Shaykh Haidar Hobbollah - an introduction to his way of thinking (part 2)

On Friday 12 January 2024, Shaykh Haidar Hobbollah came to Mahfil Ali, continuing the conversation on his methodology in deriving Islamic law and its applications in contemporary law.

This session covered Shaykh Hobollah’s methodology in deriving fiqh rulings with  practical examples to tease out how the methodology works in practice.

I have outlined his methodology in previous blogs based on his previous session at Mahfil Ali (see here), but to briefly summarise: Shaykh Hobbollah believes that one can only determine an Islamic (fiqhi) ruling (e.g. Haram / Wajib / a right) if one attains “strong confidence / almost certainty” regarding the available body of evidence (nothing can be 100% certain, but this is referring to being as confident as is reasonably possible, with evidence). This involves looking at all the evidence in totality (the Qur’an, the narrations, the history), putting them altogether and determining how confident one can be that this is Allah’s intention.

This approach significantly decreases the scope of Shari’a, makes the value of the hadith collection significantly weaker (as a single narration, even if it is sahih (authenticated) would not on its own lead to “strong confidence / almost certainty”) and creates a number of questions.

It is these questions that we explored at the session, and which I have summarised below (with some edits based on my own understanding):

 

Question 1: This methodology must mean that many rules accepted by most scholars, are not accepted by you. Can you talk through some examples. For example, let’s talk about a man shaking the hand of a woman where there is no lust / expectation of lust.

Answer: To reach the conclusion that shaking hands between genders without lust is haram (prohibited) according to Shaykh Hobbollah’s methodology, we need to reach “strong confidence / almost certainty” that this is not allowed – otherwise it would be allowed. The evidence available includes:

·       A few narrations indicating that it is not allowed, one of which is sahih (authenticated), and

·       A narration that says that the Prophet did shake the hand of a woman, although this narration is weak.

This level of evidence is insufficient to give “strong confidence / almost certainty” so Shaykh Hobbollah cannot reach the conclusion that it is haram.

There are many similar examples where Shaykh Hobbollah cannot reach the conclusion of prohibition as the evidence does not reach “strong confidence / almost certainty”:

·       The prohibition of a woman being a marja’ or leaders in society (noting the narrations on this topic are not authenticated by many traditional scholars)

·       The prohibition of a wife leaving the house e.g. to work, without permission from the husband (noting Shaykh Hobbollah believes that the violation of the rights of the husband or wife is a separate point and is the same for both genders)

·       The prohibition of relying upon women’s testimony on sighting the moon for the first of a month

Let’s look at another example – that of Qasr prayers. In order to justify the shortening of prayers, we need “strong confidence / almost certainty”. There are a range of narrations on the topic, which has led to scholars falling into three groups:

·       Some saying that you need to travel a specific distance from the hadd al-tarakhkhuss

·       Some saying that you should not be tired as a result of the travel

·       Some specifying a time period i.e. 24 hours of travel

What you can have “strong confidence / almost certainty” in from the number of texts, is that there is a provision for praying less in certain circumstances when you are travelling. However, you cannot reach “strong confidence / almost certainty” that if you travel for a couple of hours (even over a long distance) and you’re not tired, that this would apply.   Shaykh Hobollah then highlighted that one needs to then refer to the Qur’an, where the verse on breaking one’s fast is clear

Ramaḍan is the month in which the Quran was revealed as a guide for humanity with clear proofs of guidance and the decisive authority. So whoever is present this month, let them fast. But whoever is ill or on a journey, then ˹let them fast˺ an equal number of days ˹after Ramaḍân˺. Allah intends ease for you, not hardship” (Qur’an, 2:185)

The verse is clear in that the intention of breaking fast due to travel or illness is that Allah does not intend hardship for you, and therefore, one can reach “strong confidence / almost certainty” that Qasr prayers are relevant when the extent of the travel is so much that it leads to tiredness and hardship.

[one of the audience questions afterwards, challenged this and asked whether this creates undue subjectivity in the law that impedes the overall united Muslim community. Shaykh replied that actually there are multiple rules where subjectivity is part and parcel of the rules e.g. the rules on ghina’ (singing / music), where it is the incitement to lust that is often seen as the determinant of prohibition; and similarly, when it comes to breaking one’s fast due to illness, this is also a subjective measure.  It is you and you alone that can ultimately decide on your ability to fast during illness (even if a doctor may provide some advice) and there is no objective measurement of how ill you have to be to break your fast]

[At the dinner beforehand, we discussed the concept of slavery. He noted how actually to enslave an individual, required a religiously mandated war, and that the only option in those cases (which aligned with the “international law” of the time) was to barter that individual you had taken as a slave for money, or for Muslim prisoners etc. Despite so many texts, there aren’t other ways of enslaving individuals mentioned and as such, this is not an issue anymore].

[another example worthy of note is Shaykh Hobbollah’s view on women’s unilateral right to divorce. He believes that there is not sufficient evidence to reach “strong confidence / almost certainty” that women have this right. He highlighted how in the 300 years between the Prophet (SAW)’s time and that of the Imams (AS), there are no such narrations despite there being the potential for this issue to be raised.]

 

Question 2: Can you reach any conclusions on Islamic legal laws (fiqh) if the bar for acceptance is so high?

Answer: Yes, there are lots of examples where the evidence is overwhelming. For example, praying, fasting, following the Prophet and those in authority amongst you (ulul `amr min kum) etc. There are many such examples.

Let us consider an example that is explicit in the Quran and ahadith: the prohibition of pork. This is explicit many times in the Qur’an (2:173, 16:115), in narrations and in the practice of Muslims. We can reach “strong confidence / almost certainty” that this is prohibited Islamically.

 

Question 3: Can any rules – even ones that we can establish by your methodology – change with context and through time?

Answer: Yes, but we have to be careful. Let’s lay out a few important points:

·       Context (time/place) clearly can matter: We have many cases where rules at one time were different later or in another context. This is the concept of a “change of subject”. [I’ve added this point: The example of the obligation of doing Tawaf inside the Maqam Ibrahim at the time of the Prophet, was loosened at the time of the 6^th Imam (AS)].

·       We cannot assume every rule may change with context (time/place): If every rule is subject to change – then how can we reach any conclusion on any ruling? There has to be some meaning for the “completion of our religion”.

·       There need to be some rules to determine whether a ruling would be different in a different circumstance:

o   If you can reach “strong confidence / almost certainty” on the rationale for a rule (either explicitly in a text, where the term in usul al-fiqh is qiyas mansus al-illa) or by another mechanism (where the term in usul al-fiqh is tanqih al-manat), then you can conclude that if the rationale is different, the ruling is different.

o   Where we cannot have “strong confidence / almost certainty” of the rationale, we have to be careful about implying that the ruling should be different in a different circumstance. How can you know? For example, can we be “strongly confident / almost certain” that Allah wants us to do something different in a new context because the system has changed; or perhaps he wanted us to do the same in that new context, to help change the system back.

o   Whilst you can reach “strong confidence / almost certainty” about specific principles (e.g. justice, fairness etc.), we have to be careful in how we justify the use of these principles. For example, we may consider something to be unjust, but can we be “strongly confident / almost certain” that it is actually unjust, and doesn’t have another just rationale?

 

[Note: if you reach the conclusion that a rule is, for example, actively harmful, then a secondary principle such as la darar can be used to change the ruling in that new instance – however, that is not a change in the rule in and of itself]

 

Question 4: So how does this approach on context work in reality? Can you share some examples?

Answer: Let us consider a series of examples:

·       Example of qiyas mansus al-illa: consider the ruling of intoxicants. The rule is very clear that the reason for wine being prohibited, is that it is an intoxicant. Therefore, wine that is not intoxicating, is not prohibited. And other intoxicants are also prohibited.

·       Example of women witnesses in general – the traditional rule is that the value of a woman’s testimony is half that of a man. Shaykh Hobbollah noted that the reason is provided in the text: “so that one may remind the other” (Qur’an, 2:282), implicitly based on the differentiated education levels between men and women, and in order to ensure that the testimony is valid. In today’s society, where education levels are similar between the genders, a differentiated value of testimony based on gender is not justified to retain this goal of achieving testimony that is reliable.

·       Example of hudud punishments (e.g. cutting the hand of a thief). In Shaykh Hobbollah’s view, he is “strongly confident / almost certain” that the reason for the rule is to deter theft. In a context where we can be “strongly confident / almost certain” that theft is not deterred by cutting of the hand, the rule is no longer valid.

 

Question 5: Can you provide some examples where context does not result in a change in the law?

Answer: Let us look at the example of inheritance, where women are mandated half the inheritance of men. Some might try and argue that in today’s society, where women have significantly greater financial responsibility, the context is different – and as such, inheritance should not be differentiated by gender, or it should be based on need rather than gender. Shaykh Hobbollah’s view is that the threshold for a change in the law due to a change in the context is not met:

·       We can be “strongly confident / almost certain” that this differentiation by gender is what Allah had wanted at that time: as the underlying rule is explicit and in the Qur’an (Qur’an, 4:11-14)

·       We cannot be “strongly confident / almost certain” that the rule on differentiated inheritance by gender should change:

o   He notes that throughout the 300 years from the time of the Prophet (SAW) and the times of the Imams (AS), there was not a single narration where one of the Ma’sumeen suggested that the rule should change, even though there were also cases of financially independent women. If there would be a different ruling for a different context, this would have been raised during this time.

o   He notes that deriving the rationale for the rules on inheritance is very difficult to determine (and definitely not enough at the level of being “strongly confident / almost certain”). For example, why should a wife inherit a quarter if the husband who passes away is childless; and an eighth if the husband has children. These figures and differentiating figures be easily explained or understood. Therefore, one is not able to discern the rationale.

·       As a result, we should assume that the original ruling is still applicable i.e. differentiation by gender is the Islamic rule on inheritance.

[Note: Shaykh Hobbollah’s view is that equality (as it is understood today) is not an Islamic principle – this ruling is an example of this position]

 

Question 6: What are the implications of your view on the scope of Shari’a being so limited? Does it mean that Islam has nothing to say on ethics? What about other issues, such as the environment or the system of government?

 

Answer: Islam has a lot to say on ethical issues and morality. In fact, there is much more evidence on the Islamic position on ethical issues such as lying, backbiting etc., than on most fiqh issues. These are clear and the evidence easily crosses the threshold of being “strongly confident / almost certain”.

However, on other broader issues, such as the environment or the system of government, there is “strong confidence / almost certainty” on principles or goals of Islam e.g. “being a steward on the Earth”, “justice”, “fairness” etc., but no “strong confidence / almost certainty” on the implications of these principles. These should be left up to society and the government of the day to determine.

As such, it is difficult to reach the conclusion that there is a specific type of economic system that is the Islamic way [in fact, for example, we see that when communism and socialism was popular in the 1950s and 1960s, many muslim scholar propagated the idea that Islam was of a socialist hue, and now that capitalism and free market economics is popular, Muslim scholars are putting forward ideas that Islam supports liberalism and free markets. Shaykh Hobbollah is cautious of being swayed by the prevailing sentiments in society. Shaykh Hobbollah therefore is not a supporter of calling very specific positions on the environment or system of government as “Islamic”.

[In the Q&A, he noted how the wilayat al-faqih method of government, is primarily based on narrations that do not reach the level of being “strongly confident / almost certain”. He therefore considers these to be options that communities can choose – but is not necessarily or inherently Islamic].

 

Question 7: What does this approach mean for theological issues or questions of belief (Aqidah)?

Answer: If you need “strong confidence / almost certainty” for fiqh, you definitely need it for belief. In fact, this is a well-agreed position amongst all scholars.

Shaykh Haidar Hobbollah - an introduction to his way of thinking (4/4)

In the previous blogs, we discussed the way that Shaykh Haidar Hobbollah approaches fiqh, and how it differs from many others. This is important to understand his way of thinking, but what's also interesting is the ramifications of this approach on his view of specific fiqh rulings.

This blog seeks to answer this very question i.e. how do his differences in approach, manifest in the derivation of Islamic laws?

Shaykh Hobbollah has a Telegram channel where he shares his perspectives on a number of issues. Given the differences in his approach, as laid out above, the majority of the perspectives he has chosen to distribute end up being different from the majority opinion.

I have selected a few examples of his rulings:

• Mixing between men and women is not problematic in and of itself
• A person born out of wedlock (walad al-zina) is allowed to lead prayers
• It is allowed to shake the hand of the opposite gender
• It is allowed to eat all animals from the sea, including non-fish, and fish without scales; although it is better to avoid the latter ihtiyat istihbabi, and you should avoid cat-fish (al-jarrith) and al-marmahi as an obligatory precaution (ihtiyat luzumi)
• Wine, beer etc. are all tahir (although prohibited to drink)
• The person who is doing the halal slaughter of an animal, does not have to be Muslim (but they should do the slaughter in the Halal way and mention Allah at slaughter)
• It is not required to follow the most learned (a’lamiyya is not a condition of a marja’)
• There is no requirement for a judge to be a man
• You do not have to recite a full surah after Surah Fatiha in prayers (better to be at least 3 verses)
• It is not inherently wrong to dance or clap (although inciting arousal is forbidden)
• There is no evidence that a woman travelling without a mahram man is forbidden
• It is allowed to play with tools of gambling (including with dice), and chess (as long as there is no gambling)
• It is forbidden for the husband and the wife (same rule) to leave the house when it infringes on their marital rights. If it does not infringe on their marital rights, then there is no prohibition
• Shaving the beard is not forbidden
• All humans are tahir

If there are any specific rulings of his which you would like to understand further, please message me or comment below, and if available, I'll add a short summary of how he derives his opinion. 

I hope these short posts prove useful in understanding inside the mind of Shaykh Hobbollah!

Source:

His daily rulings: https://hobbollah.com/araa_category/%d8%a2%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%a1/

Mixing between men and women: https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%88%d9%82%d9%81-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%ae%d8%aa%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%b7-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b1%d8%ac%d8%a7%d9%84-%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%86%d8%b3%d8%a7%d8%a1/

Illegitimate person can lead prayers: https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%85-%d8%a5%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%85%d8%a9-%d9%88%d9%84%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b2%d9%86%d8%a7-%d9%84%d8%b5%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b9%d8%a9/

Shaking the hands of the opposite gender: https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b5%d8%a7%d9%81%d8%ad%d8%a9-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b1%d8%ac%d9%84-%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b1%d8%a3%d8%a9/ (also note his 7 lectures on the topic)

Animals from the sea: https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%88%d9%82%d9%81-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%8a%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%a6%d9%8a%d9%91%d8%a9-%d9%88%d8%ab%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84/

Purity of wine, alcohol etc. etc. https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%b7%d9%87%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ae%d9%85%d8%b1-%d9%88%d9%85%d8%b7%d9%84%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b3%d9%83%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d9%88%d9%85%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%a7/

Slaughterer does not need to be a Muslim: https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%b9%d8%af%d9%85-%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%aa%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b7-%d8%a5%d8%b3%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b0%d8%a7%d8%a8%d8%ad-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%ad%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%91%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b0%d8%a8%d9%8a/

A'lamiyya: https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%88%d9%82%d9%81-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%b4%d8%b1%d8%b7-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%85%d9%8a%d9%91%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%81%d8%aa%d9%8a-%d9%88%d9%85%d8%b1/

Judge can be man or woman: https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%b9%d8%af%d9%85-%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%aa%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b7-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b0%d9%83%d9%88%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%b6%d9%8a/

Full surah after Fatiha: https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%b9%d8%af%d9%85-%d9%88%d8%ac%d9%88%d8%a8-%d9%82%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%a1%d8%a9-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d9%83%d8%a7%d9%85%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%a8%d8%b9%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%aa%d8%ad%d8%a9-%d9%81/

Dancing and clapping: https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b1%d9%82%d8%b5-%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%b5%d9%81%d9%8a%d9%82/

Woman travelling without a mahram: https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%85-%d8%b3%d9%81%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b1%d8%a3%d8%a9-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%af%d9%88%d9%86-%d9%85%d9%8e%d8%ad%d8%b1%d9%85/

Tools of gambling: https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%a8-%d8%a8%d8%a2%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d8%a8%d8%b9%d8%af-%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%84-%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%81-%d8%a2%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84/

Leaving house: https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%85-%d8%ae%d8%b1%d9%88%d8%ac-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%ac%d8%a9-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%a7-%d8%a8%d8%ba%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a5%d8%b0%d9%86-%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%ac%d9%87%d8%a7/ - also see https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%82%d9%91-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%86%d8%b3%d9%8a-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%ac%d8%a9/

Shaving the beard: https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%85-%d8%ad%d9%84%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%8a%d8%a9/

Purity of all people: https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%b7%d9%87%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d9%86%d8%b3%d8%a7%d9%86/

Shaykh Haidar Hobbollah - an introduction to his way of thinking (3/4)

In the previous post, we covered some of the most important differences between Shaykh Hobbollah and many other Shi'a scholars. 

In this post, we do a deep-dive into what I consider (based on my brief reading of his works) other important methodological differences in how he approaches narrations (ahadith) compared to most other scholars.

• Importance of certainty:
  
  
• Shaykh Hobbollah believes that you need to be certain about any Islamic ruling [A side point: what he means by certainty is not the traditional scholars’ definition of certainty (qat’); he would instead define certainty as what the ‘urf al-‘uqala would consider to be certain which is a lower level i.e. he believes in itmi’nan and not yaqeen]. This is at two levels: certainty that it came from Allah or an infallible (qat’iyyat al-sudur) and certainty in its meaning (qat’iyyat al-dalala)
  
  
• Further to this, is his view that in order to derive Islamic laws, you do not take the traditional approach to ahadith (what he terms al manhaj al-tafkiki al-tajzi’i), where you take the narrations of a topic, compare them and reach a conclusion (often by specifying the general narrations etc.) based on those that are authoritative. He instead takes a different approach in most cases (what he terms al-manhaj al-indimami), which he believes is closer to what a general rational person would customarily do. In this approach, one takes all the evidence available whether it is deemed sahih or da`if (weak) in its reliability as a source, and consider them altogether and exert one’s best efforts to find whatever must be true given all the evidence to get the point of certainty (al-qadr al-mutayaqqan).
  
  
• Prioritise Qur’an over narrations: Most scholars end up prioritising the inference from narrations (sunna) over what you might understand from the Qur’an (including the spirit of the Qur’an or ruh al-Qur’an). This is because when they seem to contradict, the narrations are given precedence as they are perceived to specify Qur’anic verses (even when they theoretically say that the Qur’an takes precedence).
  
  
  Shaykh Hobbollah prefers another perspective (which other contemporary scholars have taken e.g. Sayyid Fadlallah, Shaykh Shams al-din, Shaykh Saanei) where narrations are discarded if they go against the spirit of the Quran (the requirement of al-muwafaqa ma’a mizaj al-Qur`an wa madmunihi wa ruhihi). He notes that Sayyid Sistani and Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr also have this position in theory but Shaykh Hobbollah struggles to find examples of its usage in practice (other than in a few examples).

• Start from theoretical principles down to rulings (not the other way around): He notes there are 3 types of fiqh: fiqh related to a specific issue (fiqh al-mas`ala) e.g. purity, blood money etc.; fiqh related to a rule (fiqh al-qa’ida) e.g. no harm principle etc., which may have multiple applications across different issues; and fiqh related to a broader theory (fiqh al-nadhariyya). In the latter category, he notes the upwards approach (al-ittijah al-su’udi) taken by some e.g. Shahid al-Sadr in his approach to Iqtisaduna (“our economics”), which is where you take the individual rulings on an issue, and gather them to derive what the principle/system must be. He prefers the downwards approach (al-ittijah al-nuzuli) from the principles to the specific issues e.g. from Shaykh Shams al-Din, which doesn’t suffer from the problems of the previous approach (gaps, inconsistencies etc.), as these are resolved if you have principles which would take precedence (hakim) over anything that contradicts them. The challenge, of course, is how to define what are the principles and how to distinguish them from the individual rulings (al-adilla al-ulya vs. al-adilla al-juz`iyya).
  
  
• Determine which texts are contextual and which are relevant for all time (al-tamyiz bayna al-nusus al-tarikhiyya wa al-thabita). There are two important mechanisms he uses here, which are (1) Qur’anic verses are generally principles; and narrations are either principles or temporal; (2) the usages of specific expressions in the text e.g. “the messenger of Allah ruled on a specific issue” gives an indication that something is temporal rather than forever (from Shahid al-Sadr). The reality is that this is not straightforward and requires detailed understanding of the various pieces of evidence, their context, the history etc. There are two approaches that one could use: (A) there is a base position (`asl) where a rule at the time of the Prophet (SAW) is applicable forever; or (B) there is a base position (‘asl) where a rule at the time of the Prophet (SAW) is only applicable in its time and not applicable in a new time. He rejects both of these as he does not think there is any base position (‘asl) in such a situation. He believes that you have to go through each ruling and find out if it is a historical ruling, and if you have any doubt, you return only to what you are certain about (al-qadr al-mutayaqqan)

On a side point, there is a general principle used by scholars, which states that when it comes to acts of worship, you need to have specific textual evidence to allow a certain act. For example, for someone to lead congregational prayers (jama'a), you need specific evidence that allows them to do so. You cannot assume that just because there is no text, that there is no restriction (which is the case on other issues). This is the discussion in usul al-fiqh about asalat ‘adam al-mashru’iyya. When it specifically comes to the issue of congregational prayers, Shaykh Hobbollah does not agree with this perspective, and would argue that unless there is certain evidence that a sitting person cannot lead the prayer of a standing person, that evidence is discarded.

In the next (and final) post, I am going to look at the ramifications of these differences in opinion in his fiqh opinions. Hope you find them interesting!

Sources:

His 779-page book on hadith, Hujjiyat al-Hadith (2016/2017): https://hobbollah.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/HojietAlhadith.pdf

The summary of the approach he takes, Manhaj al-Wuthuq al-Itmi’nani wa Kayfiyyat al-Ta’amul ma’a al-Akhbar wa al-Riwayat (December 2021) https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d9%85%d9%86%d9%87%d8%ac-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%88%d8%ab%d9%88%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%b7%d9%85%d8%a6%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%8a-%d9%88%d9%83%d9%8a%d9%81%d9%8a%d9%91%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%b9%d8%a7/

The approach he takes related to women Manahij al-Ijtihad wa Ta`thiriha ‘ala Dirasat Qadaya al-Mar`a (2019, but based on lectures in 2013, written by Shaykh Sa’eed Nura but checked by Shaykh Hobbollah): https://hobbollah.com/articles/%d9%85%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%87%d8%ac-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%ac%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%a7%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b9%d8%a7%d8%b5%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d9%88%d8%aa%d8%a3%d8%ab%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%87%d8%a7-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89/

Source on the final point: https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%85-%d8%a5%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%85%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%b9%d8%af-%d9%84%d9%84%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a6%d9%85-%d9%88-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%b5%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%85/

Shaykh Haidar Hobbollah - an introduction to his way of thinking (2/4)

In the last post, we covered Shaykh Hobbollah's view on the scope of Shari'a. This has major ramifications, when considered alongside some of his other views. 

In this post, we are going to start to cover the main differences between Shaykh Hobbollah’s approach to fiqh, and the majority of (Shi’a) scholars?

Whilst there are many differences, the three he highlighted as the most important in his lecture at Mahfil Ali (which he asked not to be recorded) were the below [in my view, the most impactful is the second one]:

1. He does not believe there is a requirement to adhere to any form of consensus (ijma’) or the majority opinion of the scholars (shuhra), because neither of these lead to certainty and therefore do not have authority. Whilst in most contemporary usul al-fiqh works, consensus or majority opinion of scholars does not have any authority (hujjiyya) unless it uncovers an Islamic rule (kashifiyya) [noting this is also dhanni], in reality, the final ruling in the fiqh works (risala ‘amaliyya) of most contemporary scholars often does adhere to the views of the majority, by use of obligatory precaution (ahwat wujubi). This is not the position he takes.
   
   
2. He does not believe that you can rely upon narrations by themselves, unless there are enough of them to give you certainty (or unless there are sufficient other contextual indicators [qara`in] that together will help reach certainty).
   
   Another way of putting this, is that he adheres to the position that khabar al-wahid al-dhanni does not have authority. This viewpoint had been held by major scholars of the past, but is not held by any (?) other senior contemporary scholar. The traditional scholarship considers that Allah has certainly given us permission to use khabar al-wahid despite it being a probable source of law. Shaykh Hobbollah disagrees with this conclusion.
   
   
3. He does not believe in the principle of tasamuh fi adillat al-sunan which some scholars use. This is a principle which allows the use of weak sources of evidence to derive a law (what I call the “why not, as there’s no harm” principle). This is often used by some scholars to justify rulings when there are only a small number of weak narrations. It is worth noting that this is not a position held by all scholars and many contemporary scholars do not use this principle.

The conclusion from these methodological differences – which in and of themselves in practice have precedent amongst the major scholars of our current time and/or of the past (including point 2) – is that the threshold required to reach an Islamic law is significantly higher than for most scholars.

This means that there are far fewer Islamic rules that can be derived compared to the majority.

This may be problematic if you had a view that the Shari’a has to be comprehensive [although you could say that the gap could be filled by principles such as bara’a, or you could use the argument of insidadis, who say that you can derive rulings without certainty (authority of Mutlaq al-dhann)]. However, given Shaykh Hobbollah does not have this view, it is not problematic.

In the next post, we will look at some of the other important ways his approach to fiqh differ from the majority.

Useful sources:

His short analysis on the authority of ijma’ and shuhra:  https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%88%d9%82%d9%81-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%ad%d8%ac%d9%8a%d9%91%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d8%ac%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b4%d9%87%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%81%d8%aa%d9%88/

His 779-page book on hadith, Hujjiyat al-Hadith (2016/2017): https://hobbollah.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/HojietAlhadith.pdf

His essay on the topic of Tasamuh (November 2021): https://hobbollah.com/araa/%d8%b9%d8%af%d9%85-%d8%ab%d8%a8%d9%88%d8%aa-%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%b9%d8%af%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%b3%d8%a7%d9%85%d8%ad-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a3%d8%af%d9%84%d9%91%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%86%d9%86/  

 

Shaykh Haidar Hobbollah - an introduction to his way of thinking (1/4)

It has been 7 years since my last post, and apologies for this! Perhaps I may start more regularly again. 

However, rarely have I been so impressed by a scholar, as I was when I met with Shaykh Haidar Hobbollah. On the one hand, he has decades of experience teaching at the highest levels (bahth kharij) in Qum complemented by a plethora of books and essays on complex topics, with innovative ideas. Yet on the other hand, he has also retained the respect of traditional scholarship despite having significantly different views.

This series of short posts aims to bring to light how he approaches Fiqh, why it is important, and what the consequences are. I have framed it as a question-and-answer dialogue, even though it is my interpretation of his perspectives, because I believe it will be easier to understand his thought process. The sources for this, is a mixture of (A) his own published works; (B) what I have heard directly from him; and (C) what he said at Mahfil Ali on 27 May 2022 (and/or what I understood from my conversations with him). I will put useful sources under each question for the more interested readers (who can understand Arabic legal texts).

[One note: I have used the term “Shaykh” throughout to refer to Shaykh Hobbollah. Some may believe this does not accurately reflect the extremely high stature of Shaykh Hobbollah, and some may prefer to use a term such as Mujtahid or Marja’. However, Shaykh Hobbollah is truly humble and does not prefer these titles, even if they appear to be a fairer reflection of his scholarship and abilities. He also dislikes the term Ayatullah because he believes we should not associate human fallible scholarship with Allah].

All errors in the below are mine, and mine alone.

What is the scope of Shari’a?

Shaykh Hobbollah covers this issue comprehensively in his 820 page book entitled “The comprehensiveness of the Shari’a” (shumul al-shari’a), and in 113 lectures on his website under the title “The comprehensiveness of the Shari’a: the limits and scope of Fiqh”. This topic is pivotal to understanding his approach to deriving Islamic laws.

He recognises that the vast majority of Muslim scholars believe that the Shari’a is comprehensive and that there is no situation without an Islamic rule (i.e. it is obligatory, prohibited, recommended, discouraged or allowed), which can be derived based on the standard sources of evidence or base principles. [I will not cover the nuance here about mintaqat al-firagh, which is the view of scholars like Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr].

In contrast to this vast majority, Shaykh Hobbollah’s conclusion is that the Shari’a is not comprehensive i.e. it does not provide an answer for every question. He does not go so far as to say that the scope of Shari’a is extremely limited or even non-existent, like Soroush, Shabastari, Ali Abd al-Razzaq, Mahdi Bazargan…etc..

Instead, Shaykh Hobbollah’s view is that the Shari’a only covers a specific number of issues, and many of issues that we face, should be resolved not by an Islamic injunction, rather they should be resolved through other mechanisms such as ethics, rationality or values (as long as they do not contravene any established Islamic law). More accurately he believes in the goals of shari’a (maqasid) or what he calls in his book the the rules of the constitution (al-qawaid al-dusturiyya). The difference here, is that the conclusions derived through these other mechanisms are human and fallible, able to be discussed and disagreed with, as they are importantly not part of the Shari’a. They therefore cannot be attributed to the religion or to Allah (swt).

For example, if one were to conclude that the Shari’a does not cover issues such as cloning, then Shaykh Hobbollah’s view is that there is no Islamic ruling on this issue, and that any ruling e.g. by the government or by society, which does not contradict an Islamic ruling or one of the maqasid al-Shari’a (goals of Shari’a), would be appropriate. If a rule was instituted by the government, it would be an Islamic duty to not break the law, but there would be no specifically Islamic rule related to cloning i.e. you could say this rule is not against Islamic law, but you could not say there is an Islamic law on this issue.

There is an important nuance to highlight here. Where there is insufficient evidence to derive an Islamic ruling, traditional scholars would often conclude that the Shari’a states that you are free to act in any way (asalat al-bara`ah). Shaykh Hobbollah would argue that there is no Shari’a ruling instituted by Allah (ja’l) in the first place.

You might think that this means there is no practical difference between these two positions (even if there is a major theoretical difference). In and of itself, this may be true. However, when this position is combined with the other differences of methodology by Shaykh Hobbollah (see below), the practical differences become very apparent.

 

Useful sources:

A short summary of his views on the topic (19 May 2022): http://hobbollah.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/shomoolshariaa.pdf

His written publication on the topic (2018): https://hobbollah.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/ShomolAlshariat.pdf

His bahth kharij lectures on the topic (2017-2019): https://hobbollah.com/mohazerat_category/%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%A9/

Translations of his position can also be seen here:

https://www.iqraonline.net/book-summary-part-1-comprehensiveness-of-the-shariah-discussions-on-extents-of-legal-reference-between-intellect-and-revelation/

https://www.iqraonline.net/book-summary-part-2-comprehensiveness-of-the-shariah/

Length of a fast - my understanding of the view of Shaykh Arif on the key / obvious concerns/questions

An alternative way of looking at the length of the fast has been presented by the renowned UK scholar Shaykh Arif. 

Firstly, it is important to understand that these are reasoned and scholarly discussions that do not deserve derision / mockery but critique / analysis - and that the idea of a shorter fast has been previously promoted by Ayatullahs Makarim and Sayyid Sadiq Shirazi (e.g. see https://www.facebook.com/notes/miqdaad-versi/length-of-fasts-should-there-be-a-maximum/10152811508540981). This idea of a shorter fast has also gained public traction following the very minority ruling of the Sunni scholar Usama Hasan (https://unity1.wordpress.com/2014/06/30/fatwa-on-fasting-in-ramadan-during-the-uk-summer/). 

It is important to start by emphasising that this is a very minority opinion but one that should not be just ignored but deserves analysis. For those who are interested in the topic, please see http://miqdaad.blogspot.co.uk/2015/06/length-of-fast-summary-of-article-about.html which provides a summary of an article Shaykh Arif is planning to publish on the topic.

However, below is a summary of my understanding of the position of Shaykh Arif on the issues that I have heard discussed.

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Why is another ruling required? The mainstream opinion provides many opportunities for not fasting (e.g. illness, if you are on a journey, age, if a woman is on her period) or of breaking one's fast (health, hardship, danger, travelling) - which covers excessively long fasts as well. In addition, people have been doing this for many years. In addition, in Makkah, for many people, shorter fasts in extreme heat is harder – but this has not pushed to change the rule. So why do we need another rule now for here?

A) The traditional ruling does not provide an answer to the idea of fasting for, say, 23 hours - other than to travel, migrate or fast as long as possible (then re-do the fast later). Similarly, there is no answer for 1 or 2 hour fasts. Some sort of limit on each side, seems plausible. And when an entire community is facing a circumstance that makes the purpose of fasting difficult and not easy as outlined in the Qur'an [see below for details] (e.g. people might be fasting 20 hour fasts but are the majority able to fulfill the purpose of fasting when fasting 20 hours?) - then the rule itself has to be re-looked at.

B) Separately, these exceptions only allow an "all or nothing" option i.e. if you cannot fast the entire fast in a complete way, your fast does not count. However, what about someone who is able to do an "almost" fast but is prevented from doing so forever due to an illness - should they not be counted? For example, consider those suffering from some chronic illnesses (e.g. requiring one injection during the day) who based on the traditional ruling, would not be allowed to fast at all for the rest of their lives even if they could "almost" do so. Is this fair? (Note this is different from those who are temporarily ill, who have to pay fidya and do a qada fast as there is no duty on them as outlined in the Qur’an)

So what is the alternative rule suggested?

A) In order to remain true to the purpose of fasting as outlined in the Qur'an, there should be a maximum length of fasting that the community agrees to, which means that the community as a whole is able to easily reach the purpose of fasting. Similarly, there should be a minimum length of fasting. Also see question 8 below for the situation of a fast in extremely hot conditions.

B) For exceptions, a gradation approach for the fast conditions should be taken for those who are not able to perform a full fast for the remainder of their life. For example, consider an individual facing a chronic illness (e.g. diabetes) that requires the individual to do something that would normally break the fast (e.g. an injection) to prevent the person from harm. If a doctor believes that an injection would be sufficient to prevent the harm, then the minimum number of injections the doctor advises would be allowed, and the fast would be valid. However, the advice from the doctor should be sought on a case-by-case basis.

And of course, this is not for the majority of people - only for exceptions. 

And such an approach is not required for those who are explicitly exempted from fasting in the first place e.g. women on their period, those ill on a specific day / temporarily, those on a journey.

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Question 1: The Qur’an says to “complete your fast until layl”. Why does it say this, if it is not meant as a condition of fasting?
[I am ignoring the question of whether layl means sunset or when the redness rises, as that requires a separate discussion]

Firstly, it is important to understand that just because a word is used in the Qur'an, does not mean that its literal meaning is the meaning in every circumstance.

For example, it says in the Qur'an: "As for the thief, both male and female, cut off their hands" (5:38) but this is not an absolute rule - all scholars agree that there are conditions for this to be applicable. Similarly, it is plausible that the "night" when referring to fasting in the Qur'an only has a literal meaning under certain circumstances - but not in the case where the length is excessively long.

In addition, the idea of “day” and “night” when used in the Qur’an may not be meant literally in terms of daylight but perhaps in terms of their function. This can be justified by the verses of the Qur’an that state, for example:

“And we have made the day for livelihood” (78:11) and “It is out of His Mercy that He has put for you night and day, that you may rest therein (i.e. during the night) and that you may seek of His Bounty (i.e. during the day), and in order that you may be grateful.” (28:73)

Therefore, it can be justifiably argued that “night” is not necessarily meaning the physical night - but it could be a "functional" night i.e. when you stop working.

Question 2: Whilst layl in the Qur’an could refer to a functional fast based to the answer to question 1, why not use the physical meaning of layl as that is the apparent (ẓāhir) or most likely meaning?

It is unanimously agreed that:

1.     The purpose of fasting, as mentioned in the Qur’an, is “to attain taqwa (God-consciousness)” (2:183).

2.     The whole of the section in the Qur’an on fasting (2:183-187), seems to be trying to demonstrate that fasting is something that is not meant to be extremely hard:

a.      Pre-Islamic fast: abstain from sexual intercourse even during the night-times and if you fall asleep and miss the night meal, you cannot eat even if you wake up before dawn. Islamic fast: these are all allowed as demonstrated in the verses.

b.     If you are ill or on a journey – then you do not need to fast

c.      And those who are able to fast but with hardship – do not need to fast

d.     “Allah intends for you ease and does not intend for you hardship”

Now consider extremely long fasts, which impact on either (or both) of the above i.e. that do not help you become more God-conscious, and that is not in line with the idea of the fast not meant to be extremely hard. This supports the conclusion that perhaps layl might not mean a literal night and is functional – this will allow fasting to actually be in line with attaining taqwa (and self-development).

Question 3: What should be the length of fasting then? Would not any amount be arbitrary? Would it not be against the idea of a collective fast as a society, if everyone breaks their fast a different time?

In an ideal world, the collective Muslim body in a region should aim to have uniformity and choose a length of fast that is in line with the unanimously agreed principles of being possible to attain taqwa for the community (and more broadly to help develop one’s self), whilst also not being excessively difficult. Whilst there remains an element of arbitrariness about the choice made, that arbitrariness is preferable to the alternative of excessively long fasts.

Some argue that a way to deal with arbitrariness is to choose Makkah (or Karbala) - a place where the Prophet / Imams (AS) used to live (with a fast length of 12 hours, say). Now consider a community that believes 18 hours is the limit of a fast's length - in a nearby town where the fast length is 17 hours and 50 minutes, they would fast the full amount but a town a bit north, they would exceed the 18-hour boundary, and suddenly fast 12 hours. This major discrepancy is not a reasonable outcome.

Question 4: Based on the idea of aiming to attain taqwa, should there also be a fast that has a minimum length?

Extremely short fasts lack any difficulty and any discernible value – therefore, there should be a minimum length of fast as well, aligned with the above principles i.e. based on the agreement of the community.

Question 5: But why did the Prophet or Imams (AS) not make this modification to a functional rather than a physical night?

Whilst the 8^th Imam (AS) is said to have fasted in excess of 17 hours in Tus, the Imams (AS) never experienced excessively long fasts (17 hours would not be considered excessively long) or extremely short fasts. 

In addition, consider the example of the Hajj – where an earlier Imam said that tawaf of the Ka’ba should be between the Rukn and Maqam only (anything else is void) However, a later Imam said that there was no problem when asked by a companion due to the excessive number of pilgrims.

Therefore, given we have textual evidence of the purpose of fasting and more broadly, we understand the function of human existence to be development of the self, we can confidently claim that there is evidence that excessively long fasts does not align with its essence - and it is legitimate for us to make this assertion.

Question 6: Could this principle be extended to those who are unable to fast because of a chronic illness for example.

Yes – consider someone who is suffering from a long-term illness that does not allow them to fast the whole time e.g. needs injections every few hours – but is otherwise willing and capable of fasting. The traditional framework would not allow such individuals to fast at all, preventing them from all the physical, spiritual and cultural value of fasting. However, if they were allowed to eat / drink a small amount, they can still retain the purpose of fasting.

This can be supported by the fact that on one occasion a person came to the sixth Imam al-Sadiq and complained of the excessive thirst his daughter felt during the fast, the Imam allowed her to take sips of water and continue to fast. (I am yet to find the source of this narration)

The obvious question would be – why can this not be the solution to anyone living in a place with an excessively long fast i.e. why should their fast be shortened rather than giving them leeway like the case above. The response is that this is an exceptional rule rather than one for the masses.

Question 7: How is this different to the views of Ayatullah Makarim Shirazi and Sayyid Sadiq Shirazi?

The conclusion of Ayatullah Makarim Shirazi / Sayyid Sadiq Shirazi would mean that if someone lives in an area that has a dawn-sunset length of 17 hours and 50 minutes, they have to fast the entire amount; but if they lived further north and had a dawn-sunset length of 18 hours and 1 minute, they would be fasting a "normal" length of 16 hours - a major discrepancy.

This viewpoint (of Ay. Shirazi) does not allow the ability to fast for those with chronic illness and does not provide a solution for construction workers working in excessive heat, for example.

Question 8: Does this ruling also allow, like Ayatullah Zanjani, for a person who is suffering from extreme heat to sip water, if he cannot bear the heat, rather than not fast? Was this not experienced at the time of the Prophet / Imams – and if so, why is there no evidence that he allowed this?

Yes, the ruling does allow for this - because the core of this ruling is about the purpose of fasting, which is affected by extreme heat as well.  

There has not been the push from the Middle East to re-look at the ruling, which might demonstrate that it is not a serious concern for the vast majority of people in attaining its purpose – other than the exceptional cases of those out in the heat e.g. construction workers. This might be due to the fact that in such countries, there is a different working culture.

And the Prophet / Imams (AS) perhaps did not experience these exceptions. Furthermore, this can be supported by the narration above where a person came to the sixth Imam al-Sadiq and complained of the excessive thirst his daughter felt during the fast, after which the Imam allowed her to take sips of water and continue to fast. (I am yet to find the source of this narration).

Question 9: But is not the consequence of this ruling – that even prayer times might be changed?

There are two main reasons why there is a difference between prayers and fasting that provide greater evidence in the case of fasting:

1.      Quran says specifically about fasting – in the section about fasting – that “Allah intends for you ease and does not intend for you hardship”. This is a specific inclusion in the topic about fasting, which is not the case for fasting

2.      The purpose of fasting is explicitly mentioned in the text as “to attain taqwa” and therefore, it is legitimate to question what happens when the community as a whole determines that the length of the fast prevents the very purpose of the fast.

Not that my view counts for much, but I find the above arguments interesting and specifically, would like to find the narration cited above and understand the traditionalist response to it. On the other hand, I would also like more understanding of the implications of this methodology in other cases – so it is a holistic alternative framework. Finally, I would like to see more on why the limit should be 17 hours rather than 20 hours, say; and a stronger and more nuanced medical consensus to support some of the ideas.