Textual Evidence supporting Freedom when there is doubt (1)

We are currently trying to understand the meaning of the verse is Surah Talaq (65), verse 7:

“Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it.”
(لا يكلف الله نفسا إلا ما آتاها)

This is a tafsir discussion, and we are focussing on the meaning of "what" in this verse. Is it:

Option 1: money/property (due to the context of the verse)
Option 2: any action
Option 3: any duty.

The ramifications of this are very wide ranging, as if it is any duty (as Shaykh Ansari claims), then the principle of baraa`a (as discussed in previous blogs i.e. that you are free to do what you want when you get a rule on which there is doubt) is confirmed.

However, although Shaykh Ansari uses the idea of Itlaq (as explained in the previous blog) to say that as there is no indication that any of these options is true, all must be true. There are some arguments against this idea:

The first argument against this point of view is a grammatical and very technical one, which I advise those not interested to ignore: in summary, the first two options are different to the third option grammatically (the first two are direct objects, whereas the third is an absolute object). Therefore, all three cannot all be used. However, this is seen as a weak point because the word can be considered a direct object here rather than an absolute object. [A possible argument that one could use تكليف or وجوب – but they are synonymous and therefore, still absolute objects]


The next question is whether the many narrations (these will be discussed later), which mentions the obligation of ihtiyat, are considered to be more applicable than this verse of the Qur`an. This is because the verse says that if it is not known what the duty is, then there is no punishment. However, these narrations, say that Allah informs you of the obligation of ihtiyat. Therefore, the verse is not applicable, as the duty is known to be ihtiyat.

This argument is similar to the situation where we have the principle that everything is tahir until you know it is najis. Then if someone comes and tells you that something is najis, does the principle still hold? Obviously not – and that is the argument here. Please ask if this is not clear and I can try and clarify further.


The answer to whether the verse of the Qur`an takes priority can be understood dependent on the meaning of the verse:

1. نفي السببية: “Allah does not punish someone due to the impermissibility of an action, as long as it is not known”. With this meaning, what is mentioned above is correct, and ihtiyat is applicable. This is because the ihtiyat is the known obligation.


2. نفي الموردية: “Allah does not punish someone when considering an impermissible action as long as it is not known but the individual is completely free in the aforementioned action”. In this case, where the verse intends actual freedom for the individual in the action, as long as it is unknown, whereas the narrations intend ihtiyat (precaution). In this case, there is clear contradiction between the two, and therefore the verse takes precedence.


The question though, is which of the two above is correct. Shahid al-Sadr considers the second one to be true because this makes sense in the context of the verse (the correct meaning is clear that Allah does not task an individual in financial matters other than what is possible for the individual to pay).

Therefore, Shahid al-Sadr backs up Shaykh Ansari that Itlaq is applicable. In the next blog, we will try and look at one more argument against Shaykh Ansari's view and how Shahid al-Sadr counters it.

Regardless, it does seem that the topic is getting a bit dry and not as interesting to most readers so following the next blog, I will move onto another potentially more interesting topic - and that is what is the basis for fiqh relying on khabar wahid i.e. traditions that come through one/few strong chains of narrations (but not enough to make you be certain of its authenticity), whilst there is a general view that you should not act based on anything other than certainty!

Textual Evidence supporting Freedom when there is doubt

So far we have discussed what the rational principle should be, if there is a ruling on which you have a genuine doubt i.e. whether it rationally makes sense to:

1. Observe precaution (Syed Sadr's view)
2. Be free to do anything (Ayatullah Khui's view)

This was a purely theoretical exercise, assuming there was no textual evidence pointing to another option....however, in reality there is textual evidence that the proponents of both points of view above, agree on - and that textual evidence points to the fact that you do not need to observe precaution but you are actually free to do anything.

We will first look at the Qur`anic evidence for this, then move onto narrations. This is a very long discussion, but it shows the importance given to this part of usul al-fiqh.


Firstly, the verse is Surah Talaq (65), verse 7:

“Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it.”
(لا يكلف الله نفسا إلا ما آتاها)

This verse is in the context of discussing the issue of a husband’s duty to pay for the wife’s expenses when he divorces her e.g. when she is pregnant, he has to continue paying for her expenses until she gives birth and if she breastfeeds the baby, then the payment should continue until the end of the breastfreeding. The question that is raised, is what is the level of this payment? Does it depend on the wealth of the husband? The point is that the amount depends on what the person is able to pay. The complete verse is as follows:

"Let the affluent man spend out of his affluence, and let he whose provision has been tightened spend out of what Allah has given him. Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it. Allah will bring about ease after hardship." (65:8)

According to Shaykh Ansari’s work – Al-Rasa`il, the word ما in the verse above (translated as “[according to] what”), introduces a relative phrase, and the question we have to answer is the meaning of “what”. There are three possibilities for the meaning of "what":

1. Money/wealth/property i.e. the verse means that Allah does not task any soul with paying money, other than to the extent to which he is able to pay. This understanding of the verse is possible due to the verse’s presence in the context of paying for a wife’s subsistence.

2. Action i.e. Allah does not "task" any soul with an action other than if he/she is able to do that action. This understanding is possible due to the term “task” mentioned in the translation, as that term (task) is only used with actions.

These two explanations of the verse do not result in the implication of the legal baraa`a. However, the third possibility does:

3. Duty i.e. Allah does not task any soul with a duty except when the duty has come to the individual. And it is clear that “coming to the individual” requires knowledge of the duty by the individual. The meaning thus becomes: Allah does not task any individual with a duty except when he has made it known to the individual, and without making it known, there is no duty.

However, the problem occurs: how do we confirm the final possibility when it is possible that one of the first two are correct. Shaykh Ansari uses the principle of Itlaq (i.e. absolute meaning). He says that as there are no indicators that the meaning is specific to one of the first two meanings, it must incorporate all of them.

However, of course there are counter arguments to this point of view, which we can discuss in the next blog!

Side topic - Adam and Hawa

Before continuing my blogs about the principles that underpin what to do when in doubt, I would like to discuss a very clever point and inference made by one of the readers.

The verse in question is 2:35:
"And We said: O Adam! Dwell you and your wife in the garden and eat from it a plenteous (food) wherever you wish and do not approach this tree, for then you will be of the unjust"

There are two options for this verse:

1. It is a clear and unambiguous statement of obligation to Adam and Hawa (this is the apparent meaning of the verse as in general, an order is consdered to be an obligation, unless there is something that implies otherwise)

2. It is doubtful as to what is meant i.e. if it is obligation or recommendation.

The reader of the blog said that if we consider Shahid al-Sadr's view (given no textual evidence from Allah, the correct rational option MUST be to consider Allah's obedience and observe precaution rather than be free to do anything), how can Adam and Hawa ever have eaten from the forbidden tree? Even in option 2, the correct course of action MUST be to practice precaution.


The answer to this point is based on a theological position held by the Shi'a, which considers Prophet Adam to be infallible. His action therefore cannot be (a priori) considered a sin. What must the reason be?

In essence, the argument against the reader's suggestion, is based on the fact that our conception of obedience to our Creator is predicated on our presence in THIS world. Our judgement and rational mind have come to the conclusion that Allah has the right to be obeyed...etc., following our experience and understanding in this frame of existence. In the heavens, how can we be sure that the same conclusions exist?

1. How can we know that pre-this world, evil was known to exist as a counterpoint to good i.e. could Adam have KNOWN that Satan was saying something actually wrong (Haram) rather than just not good, as he had never experienced evil?

2. How do we know that in that world, orders from Allah, can/should be considered as orders that MUST be obeyed, rather than just advice, that can be overlooked?

Therefore, the argument is clear - that in that world, we cannot impose our understanding of right and wrong in the same way, and our pre-conceived notions of rationality may not be applicable in a different situation. Doing something when not knowing of its reality, may not therefore, be considered a sin in the way we understand it, in this life...


In the end, Prophet Adam's infallibility is a question of theology rather than one of practicality!

Principles that underpin what to do when in doubt (4)

We have so far discussed 3 reasons why Ayatullah Khui's preference for the idea that it is "ugly" for Allah to punish someone when the ruling is doubtful (in the absence of any Quranic/hadith proof). In each of the three arguments, Shahid al-Sadr counters with his view that it is not ugly because of the right that Allah has to be obeyed. The final argument is proposed by Shaykh al-Isfahani. He splits duties into two types:

4a Those that are the foundation of other duties ( إنشائي)
4b Those that are themselves duties, which are the reason for your actions (حقيقي)

He discusses further by saying that it is these secondary duties (4b) that are the subject of the discussion. Simliar to how these duties are constrained to only those who are able to do it (i.e. it is agreed that those who are incapable are not expected to complete duties such as 4b), they are also constrained only to those who know about it, not those who are ignorant about it (i.e. knowledge of the duty is like capability of doing the action - both are prerequisites of 4b).

[This discussion is a bit complex – and is about the split into the world of theoretical wish of Allah, and the actual manifestation of that wish; Isfahani wants to consider that only those duties that are in the world of the manifestation of the wish of Allah, are considered – if you would like a longer discussion about this, please comment/discuss with me personally – it is a long discussion].

Shahid al-Sadr discusses this by again getting very technical! In summary, his view is that there are two ways of understanding 4b, one of which is correctly only relevant to the person who knows the ruling, and the other one is relevant to everyone. And with regards to the first way of understanding 4b i.e. that which is only relevant to the person who knows the ruling, it is not clear from Shaykh Isfahani, whether the person must only know that the duty is correct, or whether he might be able to know that the duty is POTENTIALLY correct. And thus Shaykh Isfahani misses the issue.



Overall, Sayyid al-Sadr says that the main arguments for the principle that it is “ugly” for Allah to punish someone for a duty that is doubtful, are not correct, and the theoretical course of action (assuming no verse to the contrary – even though there is!), is that you should use precaution when there is a doubt about your duty because Allah deserves to be obeyed, and even thinking there might be a duty, results in a punishment if not obeyed.

The reason he gives (other than the counter-arguments above), is that Allah continuously endows us with bounties and uncountable goodness, and similar to how the rational mind understands the obligation to thank him for this (without the need for any proof), this also means that it is obligatory to obey him in things you are not sure. This can be understood in another way – everything on the earth is His, as He is the Creator of everything, therefore any behaviour is using His hands and mouth…etc., and therefore you should not do something UNTIL you are sure that it is okay. (This last point is a footnote by Shaykh Ayrawani).

In summary, there are two opinions:

1. The principle that it is ugly for Allah to punish someone without making it clear to them what the correct action is; this results in you being free to do anything when you have a doubt about a duty (براءة = baraa`a)

2. The principle that Allah deserves obedience in everything, including duties on which there is a doubt; this results in you being forced to be careful (احتياط = ihtiyaat)

However, regardless of these arguments put forward by Shahid al-Sadr, the reality is that this is all predicated on the absence of any rule by Allah. When we go into the Qur`an, the actual position of Shahid al-Sadr is that براءة (baraa`a) is what is implied. In the next blog, we will briefly look at the Quranic proofs but it seems that people are not that interested in this topic, so we will move back to istidlal in a few blogs!

Principles that underpin what to do when in doubt (3)

As discussed in the previous blog, we are going to look at the main arguments for the theory that it is “ugly” for Allah to punish someone for a duty that he is unaware of. Each of these arguments is countered by Shahid al-Sadr and although there are 4 arguments, and we will focus on the first three in this blog:

1. What makes you do an action (محرّك = muharrik)? It is not the reality (الواقع = al-waqi’), but it is what you know (معلوم = ma’lum) e.g. if you know that there is a lion roaming on the street, what do you do? You base your actions on your knowledge, not on the reality (which may be that there is no lion on the street). It is clear that punishment when you do not even have knowledge (the cause of your action (muharrik)), is “ugly”.

Shahid al-Sadr replies to this and says that the محرّك (muharrik) is not based on what you know. Rather, it is actually based on your intention to obey Allah. e.g. it is not your knowledge of the fact prayers are wajib that makes you pray, but the intention that you must obey Allah in all situations that makes you pray.

This hits the core of the issue: what is the range of the right of obedience of Allah (حق الطاعة). Does the scope of obedience of Allah include issues that are doubtful?


2. What is customary amongst rational people (عرف العقلاء) – e.g. if you have a slave who does not know that he has to do something, it is known amongst the rational people, that you clearly cannot punish them.

Another example given by al-Mirza, is that if a stranger enters a new country and in some of its streets, it is not allowed to enter, does it make sense that he is punished?

Shahid al-Sadr responds by saying that this might be true for a slave and slave owner, but this is different for Allah. He says that it is dangerous to make such an analogy without having a cause for the analogy. He goes further and explains:

- it is possible that this obedience was put there because the other person put it there e.g. the people of a village might elect a leader, or because Allah put it there e.g. the father compared to his children

- alternatively the obedience could be there because that is where it must be e.g. the obedience to Allah from all mankind, which is there not because of mankind but instead because of the position of Allah as the Creator…etc.

Therefore, the examples put forward by al-Mirza are applicable to the first type but not the second.


3. Shaykh al-Isfahani says that rationality’s scope is split into two:
a. Practical: something to do with actions e.g. the law that truth is good to do; lying is bad to do; it is good to keep someone’s trust; it is not good to be unfaithful

b. Theoretical: the impossibility of two contradictory things both being true; the possibility of two different things both being true

There are very many theoretical rules whereas according to Shaykh al-Isfahani, the practical laws are split into implications of these two: “justice is good” and “injustice (ظلم) is bad”.

Shaykh Isfahani uses this and identifies “ugliness” as only one thing – “injustice (ظلم)”. So the question then becomes: when does going against the duties of Allah become injustice towards Him? Is it just things that are known duties that are considered to be injustice, or things that are possible to be duties? He says that it is clear that if the duty is not known (only possible), then going against it, is not something that is excessive or against Allah to the extent that it is injustice towards him, so there cannot be any punishment against such a person.

Sayyid al-Sadr replies to this and firstly asks what is meant by “injustice is bad”. The implication first is that Allah has the right to obedience (otherwise how could injustice towards him potentially be an injustice?). Therefore, prior to considering whether “injustice is bad”, we have to consider Allah’s right to obedience on us and whether it is applicable on issues where there is doubt. Shahid al-Sadr is basically pointing out that it is not a strong argument to base the principle, on “injustice is bad”, when the principle itself is an assumption of “injustice is bad”.

In the next blog, we will look at the final argument, and Shahid al-Sadr's response.