Najasah of the Kafir (1)

The next topic I would like to turn to is the Najasah of the Kafir. This blog is an introduction to the topic. It is a contentious issue now because of the sheer implications of the ruling and the fact that recently, some scholars have come out with different rulings.

1. In summary, the Shi’i point of view had, until a few decades ago, been that all polytheists (including Ahl al-Kitab [i.e. Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians]) were physically Najis i.e. their touch (with the presence of moisture) would require washing before praying.
2. This changed a few decades ago, with the general Shi’i position now considering people of the Book to not be physically Najis.
3. Now Syed Fadlallah (1) believes that even polytheists are not physically Najis (although it is Ihtiyaat al-Mustahab to consider them Najis), and Ayatullah Saanei (2) also considers everyone tahir (pure) other than those who are stubbornly religiously against Islam (which does not even include those who are fighting against Muslims for political reasons).

Therefore, due to the fact that in spite of little changing in the context or the source texts, the ruling has changed so dramatically, and the implicit implications that non-Muslims are somehow less “clean” in a physical sense, I believe this is an interesting topic to open up.

As with the previous topic, I would like to present Ayatullah Khui’s views (3), and discuss how I have been told Ayatullah Fadlallah’s derivation differs.

Anyway, back to Ayatullah Khui’s book and his discussion. He brings narrations from all sides of the argument but to start, Ayatullah Khui believes there is no doubt at all in the “Najasah” of the “Mushrikun” and it is, in his view, one of the necessities amongst the Shia. He had not encountered any opinion against this from any Shii scholars (even though most Sunnis believe in their Taharah (4), with few exceptions (5)). This consensus is based on the verse of the Qur`an:

يَٰٓأَيُّهَا ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوٓا۟ إِنَّمَا ٱلْمُشْرِكُونَ نَجَسٌۭ فَلَا يَقْرَبُوا۟ ٱلْمَسْجِدَ ٱلْحَرَامَ بَعْدَ عَامِهِمْ هَٰذَا

“O you who believe! the “Mushrikun” are nothing but unclean, so they shall not approach the Sacred Mosque after this year…” (6)


However, as I explained earlier, Ayatullah Fadlallah believes in the Taharah of even the Mushrikun. How is this possible? The reasoning provided to me by Shaykh Abu Mahdi, and the reasoning that I have heard whilst in Syria, was that “Najis” does not necessarily have to be a physical uncleanliness – it could be a spiritual uncleanliness. We will come to narrations which discuss this in a later blog.

Due to the fact that Ayatullah Khui does not consider the Mushrikun to have any chance of being tahir, we will look at his exceptions to this.

There are, therefore, three types of Kafir:

1. Those who believe in more than one God i.e. polytheists (mushriks) – which he considers to be najis due to consensus (based on the verse of the Qur`an) – as explained above

2. Those Kafirs who were/are stubbornly against Imam Ali (AS) e.g. the Nasib is worse than the Mushrik (based on the narration of Ibn Abu Ya’fur: “God May he be Exalted did not create anything more Najis than the dog, and the Nasib is more Najis to us as the Ahl al-Bayt than it (dog)” (7), and therefore, the Najasah will apply to him as well. (8)

This type of argument is a type of analogy based on reason, that is often used in Shi’i reasoning, and is subsumed under the category of ‘Aql.

3. Those non-Muslims who believe in one God i.e. ahl al-Kitab

In this final category, there has been disagreement amongst the scholars from the past until the present, and the future blogs will look at this in further detail.


1. Volume 1 of Fiqh al-Shari’a, page 36, point 77: 11
2. http://saanei.org/?view=03,00,00,00,0#03,05,13,4,0
3. Pages 37-52 of Volume 3 of his major Fiqh work Sharh al-‘Urwat al-Wuthqa
4. Tafsir al-Kabir 24:16, Mughanni Chapter 1, Page 49
5. Example: Fakhr in his Tafsir, Chapter 16, Page 24
6. Surah Tawba: 28
7. Wasa`il al-Shi’a 1:220, Chapters on mixed water: 11:5
8. I made a mistake in the post previously before editing it - please note the change.

Women as mujtahids? (2)

In the previous blog, we discussed the fact that the main narration used has a good chain of narration. We now have to move onto the actual content of the narration. Does it really imply that women cannot be mujtahids?

A reminder of the narration:

Abu ‘Abd Allah Ja’far ibn Muhammad al-Sadiq (A.S.) said: “Be careful that some of you do not bring others to trial in front of the people of injustice; instead, go to the man* among you who knows…”
Wasa-`il al-Shi’a 27:13/Chapters of the pages on Judges, Chapter 1, Page 5.

(* = rajul [Arabic])

Now it seems clear that some may infer from this that women should not be heeded and listened to as a judge. And it is known that the role of giving religious rulings (being a mujtahid) is at least at the same level as being a judge. Therefore, if being a man is a requirement of being a judge, then it is clearly a requirement of being a mujtahid.

This can be responded to in the following ways according to Ayatullah Khui:

Firstly, the word “rajul” (translated as man) was in contrast to the people of injustice, who the sixth Imam (AS) was preventing turning to, when you want a fair hearing. It is more common (in those days at least!) to refer to a man and we are not used to the judging of women at all. Therefore, the usage of “man” is not saying that being a judge is constrained to men, and therefore, there is no evidence from this narration that being a man is relevant in being a judge, forget about in being a mujtahid.

And furthermore, there is no evidence that there is any relationship between being a judge and being a mujtahid. It is interesting that THIS narration is the main narration mentioned by Ayatullah Khui on this topic. There is another narration mentioned in the discussion, but it is not worth mentioning as it does not really prove the point that women cannot be mujtahids, and only a couple of paragraphs are mentioned about it.


In spite of the lack of narrations, Ayatullah Khui then goes on to use his prerogative as a highly qualified scholar, to explain his viewpoint based on his understanding of Islam as a whole. As a respected mujtahid, he has researched Islamic thought, narrations…etc., and he thus proposes that women should not be mujtahids for another reason.

Independent of narratory evidence, he has inferred from the “taste” of the shari’a, that the duty loved (by Allah) for women is being covered (/away from others), and taking care of household affairs, rather than entering what prevents those duties. And it is clear that being a mujtahad puts you in the position as the person to turn to and question, as this is the necessary consequence of being at the head of Muslims. It does not please Allah that a woman is on show like this in any situation, and He would not like her leading men in congregational prayers so how would He consider their position as the head of the affairs of the society?


This is a very interesting argument proposed by Ayatullah Khui for the following reasons:
1. It suggests that there is no textual evidence that directly excludes women from being Mujtahids
2. It shows that Ayatullah Khui's reasoning is based solely on his understanding of women from his position as a respected scholar. Other respected scholars may reach another judgement, and this would change the ruling. This seems to be what the other Mujtahids in my previous post have done.
3. It does not seem to be of considerable importance, with only a few pages devoted to this topic.

In the next few posts, I am going to focus on another topic of interest - why Ayatullah Khui (in contrast to previous scholars) believes that Ahl alKitab (people of the book - considered to be Christians, Jews and Zorastrians) are tahir, and that Mushrikun (polytheists) are najis). This discussion goes over 50 pages and understanding his arguments, will give real insight into how ijtihad by scholars occurs.

Women as mujtahids? (1)

Apologies again for the long time since the last post – my excuse is inlaws and a trip abroad! Anyway, it seems that in general, people are less interested in the usul itself, only in its usage in determining rulings. With this in mind, I will return to fiqh istidlali (derivation of rulings) as I started, and where the most enthusiasm was. In previous blogs, I concentrated on Ayatullah Saanei’s works, due to their focus on contemporary issues. However, I think that it is important also to look at the great Ayatullah Khui, especially when discussing the derivation of fiqh rulings. His work is the culmination of years of research and one of a few of its kind, with over 40 volumes explaining his rulings. It is now so renowned that other scholars use it in their discussions. Syed Fadlallah, for example, uses it in his bahth kharij lessons, which I had the opportunity to attend. He reads parts of Syed Khui’s rulings, and then puts forward his point of view.

Regardless, I have decided to continue on my theme of contemporary issues and am going to look at a part of his work on Taqlid. Just a quick aside: the volume on taqlid is 370 pages long (that is the length of the commentary and reasoning of only a couple of pages worth of rulings!). On page 186, he discusses one of the conditions for becoming a mujtahid: being a man.

His derivation of this condition begins with reference to a narration by Abu Khadija Salim ibn Mukarrim al-Jamaal who said:

Abu ‘Abd Allah Ja’far ibn Muhammad al-Sadiq (A.S.) said: “Be careful that some of you do not bring others to trial in front of the people of injustice; instead, head the man* among you who knows…”
Wasa-`il al-Shi’a 27:13/Chapters of the pages on Judges, Chapter 1, Page 5.

(* = rajul [Arabic])

He discusses the chain of narration by starting with the final member of the chain Abu Khadija Salim ibn Mukarrim al-Jamaal. When discussing chains of narration, the first port of call is always the scholars of rijal in the past: in particular, Najashi and Shaykh Tusi.

In Najashi’s rijal book (188/501), he considers Abu Khadija to be trustworthy. Shaykh Tusi in his Fahrast (his rijal book 79/327), considers him to be a weak narrator of hadith but according to Allama, he considers him trustworthy in another place. In addition, Abu Khadija is in one of the narrators of Ibn Qawlawayh’s Kamil al-Ziyarat, which is considered as a sufficient condition to be trustworthy (I can go into further detail as to why most Shi’i scholars consider this to be the case if anyone is interested). Now, when faced with potentially contradicting opinions on Abu Khadija, Ayatullah Khui considers the following options as to the timing of the two opinions of Shaykh Tusi:

Either the time of Shaykh Tusi’s consideration of Abu Khadija as weak and trustworthy was at the same time. In such a case, we could not consider either to be an authority, and we would be left with Najashi’s opinion of Abu Khadija being trustworthy.

Alternatively, if the consideration of Abu Khadija as trustworthy came after Shaykh Tusi’s previous opinion of him being weak, then his final opinion of trusworthiness is later is a relinquishing of his previous opinion.

Finally, if Shaykh Tusi’s opinion of Abu Khadija as weak came after his view of Abu Khadija as trustworthy, then it is again a relinquishment of his previous view, and against the view of Najashi.

As you cannot tell the order, there are doubts about his opinion of weakness, as you cannot be sure of the final position (the only one where Shaykh Tusi’s final view matters and is of weakness). Therefore, you cannot rely on the two opinions of Shaykh Tusi and you return to the opinion of trustworthiness of Najashi and others.

He does not consider there to be any issue with the rest of the chain of narration.

In the next blog, I will focus on the remainder of his derivation.

Authority of Narrations (3)

The second verse that is used to validate the usage of this kind of narration, is that in Surah Tawbah, verse 112:

"And it does not beseem the believers that they should go forth all together; why should not then a company from every party from among them go forth that they may apply themselves to obtain understanding in religion, and that they may warn their people when they come back to them that they may be cautious?" (Shakir)

Scholars using this verse believe it implies that the people (who the experts of religion return to) must heed the warnings of these experts of religion and this “heeding” is absolute i.e. not dependent on the people reaching certainty about these experts, and thus punishable if not followed.

There is a long discussion but the most potent argument against this line of reasoning is that this may give credence to the idea that an expert should be listened to, but is irrelevant to the discussion we are having about relying on a trustworthy person transmitting a narration.

This verse is thus not seen in the same light as that in Surah Naba, and is not considered to be useful in this discussion.

We have now discussed the main verses from the Qur`an that are used, and we will now move onto narrations. It is important to note, that it is clearly not possible to use narrations that are of this category i.e.khabar wahid to determine the authority of these narrations, otherwise it would be a circular argument.

We thus have to consider only narrations that must be correct because they have been narrated by many independent people at each generation since the time of the Prophet (SAW) i.e. tawatur. This is authoritative because of the extreme unlikelihood of every one of the narrators (who are examined to be trustworthy) to have lied independently and reached the same conclusion (Shahid al-Sadr uses a rational calculation of probabilities argument to discuss the implausibility of this being wrong). This will be the focus of the next blog!

Authority of Narrations (2)

Apologies for the delay since the last post - I don't have internet at my new place! Anyway, we have so far discussed in brief, the largest and most important basis for relying on khabar wahid narrations (the verse of Naba in Surah Hujurat). It is very much based on using the maf-hum. However, there are two main reasons to object to interpreting this verse in that way:

1. This is a linguistic discussion, which considers the verse to be similar to the phrase: “if you have a boy as a child, then circumcise him”, which does not have a mafhum because you cannot infer from this phrase that if you don’t have a boy, then you don’t circumcise him, as the circumcision is reliant on the condition being fulfilled i.e. from the verse, we cannot make the inference above. The best way to understand this further is to consider the various possible meanings of the verse:
a. A report – if a fasiq comes with it – you have to look into it
b. The report of a fasiq – if a fasiq comes with it – you have to look into it
c. The person who comes with a report/narration – if he (or she) is a fasiq – you have to look into it

The objection (likening the verse to the circumcision phrase) makes sense if we consider the second meaning of the verse, but this seems least likely, as the verse does not really imply that the report has to be the report of a fasiq. Therefore, this objection is not a valid objection.


2. At the end of the verse, the reason (ta’lil – تعليل) is provided for the ruling i.e. “lest you harm a people, whilst in ignorance”. Therefore, every narration that does not result in certain knowledge, requires clarification and research. This includes narrations coming from just individuals.

This can be explained by considering the phrase: “don’t eat this pomegranate because it is sour”. This order not to eat the pomegranate is qualified by it being sour, and it can be inferred from this that you should not eat all sour things, even if it is not a pomegranate. Similarly, from the verse, you can infer that anything that might harm others because you are not resulting in certain knowledge, is not authoritative, and requires clarification/investigation.

There are two main answers to this point that the reason for the verse (ta’lil) seems to contradict what is understood above (mafhum):

A. This assumes that the ta’lil (reason of the verse) should be understood over the mafhum (the implication of the verse). However, it could be argued that the mafhum is a special case of the general ta’lil. The response would be that there is no mafhum at all because of the ta’lil. And therefore, this answer is not correct.

B. The ta’lil (reason of the verse) does not actually contradict the mafhum because of the meaning of جهالة. Above, it has been translated as ignorance, meaning the lack of knowledge but this is the meaning of جهل, and جهالة actually has the meaning of doing something silly. Therefore, although taking a narration from a just person may be something that is without complete knowledge, it is not something silly, and the argument does not apply!

Therefore, Shahid al-Sadr considers this verse to be a complete and valid basis for using narrations transmitted by a trustworthy person even if it does not make you completely confident in it being correct.

In the next blog, we will look at other pieces of evidence (one other verse of the Qur`an, and then perhaps some narrations/other disucssions).

Authority of Narrations (1)

This is a bit less technical - and hopefully more interesting - discussing a major part of our law. Most of our law is based on narrations that are narrated by only a few individuals, and should we rely on such narrations?

Ideally we would only rely on narrations that we can have complete confidence in e.g. those that are reported by many to many (tawatur - تواتر). However, the vast majority of narrations do not reach that level and are potentially misleadingly called “single narrations” (khabar wahid – خبر واحد) – note that a narration narrated by several people is still called khabar wahid.

The validity of using these narrations, which do not reach certainty (and are thus called dhunun – ظنون), is a vital pillar of the most legal laws. In the next few blogs, I will briefly discuss how Shahid al-Sadr comes to the conclusion that it is valid to use these narrations as the basis of law. There are, however, some famous scholars of the past, who do not believe in their validity such as Sayyid al-Murtada.

The discussion will be in two parts:
1. Whether we can use khabar wahid at all
2. It we can use these narrations, what are the limitations of them e.g. only by trustworthy people?

The first part is a major discussion, and as I have noticed that technical topics have not been as well received, I will stay at a higher level, which will hopefully retain your interest!

There are several bases for relying on khabar wahid narrations:
1. Qur`an
2. Narrations
3. Rationality


The biggest and most important basis for relying on khabar wahid narrations is the verse of Naba in Surah Hujurat:

“O you who believe, if a fasiq (evil-doer) comes to you with a report, look carefully into it, lest you harm a people, whilst in ignorance, then be sorry for what you have done.”

This verse clearly shows the obligation in clarifying what the person says when they come on the condition that the person is fasiq. Now what is understood (mafhum - مفهوم) by this, is that there is no obligation of clarifying when the person who comes is not a fasiq. There are some more technical discussions (which I will not go into unless someone is interested) to conclude from this, that the narration of a just person is authoritative.


In the next blog, we will look at the objections to this line of argument and then move onto the other verse used....etc.

Textual Evidence supporting Freedom when there is doubt (3)

We are currently trying to understand the meaning of the verse is Surah Talaq (65), verse 7:

“Allah does not task any soul except [according to] what He has given it.”
(لا يكلف الله نفسا إلا ما آتاها)

This is a tafsir discussion, and we are focussing on the meaning of "what" in this verse. Is it:

Option 1: money/property (due to the context of the verse)
Option 2: any action
Option 3: any duty.

Shaykh Ansari believes that Itlaq implies that all four of the above must be true and following a discussion, Shahid al-Sadr agrees.


We then have to further our understanding of the scope of this verse:

1. Is this verse specific to doubts about whether something is haram or not (e.g. smoking), or if it is generalized to actions that might be wajib e.g. recitation of supplications when seeing the new moon. The answer is that although some verses are specific to doubts about the impermissibility of actions, this verse does not specify either haram/wujub so it clearly encompasses both.

2. Is the verse specific to doubts about the legality about a ruling, or about the applicability of a ruling. There are two possibilities of what the verse might mean in this regard:

A. إيتاء تشريعي: The verse means Allah giving only in terms of laws (as Allah is the Creator of the Law) and His duty is to with regards to making clear the law, not the details about its applicability

B. إيتاء تكويني: The verse means that Allah has created everything, and therefore, His duty is to make everything clear.

Using the same argument as in the previous blog (absolute = Itlaq), it encompasses both meanings, and thus includes doubts in the applicability of a ruling as well.


3. The final question that occurs in one’s mind when considering this verse is whether baraa`a is applicable when you have a doubt only after trying to investigate, or before any investigation. One might think that using the same arguments above (itlaq = absolute), the verse should apply to both before and after investigation. However, in the case where the law is available in the books of narrations for example, such that if the individual searched, he would find out that Allah had given a ruling. The verse is not talking about baraa`ah for laws reaching the individual, but about Allah giving a law.


Therefore, we can be content that this verse is sufficient to show that when there is a ruling on whcih there is doubt, you are free to do what you want, and this textual evidence supercedes the previous blogs' discussions on ihtiyat, which would only be applicable IF there was no textual evidence.