustworthy Sunni amongst them]) and the sahih narration of Ali ibn Ja’far (2), both of which (refer to earlier blogs) could be interpreted as discouraging (makruh) being with them rather than considering them as najis.

However, amongst the narrations of those who consider Ahl al Kitab are tahir, there are narrations such as the sound (sahih) narration of Isma’il ibn Jabir (3), which explicitly implies the Ahl al Kitab are tahir.

Therefore, when there is a contradiction between something that is explicit and clear (narrations for tahara of Ahl al Kitab) and something that is only apparent (narrations for najasa of Ahl al Kitab), general fiqh dictates that you take that which is explicit.

In the final blog on this topic (next one), we will look at those who with the same information above, come to a different conclusion based on Taqiyya, and how Ayatullah Khui responds to this and finally reaches a conclusion.

If anyone has a preference on the next topic (my current thinking is a discussion on seafood by Ayatullah Fadlallah – but someone has mentioned a preference for a Ramadan-related discussion), please do get in touch!

[Reminder:
(1) A “hasan” narration from Sa’id al-A’raj (Wasa`il al-Shi’a 1:229/chapters on leftovers, 3:1; similarly in 3:421/chapters on Najasa 14:8):

“I asked Abu Abdallah (AS) about (whether I could eat from) the leftover of Jews and Christians. He said: “No”.”


(2) Sahih narration of Ali ibn Ja’far from his brother (AS) (Wasa`il al-Shi’a 3:420/chapters on Najasat, 14:9): “[I asked] about a Christian who has a shower with a Muslim in the Hammam. He said: If he [the Muslim] knows that he is a Christian, he should wash himself with other water (not from the Hammam). Alternatively, he could wash himself in the sink/bath (after the Christian)”.


(3) The sahih narration of Isma’il ibn Jabir (Wasa`il al-Shi’a 24:210/chapters on Haram Foods 54:4) who said: “I said to Abu Abdullah (AS): ‘What do you say about food of the Ahl al-Kitab?’ So he said: ‘Don’t eat it.’ Then he was silent for a moment. Then he said: ‘Don’t eat it.’ Then he was silent for a moment. Then he said: ‘Don’t eat it and don’t leave him saying it is Haram but leave him avoiding it. In their cups is wine and in their plates is pork.’” It is clear that this implies the Tahara of the Ahl al-Kitab and that eating with them is Makruh.]

Sunday 18 July 2010

Najasah of the Kafir (6)

Just a reminder that the narrations chosen and the explanations provided are those of Ayatullah Khui (not mine!) and I am showing you these, not as indicative of my point of view, but to show you how the minds of scholars work when deriving rulings.

We have so far discussed the reasons why Ahl al Kitab might be considered najis and in the previous blog 4 narrations have been discussed on why they should be considered tahir. We will now continue with two more narrations in this topic.


5. The sahih narration of Ibrahim ibn Abu Mahmud, who said: “I asked al-Ridha (AS): ‘What do you think of the Jewish or Christian tailor and cutter (قصار) who you know does not wash after urinating?’ He said: ‘It is not a problem’. [1]

If we consider the tailor only, we might not be able to infer the applicability of this narration to the issue at hand i.e. because there is no moisture necessarily present with a tailor, the response of the Imam does not imply that the Ahl al Kitab are tahir. However, the use of “cutter” makes the implication clear, as the “cutter” washes clothes with his hand.



6. A second sahih narration: “I said to Imam Ridha (AS): ‘The Christian lady-servant serves you and you know she is a Christian who does not do Wudhu or wash herself following Janaba.’ He said: ‘It is not a problem as she washes her hands.’”. This clearly supports the proposition that Ahl al Kitab are tahir.

This is because the question implies the possibility that the Imam (AS) had a Christian servant, who used to serve him and the narrator asked about the rule of using her services. Based on this, his response means there is no problem in interacting with the servant because her hands are tahir i.e. washing her hands removes any external najasat that might have been there. However, this possibility is unlikely, because the narrator is one of the great narrators and it is unlikely that he would be unsure about the Imam (AS)’s actions, as he would know if the Imam (AS) had allowed it in the past.


1. Tahdhib 6:385, paragraph 1142; and from Shaykh Tusi? In al-Wafi 6:209, paragraph 25
2. Wasa`il al-Shi’a 3:422/chapters on Najasat 14:11

Sunday 11 July 2010

Najasah of the Kafir (5)

Having looked at the narrations to do with the Najasa of the People of the Book. We will now look at some of those that imply their Tahara:

1. The sahih narration from ‘Ays ibn al-Qasim (1) who said: “I asked Abu Abdullah (AS) about eating from a Jewish person, a Christian person and a Zorastrian. He said: if it is your food, and he has washed himself, then it’s not a problem.”

What is understood (maf-hum) of this narration is that it is not allowed to eat their food if it is from their food or they have not washed. From there, it is clear that the prevention (from eating their food), comes from the najasa of their food or from their outer body due to touching something that is inherently najis (ayn an-najis) like pork or the like. What is meant by the food in the Imam’s response, cannot be something like dates or bread, as all dry things are pure. What is meant, must be the impermissibility of eating food that has moisture i.e. probably cooked food (similar to the prohibition in previous narrations). Therefore, the narration clearly implies that Ahl al-Kitab are tahir intrinsically, and that Muslims can eat with them (if the food is from the Muslims and they have washed).


2. What Zakariah has narrated from ibn Ibrahim (2) who said: “I entered into the presence of Abu Abdullah (AS) and said: I am a man from the Ahl al-Kitab and I have become a Muslim. The remainder of my family are all still Christian and I am with them in one house. I have not yet left them so can I eat from their food? He asked me: Do they eat pig? I replied: No, but they drink wine. So he said to me: Eat with them and drink.”

This clearly shows that Christians are intrinsically tahir and the prevention from eating with them does not stem from anything other than derived najasah from eating pork and the like, and if they do not eat such haram foods, then there is no problem with them. Wine, on the other hand, only makes the lips najis, which then do not touch other things, and furthermore, they are washed daily at least once, and therefore, it is not a factor in eating with them. Alternatively, this narration (like other similar narrations) could be used to imply the taharah (not permissibility) of wine.

3. The sahih narration of Isma’il ibn Jabir (3) who said: “I said to Abu Abdullah (AS): ‘What do you say about food of the Ahl al-Kitab?’ So he said: ‘Don’t eat it.’ Then he was silent for a moment. Then he said: ‘Don’t eat it.’ Then he was silent for a moment. Then he said: ‘Don’t eat it and don’t leave him saying it is Haram but leave him avoiding it. In their cups is wine and in their plates is pork.’” It is clear that this implies the Tahara of the Ahl al-Kitab and that eating with them is Makruh.

4. What Ammar al-Saabiti narrated from Abu Abdullah (AS) (4) who said: “I asked Abu Abdullah whether a man can do Wudhu from a cup, from which a Jew has drunk from. He said: ‘Yes’ so I said: ‘from the same water that he has drunk from?’. He said: ‘Yes’.” This clearly implies that Jews are Tahir, as if they were not Tahir, the water would have become Najis after they have drunk from it, and it would not have been allowed to do Wudu from it.


(1) Wasa`il al-Shi’a 3:497/chapters on Najasat, 54:1, 24:208, Chapters on Haram Foods 53:1
(2) Wasa`il al-Shi’a 24:211/chapters on Haram Foods 54:5
(3) Wasa`il al-Shi’a 24:210/chapters on Haram Foods 54:4
(4) Wasa`il al-Shi’a 1:229/chapters on remaining food 3:3

Saturday 3 July 2010

Najasah of the Kafir (4)

We have discussed four narrations so far that are used to imply the Najasah of the Kafir. Many have been shown to be flawed in their implication, but we will now continue this discussion with more narrations often used to imply the Najasah of the Kafir.

5. What Abu Busayr has related from one of the two (either 5th or 6th Imam) (AS) (1): “[What is the correct way] for a Muslim to shake hands with a Jew or Christian? He said: ‘From behind a piece of cloth. And if he shakes your hand with his, then wash your hand.’”. And from this, one can infer that it is recommended to wash your hand after shaking hands with them. This is because shaking hands from behind a cloth, would mean the cloth would get najis and the Imam (AS) would have ordered the cloth to be washed.


6. Another narration from Ali ibn Ja’far from his brother Abu al-Hasan Musa (AS) who said (2): “I asked about eating the food of a Zorastrian in one bowl, and lying down with him* on a mattress and shaking his hand, and he replied: no”. And similar to that is a narration from Harun ibn Kharija (3) who said: “I said to Abu Abdullah (AS): Can I mix with Zorastrians so can I eat from their food? And he responded: No”. From these narrations, you cannot infer that Zorastrians are najis. It is clear that one could forbid eating and sitting with them due to a disdain for them and so that Muslims do not mix with them, because sitting with them on one mattress does not make a Muslim’s clothes or body najis, as is eating on one plate with no mention of moisture.

7. Another sahih narration of Ali ibn Ja’far from his brother (AS) (4): “[I asked] about a Christian who has a shower with a Muslim in the Hammam. He said: If he [the Muslim] knows that he is a Christian, he should wash himself with other water (not from the Hammam). Alternatively, he could wash himself in the sink/bath (after the Christian)”.

This has a sound chain of narration and does imply that the Christian is Najis because although theoretically the avoidance could have been due to another reason e.g. the Christian person in this case having some najasat on him, that cannot be the meaning here, as the fact he is Christian, is used in the statement.

At the end of the above narration, is: “I asked about a Jewish person and a Christian person who put their hand into water. Can one do Wudu from that water for prayers?” He said no – unless you are forced to.” Shaykh Ansari puts the “unless you are forced to” phrase due to Taqiyya (5). There is no doubt that this attribution of taqiyya is against the clear apparent meaning of the narration, but actually this part of the narration does not imply the Najasa of the Ahl al Kitab . This is because it implies that if there is a lot of water, then you must avoid the water they have touched but if there is no choice then there is no problem. Therefore, the most you can infer from this part of the narration, is that it is better to avoid it.

There is one more narration but it does not add to the discussion. That ends the discussion on the narrations from which you may deduce the Najasa of the Ahl al Kitab. We have seen that only a few of them actually do imply the Najasah but given no other evidence, we would have inferred the Najasah of the People of the Book.

In the next blog, we will look at the many narrations that imply the Tahara of the Ahl al-Kitab, after which we will look at how scholars try and reconcile seemingly contradictory evidence.


(1) Wasa`il al-Shi’a 3:420/chapters on Najasat, 14:4-5
(2) Wasa`il al-Shi’a 3:420/chapters on Najasat, 14:6
(3) Wasa`il al-Shi’a 3:420/chapters on Najasat, 14:7
(4) Wasa`il al-Shi’a 3:420/chapters on Najasat, 14:9
(5) Kitab al-Tahara: 349, Chapter of Najasah, Sub-chapter on Najasah of the Kafir, Line 2
* This may not be the best translation

Saturday 26 June 2010

Najasah of the Kafir (3)

In the next two blogs, we will look at the heart of the issue – by analyzing the narrations that suggest that Ahl al Kitab are najis.


1. A hasan (0) narration from Sa’id al-A’raj (1) “I asked Abu Abdallah (AS) about (whether I could eat from) the leftover of Jews and Christians. He said: “No”.”

There is no problem in the chain of narration and it is clear that it is relevant to the Najasah of Ahl al-Kitab.


2. A sahih (0) narration from Muhammad ibn Muslim (2): “I asked Abu Ja’far (AS) about a dish of Ahl al-Dhimma and Zorastrians, and he said: Do not eat from their dishes, and nor from food they have cooked, and nor from the cups in which they have drunk wine.”

This narration, although it has a strong chain of transmission, is not clear in implying that the Ahl al-Kitab are Najis. In fact, it suggests the opposite, because of the usage of “wine”. If they were Najis, then all cups should be avoided, including those in which they have drunk water. In terms of the food, there are two potential options:

1. Ahl al-Kitab eat pork (and other food derived from pig), and so this is likely to be present in their food
2. The dishes may become najis by pork or other najasat (without the required washing afterwards in the prescribed way), as that is not something that is important for them

It could alternatively be for another reason.


3. A hasan (0) narration from al-Kahili, who said (3): “I asked Abu Abdullah (AS) about a group of Muslims who are eating, and a Zorastrian man comes. Should they call him to eat with them? He said: as for me, I do not make a Zorastrian eat with me, but I do not want to make haram on you anything that you are currently doing in your lands.”

It is obvious that this does not show the najasah of the Zorastrian, as he (AS) did not eat with him due to the non-suitability (for the leader of the Muslims) of sharing food with someone who stubbornly refuses the law of Islam, and this is at the level of dislike.


4. A sahih (0) narration from Muhammad ibn Muslim from Abu Ja’far (AS) (4): “There is a man who shook hands with a Zorastrian. So he said: his hand is to be washed but he does not need to do Wudu”. Some may consider the apparent meaning of this to be that the Zorastrian is Najis. However, there are two points to mention:

1. The shaking of the hands would only lead to the transfer of najasa if there was moisture
2. Therefore, washing the hands could be a recommendation, as it could not be an obligation (due to the absoluteness of the command, which would include when it is dry).

There is a narration, which further explains this from al-Qalanasi (5), who said: “I said to Abu Abdullah (AS): A Dhimmi sets off, and he shakes my hand. He said: ‘Wipe it with dust and with the wall’. I asked: and what if it is an enemy of Allah (Nasib)? He replied: ‘wash it’.”

And this might be an indication of disdain for the Ahl al-kitab or a spiritual najasah. However, based on the probability in the fact that when you shake hands, it is rare that there is any moisture, it cannot be inferred from this narration that Ahl al-Kitab are najis (in the legal sense).


In the next blog, we will look at a few more narrations that suggest that Ahl al Kitab are najis, after which we will move onto the narrations that suggest that Ahl al Kitab are tahir.

(0) The attribution of hasan and sahih to the narrations comes from Ayatullah Khui and is based on analyzing the chain of narration. In terms of narrations that are accepted: Sahih is the highest quality, followed by hasan and then muwathaq (which means that there may be a Sunni in the chain of narration but it is still accepted). We can discuss ilm al-rijal if people are interested in later blogs
(1) Wasa`il al-Shi’a 1:229/chapters on leftovers, 3:1; similarly in 3:421/chapters on Najasa 14:8
(2) Wasa`il al-Shi’a 3:518/chapters on Najasat, 72:2, and page 419, 14:1, and 24:210 on the chapters of Haram foods 54:3
(3) Wasa`il al-Shi’a 3:419/chapters on Najasat, 14:2
(4) Wasa`il al-Shi’a 3:419/chapters on Najasat, 14:3
(5) Wasa`il al-Shi’a 3:420/chapters on Najasat, 14:4-5

Saturday 19 June 2010

Najasah of the Kafir (2)

In the previous blog, we mentioned the main verse relevant to this discussion:

إنّما المشركون نجس فلا يقربوا المسجد الحرام بعد عامهم هذا

“O you who believe! the “Mushrikun” are nothing but unclean, so they shall not approach the Sacred Mosque after this year…”1


Ayatullah Khui splits najis (unclean in the verse above) into two types:

1. Technical/ritual meaning i.e. that which means that if you touch it, you must wash it before praying
2. Non-technical meaning i.e. dirtiness (either physical dirtiness or spiritual najasah – as “what najasah is dirtier than shirk!”)

It is the latter meaning which is the apparent (dhahir) meaning, as that is what would prevent entrance into Masjid al-Haram, as Allah would not be happy with the entrance of his enemy into His house. There is nothing from this verse that implies ritual uncleanliness directly. Therefore, this verse cannot be used to imply that Mushrikun are ritually unclean.


Now we move onto the meaning of Mushrikun. Shaykh Bahmanpour discussed in his tafsir classes2 that “Mushrikun” could be referring only to the polytheists of Arabia who used to come for Hajj regularly on the one hand, or it could mean anyone that commits shirk at all, including Ahl al Kitab. He considers both of these as extreme opinions and in the end, has a similar view to that of Ayatullah Khui (shown below).


Ayatullah Khui says that some scholars have considered Ahl al Kitab as amongst the Mushrikun (polytheists), based on the verse of the Qur`an:

(وقالت اليهود عزير ابن الله وقالت النصارى المسيح ابن الله ... سبحانه عمّا يشركون ) 3

And the Jews say: Uzair is the son of Allah; and the Christians say:  The Messiah is the son of Allah; these are the words of their mouths; they imitate the saying of those who disbelieved before; may Allah destroy them; how they are turned away! They have taken their doctors of law and their monks for lords besides Allah, and (also) the Messiah son of Marium and they were enjoined that they should serve one Allah only, there is no god but He; far from His glory be what they associate with him4 (with Him).

This can be responded to in the following ways:

- Shirk has several levels, some of which touch all of us (non-infallibles). So how can the najasah of a mushrik be from all these levels? What about the Muslim who shows off in his actions (an example of “Shirk”). Therefore, there are some types of shirk, which are not included in this verse, and this includes the Ahl al-Kitab.

- There are a many verses that are specific to just Ahl al-Kitab, and to Mushrikun e.g. polytheists are not allowed to live in Muslim lands (they have to leave), whereas Ahl al-Kitab can live as long as they pay the Jizya and follow the laws. Therefore, the technical meaning of Mushrikun used in the Qur`an does not seem to include Ahl al Kitab5

Therefore, there are two options
- the verse means Mushrik including Ahl al-Kitab
- the verse means Mushrik not including Ahl al-Kitab, which is the more likely given the evidence

It is clear, therefore, that you cannot infer that the Mushrikun includes Ahl al Kitab.

And considering the meaning of Najas given above, it cannot be concluded from this verse that Mushrikun are Najis with its technical meaning.


For the Najasah (at least in its spiritual meaning) of the Mushrikun, that is something that is conclusively agreed amongst the scholars, which is authoritative regardless of the verse. And similarly, for the sworn enemy of Imam Ali (AS) (Nasib), and deniers of the Creator, there is no doubt about their Najasah.

However, for the Ahl al Kitab, this verse neither points to their Najasah in a technical or non-technical sense as it is not necessarily applicable to them. Therefore, we have to look at other pieces of evidence to reach a conclusion about Ahl al-Kitab, as the verse is not conclusive for them.

The general opinion is that even they are Najis, and in fact, according to some6it is considered as one of the simple realities of religion. However, some scholars from the past and present disagree and consider them tahir. And what is used is from narrations so we will firstly look at the narrations that suggest that Ahl al-Kitab are najis, and then move to those that suggest they are tahir so we can see which is more likely.

1. Surah Tawba: 28
2. http://www.sicm.org.uk/audio.php (Shaykh Bahmanpour, Surah Tawbah, verse 28)
3: Surah Tawba: 30-31
4. Note the usage of shirk here
5. e.g. Surah Bayyinah: 1
6 e.g. in Misbah al-Faqih, Taharah, 558, line 26

Saturday 12 June 2010

Najasah of the Kafir (1)

The next topic I would like to turn to is the Najasah of the Kafir. This blog is an introduction to the topic. It is a contentious issue now because of the sheer implications of the ruling and the fact that recently, some scholars have come out with different rulings.

1. In summary, the Shi’i point of view had, until a few decades ago, been that all polytheists (including Ahl al-Kitab [i.e. Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians]) were physically Najis i.e. their touch (with the presence of moisture) would require washing before praying.
2. This changed a few decades ago, with the general Shi’i position now considering people of the Book to not be physically Najis.
3. Now Syed Fadlallah (1) believes that even polytheists are not physically Najis (although it is Ihtiyaat al-Mustahab to consider them Najis), and Ayatullah Saanei (2) also considers everyone tahir (pure) other than those who are stubbornly religiously against Islam (which does not even include those who are fighting against Muslims for political reasons).

Therefore, due to the fact that in spite of little changing in the context or the source texts, the ruling has changed so dramatically, and the implicit implications that non-Muslims are somehow less “clean” in a physical sense, I believe this is an interesting topic to open up.

As with the previous topic, I would like to present Ayatullah Khui’s views (3), and discuss how I have been told Ayatullah Fadlallah’s derivation differs.

Anyway, back to Ayatullah Khui’s book and his discussion. He brings narrations from all sides of the argument but to start, Ayatullah Khui believes there is no doubt at all in the “Najasah” of the “Mushrikun” and it is, in his view, one of the necessities amongst the Shia. He had not encountered any opinion against this from any Shii scholars (even though most Sunnis believe in their Taharah (4), with few exceptions (5)). This consensus is based on the verse of the Qur`an:

يَٰٓأَيُّهَا ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوٓا۟ إِنَّمَا ٱلْمُشْرِكُونَ نَجَسٌۭ فَلَا يَقْرَبُوا۟ ٱلْمَسْجِدَ ٱلْحَرَامَ بَعْدَ عَامِهِمْ هَٰذَا

“O you who believe! the “Mushrikun” are nothing but unclean, so they shall not approach the Sacred Mosque after this year…” (6)


However, as I explained earlier, Ayatullah Fadlallah believes in the Taharah of even the Mushrikun. How is this possible? The reasoning provided to me by Shaykh Abu Mahdi, and the reasoning that I have heard whilst in Syria, was that “Najis” does not necessarily have to be a physical uncleanliness – it could be a spiritual uncleanliness. We will come to narrations which discuss this in a later blog.

Due to the fact that Ayatullah Khui does not consider the Mushrikun to have any chance of being tahir, we will look at his exceptions to this.

There are, therefore, three types of Kafir:

1. Those who believe in more than one God i.e. polytheists (mushriks) – which he considers to be najis due to consensus (based on the verse of the Qur`an) – as explained above

2. Those Kafirs who were/are stubbornly against Imam Ali (AS) e.g. the Nasib is worse than the Mushrik (based on the narration of Ibn Abu Ya’fur: “God May he be Exalted did not create anything more Najis than the dog, and the Nasib is more Najis to us as the Ahl al-Bayt than it (dog)” (7), and therefore, the Najasah will apply to him as well. (8)

This type of argument is a type of analogy based on reason, that is often used in Shi’i reasoning, and is subsumed under the category of ‘Aql.

3. Those non-Muslims who believe in one God i.e. ahl al-Kitab

In this final category, there has been disagreement amongst the scholars from the past until the present, and the future blogs will look at this in further detail.


1. Volume 1 of Fiqh al-Shari’a, page 36, point 77: 11
2. http://saanei.org/?view=03,00,00,00,0#03,05,13,4,0
3. Pages 37-52 of Volume 3 of his major Fiqh work Sharh al-‘Urwat al-Wuthqa
4. Tafsir al-Kabir 24:16, Mughanni Chapter 1, Page 49
5. Example: Fakhr in his Tafsir, Chapter 16, Page 24
6. Surah Tawba: 28
7. Wasa`il al-Shi’a 1:220, Chapters on mixed water: 11:5
8. I made a mistake in the post previously before editing it - please note the change.

Friday 4 June 2010

Women as mujtahids? (2)

In the previous blog, we discussed the fact that the main narration used has a good chain of narration. We now have to move onto the actual content of the narration. Does it really imply that women cannot be mujtahids?

A reminder of the narration:

Abu ‘Abd Allah Ja’far ibn Muhammad al-Sadiq (A.S.) said: “Be careful that some of you do not bring others to trial in front of the people of injustice; instead, go to the man* among you who knows…”
Wasa-`il al-Shi’a 27:13/Chapters of the pages on Judges, Chapter 1, Page 5.

(* = rajul [Arabic])

Now it seems clear that some may infer from this that women should not be heeded and listened to as a judge. And it is known that the role of giving religious rulings (being a mujtahid) is at least at the same level as being a judge. Therefore, if being a man is a requirement of being a judge, then it is clearly a requirement of being a mujtahid.

This can be responded to in the following ways according to Ayatullah Khui:

Firstly, the word “rajul” (translated as man) was in contrast to the people of injustice, who the sixth Imam (AS) was preventing turning to, when you want a fair hearing. It is more common (in those days at least!) to refer to a man and we are not used to the judging of women at all. Therefore, the usage of “man” is not saying that being a judge is constrained to men, and therefore, there is no evidence from this narration that being a man is relevant in being a judge, forget about in being a mujtahid.

And furthermore, there is no evidence that there is any relationship between being a judge and being a mujtahid. It is interesting that THIS narration is the main narration mentioned by Ayatullah Khui on this topic. There is another narration mentioned in the discussion, but it is not worth mentioning as it does not really prove the point that women cannot be mujtahids, and only a couple of paragraphs are mentioned about it.


In spite of the lack of narrations, Ayatullah Khui then goes on to use his prerogative as a highly qualified scholar, to explain his viewpoint based on his understanding of Islam as a whole. As a respected mujtahid, he has researched Islamic thought, narrations…etc., and he thus proposes that women should not be mujtahids for another reason.

Independent of narratory evidence, he has inferred from the “taste” of the shari’a, that the duty loved (by Allah) for women is being covered (/away from others), and taking care of household affairs, rather than entering what prevents those duties. And it is clear that being a mujtahad puts you in the position as the person to turn to and question, as this is the necessary consequence of being at the head of Muslims. It does not please Allah that a woman is on show like this in any situation, and He would not like her leading men in congregational prayers so how would He consider their position as the head of the affairs of the society?


This is a very interesting argument proposed by Ayatullah Khui for the following reasons:
1. It suggests that there is no textual evidence that directly excludes women from being Mujtahids
2. It shows that Ayatullah Khui's reasoning is based solely on his understanding of women from his position as a respected scholar. Other respected scholars may reach another judgement, and this would change the ruling. This seems to be what the other Mujtahids in my previous post have done.
3. It does not seem to be of considerable importance, with only a few pages devoted to this topic.

In the next few posts, I am going to focus on another topic of interest - why Ayatullah Khui (in contrast to previous scholars) believes that Ahl alKitab (people of the book - considered to be Christians, Jews and Zorastrians) are tahir, and that Mushrikun (polytheists) are najis). This discussion goes over 50 pages and understanding his arguments, will give real insight into how ijtihad by scholars occurs.

Wednesday 26 May 2010

Women as mujtahids? (1)

Apologies again for the long time since the last post – my excuse is inlaws and a trip abroad! Anyway, it seems that in general, people are less interested in the usul itself, only in its usage in determining rulings. With this in mind, I will return to fiqh istidlali (derivation of rulings) as I started, and where the most enthusiasm was. In previous blogs, I concentrated on Ayatullah Saanei’s works, due to their focus on contemporary issues. However, I think that it is important also to look at the great Ayatullah Khui, especially when discussing the derivation of fiqh rulings. His work is the culmination of years of research and one of a few of its kind, with over 40 volumes explaining his rulings. It is now so renowned that other scholars use it in their discussions. Syed Fadlallah, for example, uses it in his bahth kharij lessons, which I had the opportunity to attend. He reads parts of Syed Khui’s rulings, and then puts forward his point of view.

Regardless, I have decided to continue on my theme of contemporary issues and am going to look at a part of his work on Taqlid. Just a quick aside: the volume on taqlid is 370 pages long (that is the length of the commentary and reasoning of only a couple of pages worth of rulings!). On page 186, he discusses one of the conditions for becoming a mujtahid: being a man.

His derivation of this condition begins with reference to a narration by Abu Khadija Salim ibn Mukarrim al-Jamaal who said:

Abu ‘Abd Allah Ja’far ibn Muhammad al-Sadiq (A.S.) said: “Be careful that some of you do not bring others to trial in front of the people of injustice; instead, head the man* among you who knows…”
Wasa-`il al-Shi’a 27:13/Chapters of the pages on Judges, Chapter 1, Page 5.

(* = rajul [Arabic])

He discusses the chain of narration by starting with the final member of the chain Abu Khadija Salim ibn Mukarrim al-Jamaal. When discussing chains of narration, the first port of call is always the scholars of rijal in the past: in particular, Najashi and Shaykh Tusi.

In Najashi’s rijal book (188/501), he considers Abu Khadija to be trustworthy. Shaykh Tusi in his Fahrast (his rijal book 79/327), considers him to be a weak narrator of hadith but according to Allama, he considers him trustworthy in another place. In addition, Abu Khadija is in one of the narrators of Ibn Qawlawayh’s Kamil al-Ziyarat, which is considered as a sufficient condition to be trustworthy (I can go into further detail as to why most Shi’i scholars consider this to be the case if anyone is interested). Now, when faced with potentially contradicting opinions on Abu Khadija, Ayatullah Khui considers the following options as to the timing of the two opinions of Shaykh Tusi:

Either the time of Shaykh Tusi’s consideration of Abu Khadija as weak and trustworthy was at the same time. In such a case, we could not consider either to be an authority, and we would be left with Najashi’s opinion of Abu Khadija being trustworthy.

Alternatively, if the consideration of Abu Khadija as trustworthy came after Shaykh Tusi’s previous opinion of him being weak, then his final opinion of trusworthiness is later is a relinquishing of his previous opinion.

Finally, if Shaykh Tusi’s opinion of Abu Khadija as weak came after his view of Abu Khadija as trustworthy, then it is again a relinquishment of his previous view, and against the view of Najashi.

As you cannot tell the order, there are doubts about his opinion of weakness, as you cannot be sure of the final position (the only one where Shaykh Tusi’s final view matters and is of weakness). Therefore, you cannot rely on the two opinions of Shaykh Tusi and you return to the opinion of trustworthiness of Najashi and others.

He does not consider there to be any issue with the rest of the chain of narration.

In the next blog, I will focus on the remainder of his derivation.

Sunday 18 April 2010

Authority of Narrations (3)

The second verse that is used to validate the usage of this kind of narration, is that in Surah Tawbah, verse 112:

"And it does not beseem the believers that they should go forth all together; why should not then a company from every party from among them go forth that they may apply themselves to obtain understanding in religion, and that they may warn their people when they come back to them that they may be cautious?" (Shakir)

Scholars using this verse believe it implies that the people (who the experts of religion return to) must heed the warnings of these experts of religion and this “heeding” is absolute i.e. not dependent on the people reaching certainty about these experts, and thus punishable if not followed.

There is a long discussion but the most potent argument against this line of reasoning is that this may give credence to the idea that an expert should be listened to, but is irrelevant to the discussion we are having about relying on a trustworthy person transmitting a narration.

This verse is thus not seen in the same light as that in Surah Naba, and is not considered to be useful in this discussion.

We have now discussed the main verses from the Qur`an that are used, and we will now move onto narrations. It is important to note, that it is clearly not possible to use narrations that are of this category i.e.khabar wahid to determine the authority of these narrations, otherwise it would be a circular argument.

We thus have to consider only narrations that must be correct because they have been narrated by many independent people at each generation since the time of the Prophet (SAW) i.e. tawatur. This is authoritative because of the extreme unlikelihood of every one of the narrators (who are examined to be trustworthy) to have lied independently and reached the same conclusion (Shahid al-Sadr uses a rational calculation of probabilities argument to discuss the implausibility of this being wrong). This will be the focus of the next blog!

Monday 5 April 2010

Authority of Narrations (2)

Apologies for the delay since the last post - I don't have internet at my new place! Anyway, we have so far discussed in brief, the largest and most important basis for relying on khabar wahid narrations (the verse of Naba in Surah Hujurat). It is very much based on using the maf-hum. However, there are two main reasons to object to interpreting this verse in that way:

1. This is a linguistic discussion, which considers the verse to be similar to the phrase: “if you have a boy as a child, then circumcise him”, which does not have a mafhum because you cannot infer from this phrase that if you don’t have a boy, then you don’t circumcise him, as the circumcision is reliant on the condition being fulfilled i.e. from the verse, we cannot make the inference above. The best way to understand this further is to consider the various possible meanings of the verse:
a. A report – if a fasiq comes with it – you have to look into it
b. The report of a fasiq – if a fasiq comes with it – you have to look into it
c. The person who comes with a report/narration – if he (or she) is a fasiq – you have to look into it

The objection (likening the verse to the circumcision phrase) makes sense if we consider the second meaning of the verse, but this seems least likely, as the verse does not really imply that the report has to be the report of a fasiq. Therefore, this objection is not a valid objection.


2. At the end of the verse, the reason (ta’lil – تعليل) is provided for the ruling i.e. “lest you harm a people, whilst in ignorance”. Therefore, every narration that does not result in certain knowledge, requires clarification and research. This includes narrations coming from just individuals.

This can be explained by considering the phrase: “don’t eat this pomegranate because it is sour”. This order not to eat the pomegranate is qualified by it being sour, and it can be inferred from this that you should not eat all sour things, even if it is not a pomegranate. Similarly, from the verse, you can infer that anything that might harm others because you are not resulting in certain knowledge, is not authoritative, and requires clarification/investigation.

There are two main answers to this point that the reason for the verse (ta’lil) seems to contradict what is understood above (mafhum):

A. This assumes that the ta’lil (reason of the verse) should be understood over the mafhum (the implication of the verse). However, it could be argued that the mafhum is a special case of the general ta’lil. The response would be that there is no mafhum at all because of the ta’lil. And therefore, this answer is not correct.

B. The ta’lil (reason of the verse) does not actually contradict the mafhum because of the meaning of جهالة. Above, it has been translated as ignorance, meaning the lack of knowledge but this is the meaning of جهل, and جهالة actually has the meaning of doing something silly. Therefore, although taking a narration from a just person may be something that is without complete knowledge, it is not something silly, and the argument does not apply!

Therefore, Shahid al-Sadr considers this verse to be a complete and valid basis for using narrations transmitted by a trustworthy person even if it does not make you completely confident in it being correct.

In the next blog, we will look at other pieces of evidence (one other verse of the Qur`an, and then perhaps some narrations/other disucssions).

Wednesday 17 March 2010

Authority of Narrations (1)

This is a bit less technical - and hopefully more interesting - discussing a major part of our law. Most of our law is based on narrations that are narrated by only a few individuals, and should we rely on such narrations?

Ideally we would only rely on narrations that we can have complete confidence in e.g. those that are reported by many to many (tawatur - تواتر). However, the vast majority of narrations do not reach that level and are potentially misleadingly called “single narrations” (khabar wahid – خبر واحد) – note that a narration narrated by several people is still called khabar wahid.

The validity of using these narrations, which do not reach certainty (and are thus called dhunun – ظنون), is a vital pillar of the most legal laws. In the next few blogs, I will briefly discuss how Shahid al-Sadr comes to the conclusion that it is valid to use these narrations as the basis of law. There are, however, some famous scholars of the past, who do not believe in their validity such as Sayyid al-Murtada.

The discussion will be in two parts:
1. Whether we can use khabar wahid at all
2. It we can use these narrations, what are the limitations of them e.g. only by trustworthy people?

The first part is a major discussion, and as I have noticed that technical topics have not been as well received, I will stay at a higher level, which will hopefully retain your interest!

There are several bases for relying on khabar wahid narrations:
1. Qur`an
2. Narrations
3. Rationality


The biggest and most important basis for relying on khabar wahid narrations is the verse of Naba in Surah Hujurat:

“O you who believe, if a fasiq (evil-doer) comes to you with a report, look carefully into it, lest you harm a people, whilst in ignorance, then be sorry for what you have done.”

This verse clearly shows the obligation in clarifying what the person says when they come on the condition that the person is fasiq. Now what is understood (mafhum - مفهوم) by this, is that there is no obligation of clarifying when the person who comes is not a fasiq. There are some more technical discussions (which I will not go into unless someone is interested) to conclude from this, that the narration of a just person is authoritative.


In the next blog, we will look at the objections to this line of argument and then move onto the other verse used....etc.

Monday 8 March 2010

Textual Evidence supporting Freedom when there is doubt (3)

We are currently trying to understand the meaning of the verse is Surah Talaq (65), verse 7:

“Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it.”
(لا يكلف الله نفسا إلا ما آتاها)

This is a tafsir discussion, and we are focussing on the meaning of "what" in this verse. Is it:

Option 1: money/property (due to the context of the verse)
Option 2: any action
Option 3: any duty.

Shaykh Ansari believes that Itlaq implies that all four of the above must be true and following a discussion, Shahid al-Sadr agrees.


We then have to further our understanding of the scope of this verse:

1. Is this verse specific to doubts about whether something is haram or not (e.g. smoking), or if it is generalized to actions that might be wajib e.g. recitation of supplications when seeing the new moon. The answer is that although some verses are specific to doubts about the impermissibility of actions, this verse does not specify either haram/wujub so it clearly encompasses both.

2. Is the verse specific to doubts about the legality about a ruling, or about the applicability of a ruling. There are two possibilities of what the verse might mean in this regard:

A. إيتاء تشريعي: The verse means Allah giving only in terms of laws (as Allah is the Creator of the Law) and His duty is to with regards to making clear the law, not the details about its applicability

B. إيتاء تكويني: The verse means that Allah has created everything, and therefore, His duty is to make everything clear.

Using the same argument as in the previous blog (absolute = Itlaq), it encompasses both meanings, and thus includes doubts in the applicability of a ruling as well.


3. The final question that occurs in one’s mind when considering this verse is whether baraa`a is applicable when you have a doubt only after trying to investigate, or before any investigation. One might think that using the same arguments above (itlaq = absolute), the verse should apply to both before and after investigation. However, in the case where the law is available in the books of narrations for example, such that if the individual searched, he would find out that Allah had given a ruling. The verse is not talking about baraa`ah for laws reaching the individual, but about Allah giving a law.


Therefore, we can be content that this verse is sufficient to show that when there is a ruling on whcih there is doubt, you are free to do what you want, and this textual evidence supercedes the previous blogs' discussions on ihtiyat, which would only be applicable IF there was no textual evidence.

Sunday 28 February 2010

Textual Evidence supporting Freedom when there is doubt (1)

We are currently trying to understand the meaning of the verse is Surah Talaq (65), verse 7:

“Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it.”
(لا يكلف الله نفسا إلا ما آتاها)

This is a tafsir discussion, and we are focussing on the meaning of "what" in this verse. Is it:

Option 1: money/property (due to the context of the verse)
Option 2: any action
Option 3: any duty.

The ramifications of this are very wide ranging, as if it is any duty (as Shaykh Ansari claims), then the principle of baraa`a (as discussed in previous blogs i.e. that you are free to do what you want when you get a rule on which there is doubt) is confirmed.

However, although Shaykh Ansari uses the idea of Itlaq (as explained in the previous blog) to say that as there is no indication that any of these options is true, all must be true. There are some arguments against this idea:

The first argument against this point of view is a grammatical and very technical one, which I advise those not interested to ignore: in summary, the first two options are different to the third option grammatically (the first two are direct objects, whereas the third is an absolute object). Therefore, all three cannot all be used. However, this is seen as a weak point because the word can be considered a direct object here rather than an absolute object. [A possible argument that one could use تكليف or وجوب – but they are synonymous and therefore, still absolute objects]


The next question is whether the many narrations (these will be discussed later), which mentions the obligation of ihtiyat, are considered to be more applicable than this verse of the Qur`an. This is because the verse says that if it is not known what the duty is, then there is no punishment. However, these narrations, say that Allah informs you of the obligation of ihtiyat. Therefore, the verse is not applicable, as the duty is known to be ihtiyat.

This argument is similar to the situation where we have the principle that everything is tahir until you know it is najis. Then if someone comes and tells you that something is najis, does the principle still hold? Obviously not – and that is the argument here. Please ask if this is not clear and I can try and clarify further.


The answer to whether the verse of the Qur`an takes priority can be understood dependent on the meaning of the verse:

1. نفي السببية: “Allah does not punish someone due to the impermissibility of an action, as long as it is not known”. With this meaning, what is mentioned above is correct, and ihtiyat is applicable. This is because the ihtiyat is the known obligation.


2. نفي الموردية: “Allah does not punish someone when considering an impermissible action as long as it is not known but the individual is completely free in the aforementioned action”. In this case, where the verse intends actual freedom for the individual in the action, as long as it is unknown, whereas the narrations intend ihtiyat (precaution). In this case, there is clear contradiction between the two, and therefore the verse takes precedence.


The question though, is which of the two above is correct. Shahid al-Sadr considers the second one to be true because this makes sense in the context of the verse (the correct meaning is clear that Allah does not task an individual in financial matters other than what is possible for the individual to pay).

Therefore, Shahid al-Sadr backs up Shaykh Ansari that Itlaq is applicable. In the next blog, we will try and look at one more argument against Shaykh Ansari's view and how Shahid al-Sadr counters it.

Regardless, it does seem that the topic is getting a bit dry and not as interesting to most readers so following the next blog, I will move onto another potentially more interesting topic - and that is what is the basis for fiqh relying on khabar wahid i.e. traditions that come through one/few strong chains of narrations (but not enough to make you be certain of its authenticity), whilst there is a general view that you should not act based on anything other than certainty!

Friday 19 February 2010

Textual Evidence supporting Freedom when there is doubt

So far we have discussed what the rational principle should be, if there is a ruling on which you have a genuine doubt i.e. whether it rationally makes sense to:

1. Observe precaution (Syed Sadr's view)
2. Be free to do anything (Ayatullah Khui's view)

This was a purely theoretical exercise, assuming there was no textual evidence pointing to another option....however, in reality there is textual evidence that the proponents of both points of view above, agree on - and that textual evidence points to the fact that you do not need to observe precaution but you are actually free to do anything.

We will first look at the Qur`anic evidence for this, then move onto narrations. This is a very long discussion, but it shows the importance given to this part of usul al-fiqh.


Firstly, the verse is Surah Talaq (65), verse 7:

“Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it.”
(لا يكلف الله نفسا إلا ما آتاها)

This verse is in the context of discussing the issue of a husband’s duty to pay for the wife’s expenses when he divorces her e.g. when she is pregnant, he has to continue paying for her expenses until she gives birth and if she breastfeeds the baby, then the payment should continue until the end of the breastfreeding. The question that is raised, is what is the level of this payment? Does it depend on the wealth of the husband? The point is that the amount depends on what the person is able to pay. The complete verse is as follows:

"Let the affluent man spend out of his affluence, and let he whose provision has been tightened spend out of what Allah has given him. Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it. Allah will bring about ease after hardship." (65:8)

According to Shaykh Ansari’s work – Al-Rasa`il, the word ما in the verse above (translated as “[according to] what”), introduces a relative phrase, and the question we have to answer is the meaning of “what”. There are three possibilities for the meaning of "what":

1. Money/wealth/property i.e. the verse means that Allah does not task any soul with paying money, other than to the extent to which he is able to pay. This understanding of the verse is possible due to the verse’s presence in the context of paying for a wife’s subsistence.

2. Action i.e. Allah does not "task" any soul with an action other than if he/she is able to do that action. This understanding is possible due to the term “task” mentioned in the translation, as that term (task) is only used with actions.

These two explanations of the verse do not result in the implication of the legal baraa`a. However, the third possibility does:

3. Duty i.e. Allah does not task any soul with a duty except when the duty has come to the individual. And it is clear that “coming to the individual” requires knowledge of the duty by the individual. The meaning thus becomes: Allah does not task any individual with a duty except when he has made it known to the individual, and without making it known, there is no duty.

However, the problem occurs: how do we confirm the final possibility when it is possible that one of the first two are correct. Shaykh Ansari uses the principle of Itlaq (i.e. absolute meaning). He says that as there are no indicators that the meaning is specific to one of the first two meanings, it must incorporate all of them.

However, of course there are counter arguments to this point of view, which we can discuss in the next blog!

Sunday 14 February 2010

Side topic - Adam and Hawa

Before continuing my blogs about the principles that underpin what to do when in doubt, I would like to discuss a very clever point and inference made by one of the readers.

The verse in question is 2:35:
"And We said: O Adam! Dwell you and your wife in the garden and eat from it a plenteous (food) wherever you wish and do not approach this tree, for then you will be of the unjust"

There are two options for this verse:

1. It is a clear and unambiguous statement of obligation to Adam and Hawa (this is the apparent meaning of the verse as in general, an order is consdered to be an obligation, unless there is something that implies otherwise)

2. It is doubtful as to what is meant i.e. if it is obligation or recommendation.

The reader of the blog said that if we consider Shahid al-Sadr's view (given no textual evidence from Allah, the correct rational option MUST be to consider Allah's obedience and observe precaution rather than be free to do anything), how can Adam and Hawa ever have eaten from the forbidden tree? Even in option 2, the correct course of action MUST be to practice precaution.


The answer to this point is based on a theological position held by the Shi'a, which considers Prophet Adam to be infallible. His action therefore cannot be (a priori) considered a sin. What must the reason be?

In essence, the argument against the reader's suggestion, is based on the fact that our conception of obedience to our Creator is predicated on our presence in THIS world. Our judgement and rational mind have come to the conclusion that Allah has the right to be obeyed...etc., following our experience and understanding in this frame of existence. In the heavens, how can we be sure that the same conclusions exist?

1. How can we know that pre-this world, evil was known to exist as a counterpoint to good i.e. could Adam have KNOWN that Satan was saying something actually wrong (Haram) rather than just not good, as he had never experienced evil?

2. How do we know that in that world, orders from Allah, can/should be considered as orders that MUST be obeyed, rather than just advice, that can be overlooked?

Therefore, the argument is clear - that in that world, we cannot impose our understanding of right and wrong in the same way, and our pre-conceived notions of rationality may not be applicable in a different situation. Doing something when not knowing of its reality, may not therefore, be considered a sin in the way we understand it, in this life...


In the end, Prophet Adam's infallibility is a question of theology rather than one of practicality!