Principles that underpin what to do when in doubt (2)

In the previous blog, we talked about the different types of doubt.

Let’s start with the شك بدوي i.e. the doubt when there is no overall knowledge ('olm ijmali) about what to do. This can be discussed in two ways:

1. What does the rational mind say the correct course of action should be, regadless of the Qur`an and narrations (وظيفة أولية)
2. What the Qur`an and narrations say.

We are going to first discuss what the rational mind says [in the absence of any textual evidence]. There are two main positions amongst the scholars about what the rational course of action should be (independent of the Qur`an and narrations):

- مسلك قبح العقاب بلا بيان (Qubh al-`Iqab bi la bayan) – it is ugly for Allah to punish someone when the rule has not been made clear. Based on this principle (and assuming that there is nothing from the Qur`an/narrations to suggest otherwise), the correct action would be that you are free to do any action (أصالة البراءة [bara’a]). This principle is the most widely held opinion amongst the scholars and Syed Khui is of this opinion. However, Shaykh Ansari says in his famous book al-Rasa`il, that most of the Usuli scholars in the earlier years e.g. Shaykh Tusi, Shaykh Mufid and Sayyid al-Murtada followed the principle below:

- مسلك حقّ الطاعة (Haq al-Ta’a)– this is based on the fact that Allah has a right to be obeyed even on issues where there is a debate, and therefore, the correct course of action is being cautious (احتياط = ihtiyaat based on أصالة الاشتغال). This principle is held by Shahid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.

I would like to stress that this is purely a theoretical exercise, as there are actually detailed evidences that regardless of what the rational course of action should be, the course of action based on the Qur`an and narrations, is that you are free to do what you want in the case of doubt (we will discuss this following this theoretical exercise and my personal view on this topic).


In the next blog, we will discuss the main 4 main arguments for the theory that it is “ugly” for Allah to punish someone for a duty that he is unaware of. Shahid al-Sadr will then discuss these arguments and show them to have deficiencies, after which we can move onto what his view is, and why. Following that, we can look at the Qur`anic and hadith arguments on whether it should be baraa'a or ihtiyat.

Principles that underpin what to do when in doubt (1)

As explained in the previous blog, I am starting an Usul course in the Summer, and the next few blogs will discuss one topic that is an important theoretical discussion on which there is a lot of debate. For those interested, please email!

The question is basically:

If there is a doubt about Allah’s ruling about what is a duty on the individual (شك في التكليف), and you are unable to reach a definitive legal ruling from the main sources, you have to define a position on what is the right thing to do (أصل عملي = asl ‘amali).

[This assumes there is no definitive ruling that you were sure about before, which then changed, in which case you should take the former position of certainty – istis-hab)]

How should you define this position? Now the source of this discussion is when there is a doubt in the ruling. There are different types of doubt:

[Important definition:
علم إجمالي = ‘ilm ijmali. Here there is general knowledge about the overall (علم بالجامع) with doubt about the options i.e. you know you have to pray on Friday, but you have a doubt about whether it is Juma or Dhuhr (or both).]

1. شك بدوي (Shak Badawi = basic doubt). This is when there is not even any overall knowledge about a topic (i.e. not even any علم إجمالي) e.g. smoking tobacco [of course, some might argue that there is when it talks about harming yourself but others would argue that this is completely a different situation and there is no overall knowledge on this topic]. Shahid al-Sadr believes that this is undoubtedly the place for baraa`a (freedom to choose what to do)

2. شك مقرنة بالعلم الإجمالي (a doubt on something on which there is ‘ilm ijmali). This is when there is overall knowledge about a topic but doubt about its constituent parts/details e.g. Jum’a v Dhuhr. There are two options here:

1. When there is doubt between two opposite things e.g. praying Dhuhr makes Jum’a unnecessary
2. When there is a doubt between more and less e.g. if there are 9 or 10 parts to Fajr

This is the place for احتياط – ihtiyat.


3. شك بين الوجوب والحرمة (doubt between two contradictory things e.g. haram and wajib). This is where there is a place for تخيير (choice).


In the next blog, we will start the discussion about shak badawi (basic doubt). We will look at what one would do in the absence of any information to the contrary from the Qur`an and Sunnah, and then look at what is the correct thing to do (with reasoning from the Qur`an and Sunnah).

Playing games with tools of gambling e.g. cards (3)

Ayatullah Saanei then moves onto narrations but he uses the same principle to all the narrations.

He considers the term “Qimar” (used in the narrations – also means gambling) as something specifically for playing with tools of gambling with actual gambling of money/items, not without (e.g. in Majma’ al-Bahrayn).

In addition, he uses the argument that the reality is known that playing these games without actually gambling is not something that strengthens what is wrong, and weakens the truth, especially when the goals are to strengthen the mind, for example. This makes many of the narrations not applciable.


[The implication is that all the narrations say that these are the ills of “qimar” and “maysar” so cannot be to do with this type of game without gambling]


Therefore, with the lack of evidence for terming this type of gambling haram, the rule of “asalat al-ibaha” is applicable. This rule basically states that if there is no clear indication about whether something is haram or halal, it must be mubah.

Following an email I sent about an intensive course on Usul I will be teaching in the Summer, there has been an interest on what type of topics I would be discussing. In the next few blogs, I will discuss one of the topics that would be in this course: what should be done when there is no clear ruling from the narrations. (this will explain the asalat al-ibaha as well)

Playing games with tools of gambling e.g. cards (2)

We are now going to look at the verses of the Qur`an used by scholars to discuss this issue.


Verse 1:
“They ask you about intoxicants and games of chance (maysar). Say: In both of them there is a great sin and means of profit/benefit for men, and their sin is greater than their profit.” (2:219)

The verse above (2:219) points towards the impermissibility of gambling for money or something else, but does not actually mean the impermissibility of the action itself for the following reasons:

1. The first thing that enters your mind when you consider the “profit/benefit” of gambling, is the monetary or material benefit, like it is well known that the “profit/benefit” of drinking wine is the intoxication…etc. even though the benefits are more general than that.

[Note: this idea of “what the first thing to enter one’s mind” is one of the ways of discerning what the intended meaning is]

2. The apparent meaning of gambling here is that which has monetary and material benefit.

3. The root of the word “maysar” is y-s-r, and what is meant by this term is a monetary benefit.



Verse 2:

“The Shaitan only desires to cause enmity and hatred to spring in your midst by means of intoxicants and games of chance (maysar)…” (5:91)


This verse indicates that the reason for the impermissibility here is the hatred and enmity that Shaytan creates, and this does not happen other than if there is money in between. That is because money or profit is what causes hatred, jealousy and spending time and leisure time does not necessarily cause that. All of these negative consequences come from playing for money like Syed Khurasani says in his Jaami’ al-Mudaarik fi sharh al-mukhtasir al-nafi’.



Basically the argument used, is clear - that Ayatullah Saanei believes that the words used, and the intention of the verse is clearly towards monetary benefit. A similar argument is used for the narrations, which will be the topic of the next blog.

[Note the level of depth in these arguments, and how such an argument is sufficient in scholarly circles]

Playing games with tools of gambling e.g. cards (1)

Following this brief look at one topic in usul (rules of how to derive rulings), I thought it would be interesting to go back to Istidlal (actual derivation of rulings). My aim is to return to another topic in usul after this (perhaps something like mafhum/itlaq – please contact me if you have a preference).

We will now look at Ayatullah Saanei’s view of using instruments of gambling without gambling. Just for information, I am using a different chapter in his “Series (of books) on Contemporary Fiqh” for each of these topics.

His first chapter discusses the impermissibility of gambling in general but due to this being something that is not really of concern, we will move on directly to the second chapter: “Competitions/games and playing with instruments of gambling without recompense or gambling”.

The main verse used is 2:219:

“They ask you about intoxicants and games of chance. Say: In both of them there is a great sin and means of profit/benefit for men, and their sin is greater than their profit.”

There is doubt amongst the scholars about whether this type of game e.g. playing cards/chess for fun, is haram or not:

1. Al-Muqaddas al-Ardabili who says in his Zubdat al-Bayan fi Ahkam al-Qur`an: “Know that the apparent meaning of the verse is the absolute impermissibility of wine and every intoxicant, and similarly for gambling, but this is when taking something as collateral”. [taking something as collateral basically means betting for something]

2. Shaykh Ansari says in al-Makasib al-Muharrama: “Playing with tools of gambling without taking something as collateral…is something on which there is debate.”


Backgammon and chess are excluded from this rule, according to Saanei, as playing with them is considered impermissible.

[Ayatullah Fadlallah considers playing chess as allowable as seen in http://arabic.bayynat.org.lb/mbayynat/books/nadwas/fikr241q5.htm]

Ayatullah Saanei then talks about why it is possible to use tools of gambling as long as you do not gamble. He firstly discusses verses of Qur`an, which he shows are not applicable to this type of game, and then moves onto narrations. In the next blog, we will look at the Qur`anic arguments...

Ijma (4)

What is the scope of Ijma when the ijma' is on slightly different topics?

1. If the rulings of the scholars are different e.g. some are general, and others are specific, there can still be ijma’ on that which is agreed upon by both

2. If the ijma’ is on a specific ruling, it is much harder to use the tools of إطلاق (this is when each word is taken and all implications of the word are included in the rule e.g. “take the apple” = in any way, take any type of apple in any situation [using إطلاق]; this is (in essence) because Allah would have restricted this law if he had wanted (either in this narration or in another one)); here, because it there is consensus on what the Imams did/said but not by the word they used, we cannot use إطلاق.

There are two types of Ijma’:

1. The simple Ijma’ – which is where all the scholars agree on a specific ruling
2. The composite Ijma’ – this is where some scholars agree on something being Mustahab, and others believe it to be Wajib;


This can be thought of in two ways:
1. The composite Ijma’ could be thought of as a simple Ijma’: that the action is not haram.
2. Alternatively, the scholars who believe that the action is Wajib (/mustahab), may only believe the action is not Haram IF their assumption of Wujub (mustahab) is correct


Regardless, the composite Ijma’ cannot be considered as a proof in itself, because the basis of Ijma’ is on the probability of it being from the Imam/Prophet, and if there are two different opinions, this probability is no longer present.



This is the end of the discussion about Ijma' (in that section by Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr). I have done some work finding out all the terminology used with regards to Ijma', which may be useful if you ever read any work on Ijma' (from "Usuli terminology" by Ayatullah Mirza Ali Mishkini) but I doubt it is of interest to most....

In the next blogs, we will look at gambling without tools of gambling e.g. playing cards...etc., and how Ayatullah Saanei derives his view that it is not haram.

Ijma (3)

So we now understand why Ijma' logically should be understood. However, one commenter requested some clarification about Ijma'. He was unsure about whether we could use consensus at our time (as the definition given was consensus at a time near the Prophet (SAW)). The main point to note here, is that to consider consensus as a definitive proof of the Prophet (and thus Allah's) desire at that time, there are limitations to consensus so far from that time. It thus has a lower value. Its value can be considered thus:

1. If consensus now uncovers consensus at that time, then it is useful
2. As a proof on its own - but this is not a proof in itself but may act as an indicator..


We do not discover this ارتكاز (action of the Prophet/Imam - not something that was written) unless the following conditions are met:

1. The Ijma’ is complete amongst the early jurists and it does not count if there is Ijma’ amongst the scholars of recent times, if this is in contrast to the scholars of the early times. This is because they were closer to the time of the Imams/their companions.

2. There is no riwaya/other reasoning which the scholars part of the ijma’ could be relying on (if there is a riwaya/other reasoning, then it is called اجماع مدركي). This is because the riwaya could be the basis of the ijma’. Therefore, the ijma’ does not discover the ارتكاز and is not a proof. We would then look at the riwaya itself. It is possible that the ijma’ gives us extra confidence that might make a weak riwaya seem stronger. In such a case, we might use the ijma’, but in addition to the riwaya, and not as a proof in itself.

3. There are no other factors that might indicate that the ijma’ is not discovering the ارتكاز e.g. a major scholar’s view might influence everyone else

4. The issue is not something that عقل works in e.g. the fact that preparation for Hajj (e.g. buying a ticket…etc.) is wajib because Hajj is wajib is a rational deduction. Ijma’ in this topic is not a proof.

5. The issue is not something that there is اطلاق or عموم about e.g. if it says pray with your hands down, then if there is ijma’ that this allows your fingers to be facing up or down, the ijma’ is not a proof, as it is clear from the rule of اطلاق.


There are many factors influencing the strength of the ijma:

1. The number of scholars who agree/disagree; Ijma’ would still apply if it was most (not all) scholars, although the value of the ijma’ would be less.

2. The quality of the scholars: if a major scholar (e.g. Shaykh Tusi/Mufid) disagrees, then the ijma’ would not be seen to be correct.

3. How far the consensus is ,from the time of the Prophet/Imam – the closer to that time, the more chance it has of being correct

The value of the Ijma’ cannot be as strong as tawatur for example for the following reasons:

1. Each scholar could have reached a ruling for a different reason using their own ijtihad, rather than getting it from the Imams

2. The scholars may have been influenced by a major scholar (so a mistake by this major scholar might have led to every scholar in that era agreeing – rather than the cause being the Imam/Prophet)

3. It is dependent on the scholars themselves and their capabilities/methods, which might be flawed i.e. all might be using the same usul al-fiqh tool; they might all be influenced by the same factors (social/gender…etc.)


This should give you a better way of understanding how consensus is limited. In the remaining blogs of Ijma', we will discuss further conditions, types of Ijma', and the main terminology used when discussing Ijma'.

Ijma (2)

Now we will look at the main reasons given for why Ijma' should be accepted (theologically):

1. Allah would not have let all the scholars agree due to his kindness (lutf) – Shaykh Tusi’s argument

2. The same proofs that are used for the authority of normal traditions with trustworthy people. If someone of the caliber of Shaykh Tusi/Murtada narrates there was ijma’, that means that a trustworthy person mentioned it to them

3. If one of the people in the ijma’ is the Ma’sum Imam., then he cannot be wrong

4. There is a narration attributed to the Prophet (SAW): “My nation will never reach consensus on something that is wrong”

5. Muhammad Baqir Sadr’s usage of multiplication of probabilities (حساب الاحتمال) – the chance of each one of the scholars making a mistake by themselves may not be negligible but when all of them independently reach a ruling, then it is far more likely to be true.

The first/third/fourth points assume that the rule is true, as God would not let the scholars agree on a true ruling. The second proof is conveying the rule given by others. Only the final proof actually uncovers a law.

Therefore, for the non-final proofs, they are a type of ijma’ that is not something that can constitute a legal basis for a ruling by themselves. They do not uncover a ruling, but they are just supplementary to a ruling.

The final proof, however, does give enough weight to by itself to show an actual ruling, and is independent of the Qur`an and sunnah, as it is something that uncovers a ruling by itself.

Because of this, the ijma’ shows that you are trying to uncover part of the sunna of the Prophet/Imam, or his words/action (called ارتكاز or رواية غير مكتوبة). We can be sure that there is no written riwaya, otherwise they would have mentioned it in their books (and if they did, that would be the thing that you base the ruling on – looking at its chain of narrations and content). The ijma’ shows the presence of something in the minds of the Imam or something that was clear amongst them, and when the jurists present saw that, they based their rulings on it (based on learning from the Imam).

[just for information, this is based on Muhammad Baqir Sadr - others believe that point 1 is sufficent]

In the next blog, we will look at the conditions for ارتكاز to be discovered.

Ijma (1)

We have so far discussed many interesting topics in the realm of istidlal i.e. how to derive rulings from the sources. This is the end (and potentially most interesting) side of fiqh, but behind this, there is a wealth of learning. This istidlal gives an insight into the rulings of scholars but all of these deductions requires understandings of many different topics such as Usul, Rijal, Tafsir…etc., and the next few blogs gives an insight into the scholarship/discussions that occur about each of these sources as well. This hopefully will show that the istidlal, although seemingly straightforward, has a lot of complications that are not always easy to understand.

There are several ways of determining whether something is actually from the Prophet/Imam:

1. Tawatur (many independent chains of narrations)
2. Ijma’ (consensus)
3. Shuhrah (widely known)
4. Sirat al-mutasharri’ah (normative practices of observant believers)
5. Khabar al-wahid al-thiqah (traditions which have a sound chain of transmission)

Ijma’ was used in the previous discussion about Bulugh and a few people have expressed their interest in how it really makes sense and why we use it. In the next few blogs, I will detail Shahid Muhammad Baqir Sadr’s view (with my own comments) in his Halaqat (I have used Ayrawani’s commentary on Halaqat al-Thalitha to supplement this).

Ijma’ (/Shurah) means consensus (/widely known), and it is when all (/most) scholars at one time, close to the time of the Imam/Prophet, agree to a ruling. If one scholar has a ruling, there are two possibilities:

1. He relied on verbal evidence from the Imam/Prophet (or others)
2. He made a mistake

Now if there are lots of scholars at one time, close to the time of the Imam/Prophet agreeing to a ruling, there is more chance that there is the existence of some verbal evidence (by probabilities).The point is that this should be taken into consideration IF they yield evidence of verbal evidence.

In the next blog, we will discuss some of the proofs, what is meant by them and their limitations...and then move onto the main conditions of the ijma'...enjoy!