Saturday 27 January 2024

Shaykh Haidar Hobbollah - an introduction to his way of thinking (part 2)

On Friday 12 January 2024, Shaykh Haidar Hobbollah came to Mahfil Ali, continuing the conversation on his methodology in deriving Islamic law and its applications in contemporary law.

This session covered Shaykh Hobollah’s methodology in deriving fiqh rulings with  practical examples to tease out how the methodology works in practice.

I have outlined his methodology in previous blogs based on his previous session at Mahfil Ali (see here), but to briefly summarise: Shaykh Hobbollah believes that one can only determine an Islamic (fiqhi) ruling (e.g. Haram / Wajib / a right) if one attains “strong confidence / almost certainty” regarding the available body of evidence (nothing can be 100% certain, but this is referring to being as confident as is reasonably possible, with evidence). This involves looking at all the evidence in totality (the Qur’an, the narrations, the history), putting them altogether and determining how confident one can be that this is Allah’s intention.

This approach significantly decreases the scope of Shari’a, makes the value of the hadith collection significantly weaker (as a single narration, even if it is sahih (authenticated) would not on its own lead to “strong confidence / almost certainty”) and creates a number of questions.

It is these questions that we explored at the session, and which I have summarised below (with some edits based on my own understanding):

 

Question 1: This methodology must mean that many rules accepted by most scholars, are not accepted by you. Can you talk through some examples. For example, let’s talk about a man shaking the hand of a woman where there is no lust / expectation of lust.

Answer: To reach the conclusion that shaking hands between genders without lust is haram (prohibited) according to Shaykh Hobbollah’s methodology, we need to reach “strong confidence / almost certainty” that this is not allowed – otherwise it would be allowed. The evidence available includes:

·       A few narrations indicating that it is not allowed, one of which is sahih (authenticated), and

·       A narration that says that the Prophet did shake the hand of a woman, although this narration is weak.

This level of evidence is insufficient to give “strong confidence / almost certainty” so Shaykh Hobbollah cannot reach the conclusion that it is haram.

There are many similar examples where Shaykh Hobbollah cannot reach the conclusion of prohibition as the evidence does not reach “strong confidence / almost certainty”:

·       The prohibition of a woman being a marja’ or leaders in society (noting the narrations on this topic are not authenticated by many traditional scholars)

·       The prohibition of a wife leaving the house e.g. to work, without permission from the husband (noting Shaykh Hobbollah believes that the violation of the rights of the husband or wife is a separate point and is the same for both genders)

·       The prohibition of relying upon women’s testimony on sighting the moon for the first of a month

Let’s look at another example – that of Qasr prayers. In order to justify the shortening of prayers, we need “strong confidence / almost certainty”. There are a range of narrations on the topic, which has led to scholars falling into three groups:

·       Some saying that you need to travel a specific distance from the hadd al-tarakhkhuss

·       Some saying that you should not be tired as a result of the travel

·       Some specifying a time period i.e. 24 hours of travel

What you can have “strong confidence / almost certainty” in from the number of texts, is that there is a provision for praying less in certain circumstances when you are travelling. However, you cannot reach “strong confidence / almost certainty” that if you travel for a couple of hours (even over a long distance) and you’re not tired, that this would apply.   Shaykh Hobollah then highlighted that one needs to then refer to the Qur’an, where the verse on breaking one’s fast is clear

Ramaḍan is the month in which the Quran was revealed as a guide for humanity with clear proofs of guidance and the decisive authority. So whoever is present this month, let them fast. But whoever is ill or on a journey, then ˹let them fast˺ an equal number of days ˹after Ramaḍân˺. Allah intends ease for you, not hardship” (Qur’an, 2:185)

The verse is clear in that the intention of breaking fast due to travel or illness is that Allah does not intend hardship for you, and therefore, one can reach “strong confidence / almost certainty” that Qasr prayers are relevant when the extent of the travel is so much that it leads to tiredness and hardship.

[one of the audience questions afterwards, challenged this and asked whether this creates undue subjectivity in the law that impedes the overall united Muslim community. Shaykh replied that actually there are multiple rules where subjectivity is part and parcel of the rules e.g. the rules on ghina’ (singing / music), where it is the incitement to lust that is often seen as the determinant of prohibition; and similarly, when it comes to breaking one’s fast due to illness, this is also a subjective measure.  It is you and you alone that can ultimately decide on your ability to fast during illness (even if a doctor may provide some advice) and there is no objective measurement of how ill you have to be to break your fast]

[At the dinner beforehand, we discussed the concept of slavery. He noted how actually to enslave an individual, required a religiously mandated war, and that the only option in those cases (which aligned with the “international law” of the time) was to barter that individual you had taken as a slave for money, or for Muslim prisoners etc. Despite so many texts, there aren’t other ways of enslaving individuals mentioned and as such, this is not an issue anymore].

[another example worthy of note is Shaykh Hobbollah’s view on women’s unilateral right to divorce. He believes that there is not sufficient evidence to reach “strong confidence / almost certainty” that women have this right. He highlighted how in the 300 years between the Prophet (SAW)’s time and that of the Imams (AS), there are no such narrations despite there being the potential for this issue to be raised.]

 

Question 2: Can you reach any conclusions on Islamic legal laws (fiqh) if the bar for acceptance is so high?

Answer: Yes, there are lots of examples where the evidence is overwhelming. For example, praying, fasting, following the Prophet and those in authority amongst you (ulul `amr min kum) etc. There are many such examples.

Let us consider an example that is explicit in the Quran and ahadith: the prohibition of pork. This is explicit many times in the Qur’an (2:173, 16:115), in narrations and in the practice of Muslims. We can reach “strong confidence / almost certainty” that this is prohibited Islamically.

 

Question 3: Can any rules – even ones that we can establish by your methodology – change with context and through time?

Answer: Yes, but we have to be careful. Let’s lay out a few important points:

·       Context (time/place) clearly can matter: We have many cases where rules at one time were different later or in another context. This is the concept of a “change of subject”. [I’ve added this point: The example of the obligation of doing Tawaf inside the Maqam Ibrahim at the time of the Prophet, was loosened at the time of the 6th Imam (AS)].

·       We cannot assume every rule may change with context (time/place): If every rule is subject to change – then how can we reach any conclusion on any ruling? There has to be some meaning for the “completion of our religion”.

·       There need to be some rules to determine whether a ruling would be different in a different circumstance:

o   If you can reach “strong confidence / almost certainty” on the rationale for a rule (either explicitly in a text, where the term in usul al-fiqh is qiyas mansus al-illa) or by another mechanism (where the term in usul al-fiqh is tanqih al-manat), then you can conclude that if the rationale is different, the ruling is different.

o   Where we cannot have “strong confidence / almost certainty” of the rationale, we have to be careful about implying that the ruling should be different in a different circumstance. How can you know? For example, can we be “strongly confident / almost certain” that Allah wants us to do something different in a new context because the system has changed; or perhaps he wanted us to do the same in that new context, to help change the system back.

o   Whilst you can reach “strong confidence / almost certainty” about specific principles (e.g. justice, fairness etc.), we have to be careful in how we justify the use of these principles. For example, we may consider something to be unjust, but can we be “strongly confident / almost certain” that it is actually unjust, and doesn’t have another just rationale?

 

[Note: if you reach the conclusion that a rule is, for example, actively harmful, then a secondary principle such as la darar can be used to change the ruling in that new instance – however, that is not a change in the rule in and of itself]

 

Question 4: So how does this approach on context work in reality? Can you share some examples?

Answer: Let us consider a series of examples:

·       Example of qiyas mansus al-illa: consider the ruling of intoxicants. The rule is very clear that the reason for wine being prohibited, is that it is an intoxicant. Therefore, wine that is not intoxicating, is not prohibited. And other intoxicants are also prohibited.

·       Example of women witnesses in general – the traditional rule is that the value of a woman’s testimony is half that of a man. Shaykh Hobbollah noted that the reason is provided in the text: “so that one may remind the other” (Qur’an, 2:282), implicitly based on the differentiated education levels between men and women, and in order to ensure that the testimony is valid. In today’s society, where education levels are similar between the genders, a differentiated value of testimony based on gender is not justified to retain this goal of achieving testimony that is reliable.

·       Example of hudud punishments (e.g. cutting the hand of a thief). In Shaykh Hobbollah’s view, he is “strongly confident / almost certain” that the reason for the rule is to deter theft. In a context where we can be “strongly confident / almost certain” that theft is not deterred by cutting of the hand, the rule is no longer valid.

 

Question 5: Can you provide some examples where context does not result in a change in the law?

Answer: Let us look at the example of inheritance, where women are mandated half the inheritance of men. Some might try and argue that in today’s society, where women have significantly greater financial responsibility, the context is different – and as such, inheritance should not be differentiated by gender, or it should be based on need rather than gender. Shaykh Hobbollah’s view is that the threshold for a change in the law due to a change in the context is not met:

·       We can be “strongly confident / almost certain” that this differentiation by gender is what Allah had wanted at that time: as the underlying rule is explicit and in the Qur’an (Qur’an, 4:11-14)

·       We cannot be “strongly confident / almost certain” that the rule on differentiated inheritance by gender should change:

o   He notes that throughout the 300 years from the time of the Prophet (SAW) and the times of the Imams (AS), there was not a single narration where one of the Ma’sumeen suggested that the rule should change, even though there were also cases of financially independent women. If there would be a different ruling for a different context, this would have been raised during this time.

o   He notes that deriving the rationale for the rules on inheritance is very difficult to determine (and definitely not enough at the level of being “strongly confident / almost certain”). For example, why should a wife inherit a quarter if the husband who passes away is childless; and an eighth if the husband has children. These figures and differentiating figures be easily explained or understood. Therefore, one is not able to discern the rationale.

·       As a result, we should assume that the original ruling is still applicable i.e. differentiation by gender is the Islamic rule on inheritance.

[Note: Shaykh Hobbollah’s view is that equality (as it is understood today) is not an Islamic principle – this ruling is an example of this position]

 

Question 6: What are the implications of your view on the scope of Shari’a being so limited? Does it mean that Islam has nothing to say on ethics? What about other issues, such as the environment or the system of government?

 

Answer: Islam has a lot to say on ethical issues and morality. In fact, there is much more evidence on the Islamic position on ethical issues such as lying, backbiting etc., than on most fiqh issues. These are clear and the evidence easily crosses the threshold of being “strongly confident / almost certain”.

However, on other broader issues, such as the environment or the system of government, there is “strong confidence / almost certainty” on principles or goals of Islam e.g. “being a steward on the Earth”, “justice”, “fairness” etc., but no “strong confidence / almost certainty” on the implications of these principles. These should be left up to society and the government of the day to determine.

As such, it is difficult to reach the conclusion that there is a specific type of economic system that is the Islamic way [in fact, for example, we see that when communism and socialism was popular in the 1950s and 1960s, many muslim scholar propagated the idea that Islam was of a socialist hue, and now that capitalism and free market economics is popular, Muslim scholars are putting forward ideas that Islam supports liberalism and free markets. Shaykh Hobbollah is cautious of being swayed by the prevailing sentiments in society. Shaykh Hobbollah therefore is not a supporter of calling very specific positions on the environment or system of government as “Islamic”.

[In the Q&A, he noted how the wilayat al-faqih method of government, is primarily based on narrations that do not reach the level of being “strongly confident / almost certain”. He therefore considers these to be options that communities can choose – but is not necessarily or inherently Islamic].

 

Question 7: What does this approach mean for theological issues or questions of belief (Aqidah)?

Answer: If you need “strong confidence / almost certainty” for fiqh, you definitely need it for belief. In fact, this is a well-agreed position amongst all scholars.